In the more than twenty years since Roe v. Wade, the executive and legislative branches of government have pursued a staggering number of initiatives relating to abortion. In this groundbreaking study, legal scholar Neal Devins shows how the Supreme Court, elected government, and private citizens together help to shape what the Constitution means. Central to his study is the question of how the Court and elected government influence each other. In addition to the abortion debate, Devins examines conflicts over federalism, race, religion, and separation of powers. These constitutional disputes, Devins contends, can be as constructive as they are inevitable. Without an ongoing dynamic that allows each side to win some of the time, Devins concludes, the Constitution would be less enduring.

Constitutional rights protect individuals against government overreaching, but that is not all they do. In different ways and to different degrees, constitutional rights also regulate legal relations among private parties in most legal systems. Rights can have not only a vertical effect, within the hierarchical relationship between citizen and state, but also a horizontal one, on the citizen-to-citizen relationships otherwise governed by private law. In every constitutional system with judicially enforceable constitutional rights, courts must make choices about whether, when, and how to give those rights horizontal effect. This book is about how different courts make those choices, and about the consequences that they have. The doctrines that courts build to manage the horizontal effect of rights speak to the most fundamental issues that constitutional systems address, about the nature of rights and of constitutionalism itself. These doctrines can also entrench or enhance judicial power, but in very different ways depending on the legal system. This book offers three case studies, of Germany, the United States, and Canada. For each, it offers a detailed account of the horizontal effect jurisprudence of its apex court-not in isolation, but as a central feature of a broader account of that country's constitutional development. The case studies show how the choices courts make about horizontal rights reflect existing normative and political realities and, over time, help to shape new ones.

The Democratic Constitution is the first attempt to capture the perpetual, collaborative process that shapes the interpretation of the American constitution. Though the Court has unique power in the American system, the Constitution created a balance of power between the three branches of government, a balance essential to a vibrant and durable democracy. Nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpretation, Neal Devins and Louis Fisher demonstrate, make the Constitution more stable, more consistent with constitutional principles, and more protective of individual and minority rights. Making use of case studies on race, privacy, federalism, war powers, speech, separation of powers, and religion, Devins and Fisher show how elected officials uphold and safeguard individual rights as well as, and often better than, the courts. This highly readable narrative is an impressive affirmation of public participation in the political process that defines, protects, and gives life to the constitutional order.--Publisher description.

Constitutional Values: Governmental Power and Individual Freedoms in American Politicsis a single volume that examines both constitutional law and civil liberties using narrative, well-edited cases, and real-world interpretations. It introduces readers to the underlying political structure of the American judiciary, explores the constitutional foundations for governmental authority, and reviews the legal protections for individual rights and liberties in the American political system. Chapter questions are included to provoke readers' analytical and critical thinking skills, and over 100 cases help readers understand how constitutional doctrines are applied. Presents a sound discussion of governmental structure and authority in the first part of the book. Follows with a clear presentation of civil liberties and civil rights in the second part of the book. Contains over 100 edited cases which are referenced in Part Two of the book. Includes important U.S. Supreme Court opinions regarding governmental authority and individual freedoms. Covers standard Supreme Court cases and also incorporates contemporary constitutional controversies. Discusses unique local cases which demonstrate the local implications of constitutional politics. Includes cases from Maryland, New York, Connecticut, California, Ohio, Minnesota, Iowa, Rhode Island, Alabama, Virginia and more! Provides true insights into the day-to-day realities of constitutional law. Encourages readers to apply constitutional doctrines to local controversies.Anyone interested in or involved with constitutional law and civil liberties.

