This report portrays the results of experimental research on dynamic duopoly markets with demand inertia. Two methods of experimentation are studied: game-playing experiments where subjects interact spontaneously via computer terminals, and computer tournaments between strategies designed by subjects. The principal aim of this study is the understanding of boundedly rational decision making in the dynamic duopoly situation. 1. 1 Motivation The experiments examine a multistage duopoly game where prices in each period are the only decision variables. Sales depend on current prices and also on past sales (demand inertia). Applying the game-theoretic concept of subgame perfect equilibrium, the game is solved by backward induction. The result is a uniquely determined system of decision rules. However, we can hardly expect that human beings behave according to the equilibrium strategy of this game. It is unlikely that subjects are able to compute the equilibrium. And even if a subject is able to compute it, he might not make use of this knowledge. Only if he expects the others to behave according to the equilibrium, it is optimal for him to play the equilibrium strategy. We have evidence from several earlier experimental studies on oligopoly markets that, even in less complex oligopoly situations where the equilibrium solutions are very easy to compute, human behavior often is different from what is prescribed by normative theory. ! Normative theory is based on the concept of ideal rationality. However, human capabilities impose cognitive limits on rationality.

This paper analyzes dynamic pricing in markets with network externalities. Network externalities imply demand inertia, because the size of a network increases the usefulness of the product for consumers. Because past sales increase current demand, firms have an incentive to set low introductory prices to be able to increase prices as their networks grow. However, in reality we observe decreasing prices. This could be due to other factors dominating the network effects. We use an experimental duopoly market with demand inertia to isolate the effect of network externalities. We find that experimental prices are consistent with real world observations rather than with theoretical predictions.

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, Stony Brook, New York, U.S.A., from 7 to 17 July 1999

Reinhard Selten, to date the only German Nobel Prize laureate in economics, celebrates his 80th birthday in 2010. While his contributions to game theory are well-known, the behavioral side of his scientific work has received less public exposure, even though he has been committed to experimental research during his entire career, publishing more experimental than theoretical papers in top-tier journals. This Festschrift is dedicated to Reinhard Selten’s exceptional influence on behavioral and experimental economics. In this collection of academic highlight papers, a number of his students are joined by leading scholars in experimental research to document the historical role of the “Meister” in the development of the research methodology and of several sub-fields of behavioral economics. Next to the academic insight in these highly active fields of experimental research, the papers also provide a glance at Reinhard Selten’s academic and personal interaction with his students and peers.

Four stylised facts of aggregate economic growth are set up initially. The growth process is interpreted to represent transitional dynamics rather than balanced-growth equilibria. Against this background, the fundamental importance of subsistence consumption is comprehensively analysed. Subsequently, the meaning of the productive-consumption hypothesis for the intertemporal consumption trade-off and the growth process is investigated. Finally, the process of growth is analysed empirically by means of cross-sectional conditional convergence regressions with endogenous control variables.

This book is on applications of game theory. The title of this book is not "Game Theory and its Applications" because it does not construct a general theory for considered games. The book contains a lot of examples of applica tion of game theory together with the background of those games considered and a list of unsolved problems. Also we consider only the game where the optimal strategies of the players are found in closed form. This book is an attempt to carryon the approach developed in nice books "Search Games" by Gal and "Geometric Games and their Applications" by Ruckle. The first chapter of this book supplies the required definitions and theorems from game theory. The second chapter deals with discrete search games where both players act simultaneously: the games of protection of a channel from infiltration of a submarine, the submarine versus helicopter game, the matrix search games and others. The third chapter considers the game where the players allocate their contin uous efforts. In these games players face up an alternative either not to come into contest if the cost of efforts seems too high, or come into it. In the last case the player have to decide how much resources they can afford to spend. The allocation models of search, antiballistic protection and marketing are investigated.

This proceedings volume consists of papers presented at the Sixth International Workshop on Computer-Aided Scheduling of Public Transpon, which was held at the Fund~lio Calouste Gulbenkian in Lisbon from July 6th to 9th, 1993. In the tradition of alternating Workshops between North America and Europe - Chicago (1975), Leeds (1980), Montreal (1983), Hamburg (1987) and again Montreal (1990), the European city of Lisbon was selected as the venue for the Workshop in 1993. As in earlier Workshops, the central theme dealt with vehicle and duty scheduling problems and the employment of operations-research-based software systems for operational planning in public transport. However, as was initiated in Hamburg in 1987, the scope of this Workshop was broadened to include topics in related fields. This fundamental alteration was an inevitable consequence of the growing demand over the last decade for solutions to the complete planning process in public transport through integrated systems. Therefore, the program of this workshop included sections which dealt with scheduling problems and computerized systems for operational planning as well as sections on network planning and data management.

The main purpose of this monograph is to give a detailed account of a contemporary, state-of-the art, macroeconometric model that is regularly used for policy advising, and for forecasting in commerce and industry.