Stalin's purge of army officers in the late 1930s and disputes about tank tactics meant that Soviet armoured forces were in disarray when Hitler invaded in 1941. As a result, during Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht's 3,200 panzers ran circles round the Red Army's tank force of almost 20,000 - thousands of Soviet tanks were disabled or destroyed.Yet within two years of this disaster the Red Army's tank arm had regained its confidence and numbers and was in a position to help turn the tide and liberate the Soviet Union. This is the remarkable story Anthony Tucker-Jones relates in this concise, highly illustrated history of the part played by Soviet armour in the war on the Eastern Front.Chapters cover each phase of the conflict, from Barbarossa, through the battles at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk to the massive, tank-led offensives that drove the Wehrmacht back to Berlin. Technical and design developments are covered, but so are changes in tactics and the role of the tanks in the integrated all-arms force that crushed German opposition.

With over 60 photos, this look at the role of Red Army tanks in Hitler’s defeat “will be of interest to modelers and military historians alike” (AMPS Indianapolis). Stalin’s purge of army officers in the late 1930s and disputes about tank tactics meant that Soviet armored forces were in disarray when Hitler invaded in 1941. As a result, during Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht’s 3,200 panzers ran circles round the Red Army’s tank force of almost 20,000—and thousands of Soviet tanks were disabled or destroyed. Yet within two years of this disaster the Red Army’s tank arm had regained its confidence and numbers and was in a position to help turn the tide and liberate the Soviet Union. This is the remarkable story Anthony Tucker-Jones relates in this concise, highly illustrated history of the part played by Soviet armor in the war on the Eastern Front. Chapters cover each phase of the conflict, from Barbarossa, through the battles at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk to the massive, tank-led offensives that drove the Wehrmacht back to Berlin. Technical and design developments are covered, but so are changes in tactics and the role of the tanks in the integrated all-arms force that crushed German opposition.

The first in-depth account of one of the great tank battles of WWII, when more than 2000 German and Soviet tanks met in northwestern Ukraine in 1941.

In the summer of 1941, a collective madness overtook Adolf Hitler and his senior generals. They convinced themselves that they could take on and defeat a superpower in the making – the Soviet Union. Foolishly, they thought in a swift campaign they could smash the Red Army and force Stalin to sue for peace, despite dire warnings that Stalin was amassing a reserve army of more than 1 million men on the Volga. The end result would be such carnage that it would tear the German forces apart. In his major reassessment of the war on the Eastern Front, Anthony Tucker-Jones casts new light on the brutal fighting, including such astounding German defeats as at Stalingrad, Kursk, Minsk and, finally, Berlin. He controversially contends that from the very start intelligence officers on both sides failed to influence their leadership resulting in untold slaughter. He also reveals the shocking blunders by Hitler, Stalin and even Churchill that led to the appalling, needless destruction of Hitler’s armed forces as early as the winter of 1941–42. Step by step, Tucker-Jones describes how the German war machine fought to its very last against a relentless enemy, fully aware that defeat was inevitable.

In the interwar period, Red Army commanders headed by Tukhachevskii developed a new doctrine of mobile warfare and 'deep operations'. The military requirements of armaments and industrial production in the event of war was a central parameter in Stalinist industrialization. Based on recently opened Russian archives, the book analyzes military dimensions of Soviet long-term economic and military reconstruction plans from the mid-1920s until 1941. It presents a new framework for estimating the Soviet war-economic preparations, drastically underestimated by contemporaries.

