This thesis will use a comparative study of the German Storm trooper battalions and the Canadian trench raiders in order to examine the dynamics of the World War I battlefield, the role of military culture in adaptation in order to acknowledge and act on the requirements of battlefield innovation. The purpose is to determine what key factors contributed to the tactical effectiveness of specialized assault units on the Western Front. The military cultures of these armies comprised the logical and innovative principles that were fundamental in the tactical effectiveness of these elite assault units by making revolutionary developments in force structure, institutional support, personnel selection, decentralized leadership, and training on small-unit tactics and advanced weaponry. Did these tactics create similar or different effects for each army? What factors did these armies use to organize and employ these assault units? To answer these questions, several areas will be examined: (1) force structure, (2) institutional support, (3) personnel selection, and (4) training on decentralized leadership, small unit infiltration tactics, and advanced weaponry. Both armies had different backgrounds and situations. The German Army’s Sturm battalions represented an army-wide institutionalization of organization, selection and technique. The Canadian Corps’ trench raiders were based on the Canadian Corps’ homogeneous structure that separated itself from the BEF in developing its own doctrine, training schools, organization, and tactical innovations.

Historians have portrayed British participation in World War I as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, with untried new military technology, and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book a renowned military historian studies the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies failed persistently during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology, and, eventually, its' self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the fall of 1918, says Paddy Griffith, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during World War II. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties, but that breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. According to Griffith, the British were already masters of "storm troop tactics" by the end of 1916, and in several important respects were further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, "Commando-style" trench raiding, the use of light machine guns, or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, says Griffith, they should at least be credited for effectively inventing much of the twentieth-century's art of war.

This book covers the organization, tactics, weapons, equipment, orders of battle, and uniforms of official and unofficial units, from early raiding parties to formal assault battalions. Rare photos depict badges and insignia not previously known, while primary documents describing regulations and training are provided in their entirety. New information on the origin of shock tactics is presented, gleaned from German archives and not previously published in English. Specific operations on all fronts are included, along with extracts from German army manuals for shock-troop arms such as flamethrowers, mortars, machine guns, grenade launchers, assault artillery, and tanks.

Discusses the Allied invasion of Normandy, with extensive details about the planning stage, called Operation Overlord, as well as the fighting on Utah and Omaha Beaches.

Describes the world that would have existed in 1945 if Adolf Hitler had not declared war on the United States after Pearl Harbor.

Contents: The Prewar Experience; Evolution of Airborne Forces During World War II; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, January-February 1942; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, February-June 1942; Operational Employment: On the Dnepr, September 1943; Tactical Employment; The Postwar Years.