Based on the 1972 Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments.

This book examines how the types, numbers and designs of Russian warships were determined in the years preceding the two world wars, with the three-way interplay of naval staff, naval designers, and political leaders, resulting in fleets that contained some outstanding units but were, on the whole, inappropriate to the tasks set by those wars. It also considers how under both Nicholas II and Stalin foreign ideas were adopted with too little consideration of Russia's unique circumstances.

The book describes in detail the discussions about the naval strategy and the shipbuilding progams in the Soviet political and military leadership from 1922 to the death of Stalin in 1953.

The efforts of the Soviet Union since the mid-1950s to develop naval power have produced one of the strongest navies in the world, but this achievement has not been without serious costs. The construction of increasingly complex submarines, ships, and aircraft has required greater investment of resources and manpower. This volume addresses whether the Soviet Union will continue naval expansion and what directions technological development will take in the future. In particular, the contributors consider trends in submarine, aircraft carrier, and surface combatant systems and examine what implications these developments have for U.S. defense planning over the next two decades.