This book, first published in 1991, analyses the unprecedented changes, as well as the troubling continuities, that characterized Soviet military thinking during the early 1990s.

This book analyzes the evolution of Russian military thought and how Russia's current thinking about war is reflected in recent crises. While other books describe current Russian practice, Oscar Jonsson provides the long view to show how Russian military strategic thinking has developed from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present. He closely examines Russian primary sources including security doctrines and the writings and statements of Russian military theorists and political elites. What Jonsson reveals is that Russia's conception of the very nature of war is now changing, as Russian elites see information warfare and political subversion as the most important ways to conduct contemporary war. Since information warfare and political subversion are below the traditional threshold of armed violence, this has blurred the boundaries between war and peace. Jonsson also finds that Russian leaders have, particularly since 2011/12, considered themselves to be at war with the United States and its allies, albeit with non-violent means. This book provides much needed context and analysis to be able to understand recent Russian interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, how to deter Russia on the eastern borders of NATO, and how the West must also learn to avoid inadvertent escalation.

This new IISS Strategic Dossier examines the recent development of Moscow’s armed forces and military capabilities. It analyses the aspirations underpinning Russia’s military reform programme and its successes as well as its failures. The book also provides insights into Russia’s operational use of its armed forces, including in the intervention in Syria, the goals and results of recent state armament programmes, and the trajectory of future developments. This full-colour volume includes more than 50 graphics, maps and charts and over 70 images, and contains chapters on: Russia's armed forces since the end of the Cold War Strategic forces Ground forces Naval forces Aerospace forces Russia’s approach to military decision-making and joint operations Economics and industry At a time when Russia’s relations with many of its neighbours are increasingly strained, and amid renewed concern about the risk of an armed clash, this dossier is essential reading for understanding the state,capabilities and future of Russia’s armed forces.

David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.

In this first comprehensive treatment of the subject, Richard Harrison shows how this theory emerged and developed to become - despite radically different political settings and levels of technology - essential to the Red Army's victory over Germany in World War II.".

In recent years, Western experts have generally portrayed the Kremlin’s actions as either strategic or tactical. Yet this proposition raises a very important question: how closely does the West’s interpretation of Russian strategy reflect the country’s own definitions? While many military historians have sought to interpret Russian strategy, Strategiya takes a different approach. It brings together, in English, the classic works of the Russian art of strategy, which were rediscovered after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead of explaining his analysis of Russia’s contemporary strategy, Ofer Fridman offers his translation of and commentary upon the founding texts of Russia’s own Clausewitzes, Baron Jominis and Liddell Harts, who have been inspiring Russian strategic thinking—both its conceptualisation and its implementation—from the moment Moscow rejected the exclusive role of Marxism-Leninism in strategic affairs. Russian contemporary strategists draw their inspiration from three main schools of thought. While works by Soviet military thinkers have already been translated into English, those by both Imperial strategists and military thinkers in exile have remained almost inaccessible to the Western reader. Filling this lacuna, Strategiya offers a fascinating glimpse inside the foundations of Russian strategic thought and practice.

In a definitive new account of the Soviet Union at war, Alexander Hill charts the development, successes and failures of the Red Army from the industrialisation of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s through to the end of the Great Patriotic War in May 1945. Setting military strategy and operations within a broader context that includes national mobilisation on a staggering scale, the book presents a comprehensive account of the origins and course of the war from the perspective of this key Allied power. Drawing on the latest archival research and a wealth of eyewitness testimony, Hill portrays the Red Army at war from the perspective of senior leaders and men and women at the front line to reveal how the Red Army triumphed over the forces of Nazi Germany and her allies on the Eastern Front, and why it did so at such great cost.

Volume I covers in detail the background, strategic regrouping, and strategic planning and conduct of the offensive.

No other nation has invested as much intellectual capital in the study of war as has the Soviet Union over the last six decades, and the doctrine, strategy, and tactics that have been developed by Soviet theoreticians are bound to guide any future Soviet military action. The Soviet Art of War makes available to Western readers selections from the most significant and influential Soviet military writings from 1917 to the present. The Scotts have examined thousands of Soviet military publications, including the restricted journal of the Soviet General Staff, Voyennaya Mysl', to make this book the most comprehensive account of Soviet military theory and practice yet published. The papers they have chosen thoroughly illustrate the development of the basic features of Soviet military art, from the days of trench warfare to the era of the nuclear battlefield. These documents demonstrate the emphasis on surprise, on deception, on mass deep penetration of enemy defenses, and on a unified strategy for all services. They also show the forms of military action—destruction and attrition, defense and offense, maneuver and position-as seen through the eyes of leading Soviet marshals, generals, and admirals. The usefulness of this material is further enhanced by the Scotts' commentary and their analysis of each group of readings.