In the summer of 1944 the Red Army crushed Army Group Centre in one of the largest offensives in military history. Operation Bagration - launched almost exactly three years after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union - was Stalin's retribution for Hitler's Operation Barbarossa. Earlier battles at Stalingrad and Kursk paved the way for Soviet victory, but as Anthony Tucker-Jones demonstrates in this fascinating study, Bagration ensured that the Germans would never regain the strategic initiative. In one fell swoop the Wehrmacht lost a quarter of its strength on the Eastern Front. And in a series of overwhelming assaults, the Red Army recaptured practically all the territory the Soviet Union had lost in 1941, advanced into East Prussia and reached the outskirts of Warsaw. As he reconstructs this massive and complex battle, Anthony Tucker-Jones assesses the opposing forces and their commanders and gives a vivid insight into the planning and decision-making at the highest level. He recreates the experience of the soldiers on the battlefield by using graphic contemporary accounts, and he sets the Bagration offensive in the wider context of the Soviet war effort. He also asks why Stalin's road to retribution proved to be such a long and bloody one - for the Germans, despite their crippling losses, managed to resist for another ten months.

Originally published as Deathride, this is the true story of the Eastern Front in World War II, emphasizing how close Germany came to winning and the USSR to losing; the severity of the Soviet losses, which have been minimized due to Soviet propaganda; and the importance of the Allied invasions of North Africa and Sicily, among other factors, in forcing Hitler to re-deploy troops, saving the Soviets from disaster. The German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, began a war that lasted nearly four years and created by far the bloodiest theater in World War II. In the conventional narrative of this war, Hitler was defeated by Stalin because, like Napoleon, he underestimated the size and resources of his enemy. In fact, says historian John Mosier, Hitler came very close to winning and lost only because of the intervention of the western Allies. Stalin’s great triumph was not winning the war, but establishing the prevailing interpretation of the war. The Great Patriotic War, as it is known in Russia, would eventually prove fatal, setting in motion events that would culminate in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mosier argues that the Soviet losses in World War II were unsustainable and would eventually have led to defeat. The Soviet Union had only twice the population of Germany at the time, but it was suffering a casualty rate more than two and a half times the German rate. Because Stalin had a notorious habit of imprisoning or killing anyone who brought him bad news (and often their families as well), Soviet battlefield reports were fantasies, and the battle plans Soviet generals developed seldom responded to actual circumstances. In this respect the Soviets waged war as they did everything else: through propaganda rather than actual achievement. What saved Stalin was the Allied decision to open the Mediterranean theater. Once the Allies threatened Italy, Hitler was forced to withdraw his best troops from the eastern front and redeploy them. In addition, the Allies provided heavy vehicles that the Soviets desperately needed and were unable to manufacture themselves. It was not the resources of the Soviet Union that defeated Hitler but the resources of the West. In this provocative revisionist analysis of the war between Hitler and Stalin, Mosier provides a dramatic, vigorous narrative of events as he shows how most previous histories accepted Stalin’s lies and distortions to produce a false sense of Soviet triumph. This is the real story of the Eastern Front, fresh and different from what we thought we knew.

The T-62 is one of the most widespread tanks used by the Soviets during the Cold War. Developed from the T-55, the T-62 enjoyed a long career in the Red Army and even into the early days of the reformed Russian Army. It was the principal tank used by Soviet forces in the Soviet-Afghan War, and went on to see service with Russian forces in Chechnya and South Ossetia. It has also been employed in almost every conflict in the Middle East and Africa from its introduction into service. It remains in service with many countries throughout the world and has seen a great deal of use in the Syrian Civil War. Containing more than 400 stunning contemporary and modern photographs, and written by two experts on Soviet armour, this authoritative book tells the complete story of the T-62.

In this fascinating account of the battle tanks that saw combat in the European Theater of World War II, Mary R. Habeck traces the strategies developed between the wars for the use of armored vehicles in battle. Only in Germany and the Soviet Union were truly original armor doctrines (generally known as "blitzkreig" and "deep battle") fully implemented. Storm of Steel relates how the German and Soviet armies formulated and chose to put into practice doctrines that were innovative for the time, yet in many respects identical to one another.As part of her extensive archival research in Russia, Germany, and Britain, Habeck had access to a large number of formerly secret and top-secret documents from several post-Soviet archives. This research informs her comparative approach as she looks at the roles of technology, shared influences, and assumptions about war in the formation of doctrine. She also explores relations between the Germans and the Soviets to determine whether collaboration influenced the convergence of their armor doctrines.