Critical examination of the concept of compelling government interests

The United States, it is widely believed, is at a moment of constitutional crisis. At no time since the Civil War era has it seemed more likely that what James Madison called the “experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people”--the experiment in democratic constitutional self-governance--will fail. This article argues that one reason for this state of affairs is that the 'people' sense that they are no longer active participants in the experiment. While the historical etiology of this crisis is complex, and the forces involved not confined to the US, this article focuses on the crisis in the legitimacy of the Federal Judiciary--and the role that current orthodoxies in constitutional interpretation have played in fomenting that crisis.The immediate critical target of this article is contemporary jurisprudential uses of what is called “public meaning originalism,” specifically, and 'textualist originalism' more broadly, as a theory for the interpretation of those clauses in the US Constitution that refer to fundamental rights and freedoms. This concern with “textualism,” however, is primarily diagnostic. For, despite its relative unpopularity among most contemporary legal theorists, the application of “public meaning originalism” by the US Supreme Court is perfectly consistent with the dominant legal theoretical approach in the English-speaking world. The extremity of the Court's recent 'textualist' jurisprudence provides an excellent illustration, or reminder, of the dangers of legal positivist jurisprudence. In arguing against textualist originalism, this article defends a version of the anti-positivist distinction between legal rules and legal principles, most famously associated with the work of Ronald Dworkin. It argues, however, that this distinction cannot be captured by understanding constitutional principles in terms of moral principles, as Dworkin suggests. Instead, constitutional principles must be understood as deliberative principles of political association and communal self-determination. The primary subject of this article, then, is the character of fundamental constitutional law; our hope is that the current crises in democratic constitutional legitimacy can help make salient certain aspects of the relation between popular sovereignty and constitutional legitimacy that are harder to discern in less fractured political climates.This article begins, in Part One, with a consideration of the Roberts Court's recent jurisprudence, focusing on three landmark opinions issued in June of 2022: Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization, Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. and West Virginia v EPA. The point of revisiting this recent history will not be--or will not only be--to decry these rulings as anti-democratic and constitutionally ill-founded. The point, rather, will be 1) to see these rulings as consolidations of the Court's newly asserted constitutional authority, and 2) show how contemporary positivist constitutional theory has helped prepare the way for the Court's manipulation of the constitutional order.Part Two begins to elaborate an anti-positivist alternative both to legal positivism and to natural law legal theory. In agreement with traditional natural law theorists, it is argued that the distinction between illegitimate and legitimate expressions of political authority depends on the degree to which a system of authority is directed toward a common good. In disagreement with those theorists, however, this article contends that the common good of a political community is determined by the communal deliberative activity of a political community, and that the deliberative determination of a common good is the normative foundation of that community.Part Three focuses on the First Amendment of the US Constitution with two aims in mind. First, to illustrate the account of constitutional law here advocated, it offers a reading of the First Amendment as an attempt to put into words a shared understanding among the ratifiers of the Bill of Rights of what this article calls 'the shape of citizenship' in our constitutional democracy. Second, it shows how the Court's recent opinions have radically subverted the last vestiges of this original connection between constitutional rights and the foundational principles of constitutional self-government. In Dobbs v Jackson, in particular, the Court asserts an understanding of constitutional rights as merely a particular structural variant of positive law, and in so doing effectively makes the legal order a sovereign power over the people, rather than an expression of and vehicle for their common self-determination.

What do constitutional interpretation and legal education have in common?For one thing, they share the same tension between theory and practice, between form and substance, between process and outcomes, between constancy and change, and between local and comparative perspectives. Each also has a substratum of fundamental underlying values that demand, but do not always receive, clear articulation.For another thing, they have both been the subject of illuminating examination by Michael Coper over the course of a long and distinguished career.An extraordinary group of authors, including Justice Stephen Gageler, the Hon Michael Kirby and Sir Anthony Mason, come together in this book to celebrate Coper's achievement, and take his various contributions as a jumping off point for their own further scholarly insights.From the gripping story of the revolution that swept away the old law on section 92 of the Constitution, to the endemic conflict in the judicial process between legalism and realism, to the never-ending controversy about the Dismissal, to perceiving the world and organising legal knowledge in new ways through biography and oral history, to the role of educators in shaping the views and values of newcomers to this knowledge, this book contains over a dozen sparkling essays by some of Australia's most renowned and respected lawyers, as well as a substantial reflective commentary by Michael Coper himself.An intellectual feast!

Chief Justice John Marshall argued that a constitution "requires that only its great outlines should be marked [and] its important objects designated." Ours is "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." In recent years, Marshall's great truths have been challenged by proponents of originalism and strict construction. Such legal thinkers as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argue that the Constitution must be construed and applied as it was when the Framers wrote it. In Keeping Faith with the Constitution, three legal authorities make the case for Marshall's vision. They describe their approach as "constitutional fidelity"--not to how the Framers would have applied the Constitution, but to the text and principles of the Constitution itself. The original understanding of the text is one source of interpretation, but not the only one; to preserve the meaning and authority of the document, to keep it vital, applications of the Constitution must be shaped by precedent, historical experience, practical consequence, and societal change. The authors range across the history of constitutional interpretation to show how this approach has been the source of our greatest advances, from Brown v. Board of Education to the New Deal, from the Miranda decision to the expansion of women's rights. They delve into the complexities of voting rights, the malapportionment of legislative districts, speech freedoms, civil liberties and the War on Terror, and the evolution of checks and balances. The Constitution's framers could never have imagined DNA, global warming, or even women's equality. Yet these and many more realities shape our lives and outlook. Our Constitution will remain vital into our changing future, the authors write, if judges remain true to this rich tradition of adaptation and fidelity.

This book compares the political process and role of the media using controversy over abortion.

Breakthroughs in biomedicine often lead to new life-giving treatments but may also raise troubling, even life-and-death, quandaries. Society's Choices discusses ways for people to handle today's bioethics issues in the context of America's unique history and cultureâ€"and from the perspectives of various interest groups. The book explores how Americans have grappled with specific aspects of bioethics through commission deliberations, programs by organizations, and other mechanisms and identifies criteria for evaluating the outcomes of these efforts. The committee offers recommendations on the role of government and professional societies, the function of commissions and institutional review boards, and bioethics in health professional education and research. The volume includes a series of 12 superb background papers on public moral discourse, mechanisms for handling social and ethical dilemmas, and other specific areas of controversy by well-known experts Ronald Bayer, Martin Benjamin, Dan W. Brock, Baruch A. Brody, H. Alta Charo, Lawrence Gostin, Bradford H. Gray, Kathi E. Hanna, Elizabeth Heitman, Thomas Nagel, Steven Shapin, and Charles M. Swezey.