The threat of terror, which flares in Africa and Indonesia, has given the problem of failed states an unprecedented immediacy and importance. In the past, failure had a primarily humanitarian dimension, with fewer implications for peace and security. Now nation-states that fail, or may do so, pose dangers to themselves, to their neighbors, and to people around the globe: preventing their failure, and reviving those that do fail, has become a strategic as well as a moral imperative. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror develops an innovative theory of state failure that classifies and categorizes states along a continuum from weak to failed to collapsed. By understanding the mechanisms and identifying the tell-tale indicators of state failure, it is possible to develop strategies to arrest the fatal slide from weakness to collapse. This state failure paradigm is illustrated through detailed case studies of states that have failed and collapsed (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Somalia), states that are dangerously weak (Colombia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan), and states that are weak but safe (Fiji, Haiti, Lebanon).

Since September 11, the threat of terror gives the failed state problem an immediacy and an importance that transcends its previous humanitarian dimension. In the past, failure had fewer implications for peace and security. Now failed states pose dangers to themselves, theirneighbors, and to people around the globe. Preventing nation states from failing, and reviving those that do fail, has become a strategic, as well as moral, imperative.The introduction to this innovative book develops a theory of state failure and suggests how it may guarded against. The subsequent chapters illustrate the state failure paradigm by examining cases of state collapse (Somalia), state failure (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan), and states at risk for failure (Colombia, Fiji, Haiti, Indonesia, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan). The last chapters ask when and how weak states succumb to failure, and how that fatal slide can be arrested.Contributors (all of whom have participated in a large Harvard University project on state failure): Oren Barak, Walter Clarke, Nasrin Dadmehr, Marlye Gelin-Adams, Rachel Gisselquist, Robert Gosende, Erin Jennie, Harvey Kline, Stephanie Lawson, Rene Lemarchand, Michael Malley, David Malone, Gerard Prunier, Will Reno, and Robert I. Rotberg.

Since September 11, the threat of terror gives the failed state problem an immediacy and an importance that transcends its previous humanitarian dimension. In the past, failure had fewer implications for peace and security. Now failed states pose dangers to themselves, theirneighbors, and to people around the globe. Preventing nation states from failing, and reviving those that do fail, has become a strategic, as well as moral, imperative.The introduction to this innovative book develops a theory of state failure and suggests how it may guarded against. The subsequent chapters illustrate the state failure paradigm by examining cases of state collapse (Somalia), state failure (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan), and states at risk for failure (Colombia, Fiji, Haiti, Indonesia, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan). The last chapters ask when and how weak states succumb to failure, and how that fatal slide can be arrested.Contributors (all of whom have participated in a large Harvard University project on state failure): Oren Barak, Walter Clarke, Nasrin Dadmehr, Marlye Gelin-Adams, Rachel Gisselquist, Robert Gosende, Erin Jennie, Harvey Kline, Stephanie Lawson, Rene Lemarchand, Michael Malley, David Malone, Gerard Prunier, Will Reno, and Robert I. Rotberg.

Since 1990, more than 10 million people have been killed in the civil wars of failed states, and hundreds of millions more have been deprived of fundamental rights. The threat of terrorism has only heightened the problem posed by failed states. When States Fail is the first book to examine how and why states decay and what, if anything, can be done to prevent them from collapsing. It defines and categorizes strong, weak, failing, and collapsed nation-states according to political, social, and economic criteria. And it offers a comprehensive recipe for their reconstruction. The book comprises fourteen essays by leading scholars and practitioners who help structure this disparate field of research, provide useful empirical descriptions, and offer policy recommendations. Robert Rotberg's substantial opening chapter sets out a theory and taxonomy of state failure. It is followed by two sets of chapters, the first on the nature and correlates of failure, the second on methods of preventing state failure and reconstructing those states that do fail. Economic jump-starting, legal refurbishing, elections, the demobilizing of ex-combatants, and civil society are among the many topics discussed. All of the essays are previously unpublished. In addition to Rotberg, the contributors include David Carment, Christopher Clapham, Nat J. Colletta, Jeffrey Herbst, Nelson Kasfir, Michael T. Klare, Markus Kostner, Terrence Lyons, Jens Meierhenrich, Daniel N. Posner, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Donald R. Snodgrass, Nicolas van de Walle, Jennifer A. Widner, and Ingo Wiederhofer.

