Classic Books Library presents this brand new edition of “The Federalist Papers”, a collection of separate essays and articles compiled in 1788 by Alexander Hamilton. Following the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776, the governing doctrines and policies of the States lacked cohesion. “The Federalist”, as it was previously known, was constructed by American statesman Alexander Hamilton, and was intended to catalyse the ratification of the United States Constitution. Hamilton recruited fellow statesmen James Madison Jr., and John Jay to write papers for the compendium, and the three are known as some of the Founding Fathers of the United States. Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755–1804) was an American lawyer, journalist and highly influential government official. He also served as a Senior Officer in the Army between 1799-1800 and founded the Federalist Party, the system that governed the nation’s finances. His contributions to the Constitution and leadership made a significant and lasting impact on the early development of the nation of the United States.

The rule of law is frequently invoked in political debate, yet rarely defined with any precision. Some employ it as a synonym for democracy, others for the subordination of the legislature to a written constitution and its judicial guardians. It has been seen as obedience to the duly-recognised government, a form of governing through formal and general rule-like laws and the rule of principle. Given this diversity of view, it is perhaps unsurprising that certain scholars have regarded the concept as no more than a self-congratulatory rhetorical device. This collection of eighteen key essays from jurists, political theorists and public law political scientists, aims to explore the role law plays in the political system. The introduction evaluates their arguments. The first eleven essays identify the standard features associated with the rule of law. These are held to derive less from any characteristics of law per se than from a style of legislating and judging that gives equal consideration to all citizens. The next seven essays then explore how different ways of separating and dispersing power contribute to this democratic style of rule by forcing politicians and judges alike to treat people as equals and regard none as above the law.

To what extent should the doctrine of the separation of powers evolve in light of recent shifts in constitutional design and practice? Constitutions now often include newer forms of rights – such as socioeconomic and environmental rights – and are written with an explicitly transformative purpose. They also often reflect include new independent bodies such as human rights commissions and electoral tribunals whose position and function within the traditional structure is novel. The practice of the separation of powers has also changed, as the executive has tended to gain power and deliberative bodies like legislatures have often been thrown into a state of crisis. The chapters in this edited volume grapple with these shifts and the ways in which the doctrine of the separation of powers might respond to them. It also asks whether the shifts that are taking place are mostly a product of the constitutional systems of the global south, or instead reflect changes that run across most liberal democratic constitutional systems around the world.

This handy pocket guide explains the core concepts of democracy in a clear A-Z format. Though these core concepts may be practiced differently in various countries, every genuine democracy is based on them in one way or another. Ideal for civics and government classrooms, Understanding Democracy is a concise, scholarly starting point for research papers and writing assignments.

Contrasts liberal views in the tradition of John Locke with conservative Whig attitudes as personified by Edmund Burke in a consideration of moral duty and civil disobedience

This insightful book guides readers through the transformation of, and theoretical challenges posed by, the separation of powers in national contexts. Building on the notion that the traditional tripartite structure of the separation of powers has undergone a significant process of fragmentation and expansion, this book identifies and illustrates the most pressing and intriguing aspects of the separation of powers in contemporary constitutional systems.

The U.S. Supreme Court is not a unitary actor and it does not function in a vacuum. It is part of an integrated political system in which its decisions and doctrine must be viewed in a broader context. In some areas, the Court is the lead policy maker. In other areas, the Court fills in the gaps of policy created in the legislative and executive branches. In either instance, the Supreme Court’s work is influenced by and in turn influences all three branches of the federal government as well as the interests and opinions of the American people. Pacelle analyzes the Court’s interaction in the separation of powers system, detailing its relationship to the presidency, Congress, the bureaucracy, public opinion, interest groups, and the vast system of lower courts. The niche the Court occupies and the role it plays in American government reflect aspects of both the legal and political models. The Court has legal duties and obligations as well as some freedom to exercise its collective political will. Too often those studying the Court have examined it in isolation, but this book urges scholars and students alike to think more broadly and situate the highest court as the "balance wheel" in the American system.

Arguably no political principle has been more central than the separation of powers to the evolution of constitutional governance in Western democracies. In the definitive work on the subject, M. J. C. Vile traces the history of the doctrine from its rise during the English Civil War, through its development in the eighteenth century—when it was indispensable to the founders of the American republic—through subsequent political thought and constitution-making in Britain, France, and the United States. The author concludes with an examination of criticisms of the doctrine by both behavioralists and centralizers—and with "A Model of a Theory of Constitutionalism." The new Liberty Fund second edition includes the entirety of the original 1967 text published by Oxford, a major epilogue entitled "The Separation of Powers and the Administrative State," and a bibliography. M. J. C. Vile is Professor of Politics at the University of Kent at Canterbury and author also of The Structure of American Federalism.