This paper presents the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, which ranks all 141 developing countries according to their relative performance in four critical spheres: economic, political, security, and social welfare.

Policymakers worry that "ungoverned spaces" pose dangers to security and development. Why do such spaces exist beyond the authority of the state? Earlier scholarship—which addressed this question with a list of domestic failures—overlooked the crucial role that international politics play. In this shrewd book, Melissa M. Lee argues that foreign subversion undermines state authority and promotes ungoverned space. Enemy governments empower insurgents to destabilize the state and create ungoverned territory. This kind of foreign subversion is a powerful instrument of modern statecraft. But though subversion is less visible and less costly than conventional force, it has insidious effects on governance in the target state. To demonstrate the harmful consequences of foreign subversion for state authority, Crippling Leviathan marshals a wealth of evidence and presents in-depth studies of Russia's relations with the post-Soviet states, Malaysian subversion of the Philippines in the 1970s, and Thai subversion of Vietnamese-occupied Cambodia in the 1980s. The evidence presented by Lee is persuasive: foreign subversion weakens the state. She challenges the conventional wisdom on statebuilding, which has long held that conflict promotes the development of strong, territorially consolidated states. Lee argues instead that conflictual international politics prevents state development and degrades state authority. In addition, Crippling Leviathan illuminates the use of subversion as an underappreciated and important feature of modern statecraft. Rather than resort to war, states resort to subversion. Policymakers interested in ameliorating the consequences of ungoverned space must recognize the international roots that sustain weak statehood.

The point of departure for this collection of articles is the idea that there is a link between international peace and strong states respectful of human rights and robust civil societies. Presented by Chesterman (New York U. School of Law, US), Ignatieff (Harvard U.'s John F. Kennedy School of Government, US), and Thakur (United Nations Universi

1998: A REPLAY OF 1996?

This book explores the phenomenon of de facto states in Eurasia: states such as Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. It examines how they are formed, what sustains them, and how their differing development trajectories have unfolded. It argues that most of these de facto states have been formed with either direct or indirect support from Russia, but they all have their own internal logic and are not simply puppets in the hands of a powerful patron. The book provides detailed case studies and draws out general patterns, and compares present-day de facto states with de facto states which existed in the past.

Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 2,3, University of Potsdam (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät ), course: State Failure, Crisis, and Conflict Management, language: English, abstract: Nation-states are more numerous than they were half a century ago. In 1919 there were fifty-nine nation-states. In 1950 that number climbed up to sixty-nine. A decade later, after much of Africa gained independence, the number of nation-states reached ninety. The constant increase of independences in Africa, Asia and the Oceanic territories in addition to the implosion of the Soviet Union, have brought the total number of nation states in 2002 up to 192. Given these explosive numbers, the indigenous fragility of many of the new states and the inherent navigational dangers of the post Cold War economic and political surroundings, the possibility of failure among some of these new nation-states remains ever present.1Because they can no longer provide positive political goods to their citizens, nationstates fail. The government respectively the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate. At the moment only a few of the worlds nationstates are categorized as failed or collapsed. In spite of that, several dozen are weak and walking at the edge of failure. The aftermath of 9/11 led to the assumption that failed states harbour nonstate actors like warlords and terrorists which makes it necessary to understand the drivers and dynamics of nation state failure for the war on terrorism. This paper is an attempt to analyze which factors have led to the crisis of state collapse in Somalia and why does state collapse continue to be the order of the day? The first part of the paper is supposed to give an overview of Rotberg’s classification of state failure and state collapse. It will provide some general definitions and presents the indicators of the above mentioned terms The second part examines the Somali situation of collapsed state mostly in a chronological order. In a conclusion at the end, the question of prolonged state collapse in Somalia will be summarized.