This is a credible challenge to the wideheld and possibly erroneous assumption that an invasion of France in 1943 would have failed.

One of the great arguments of World War II took place among Allied military leaders over when and where to launch a second front against Germany in Europe. This realistic, fact-based work posits what would have happened had Churchill been overruled, and that rather than invading North Africa in the fall of 1942, thence Sicily and Italy, the Allies

A broadly interdisciplinary work, this handbook discusses the best and most enduring literature related to the major topics and themes of World War II. Military historiography is treated in essays on the major theaters of military operations and the related themes of logistics and intelligence, while political and diplomatic history is covered in chapters on international relations, resistance movements, and collaboration. The volume analyzes themes of domestic history in essays on economic mobilization, the home fronts, and women in the military and civilian life. The book also covers the Holocaust. This handbook approaches each topic from a global viewpoint rather than focusing on individual national communities. Except for nonprint material, the literature, research, and sources surveyed are primarily those available in English. The volume is aimed at both experts on the war and the general academic community and will also be useful to students and serious laymen interested in the war.

Despite the best efforts of a number of historians, many aspects of the ferocious struggle between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War remain obscure or shrouded in myth. One of the most persistent of these is the notion - largely created by many former members of its own officer corps in the immediate postwar period - that the German Army was a paragon of military professionalism and operational proficiency whose defeat on the Eastern Front was solely attributable to the amateurish meddling of a crazed former Corporal and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Red Army. A key pillar upon which the argument of German numerical-weakness vis-à-vis the Red Army has been constructed is the assertion that Germany was simply incapable of providing its army with the necessary quantities of men and equipment needed to replace its losses. In consequence, as their losses outstripped the availability of replacements, German field formations became progressively weaker until they were incapable of securing their objectives or, eventually, of holding back the swelling might of the Red Army. This work seeks to address the notion of German numerical-weakness in terms of Germany's ability to replace its losses and regenerate its military strength, and assess just how accurate this argument was during the crucial first half of the Russo-German War (June 1941-June 1943). Employing a host of primary documents and secondary literature, it traces the development and many challenges of the German Army from the prewar period until the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It continues on to chart the first two years of the struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union, with a particular emphasis upon the scale of German personnel and equipment losses, and how well these were replaced. It also includes extensive examinations into the host of mitigating factors that both dictated the course of Germany's campaign in the East and its replacement and regeneration capabilities. In contrast to most accounts of the conflict, this study finds that numerical-weakness being the primary factor in the defeat of the Ostheer - specifically as it relates to the strength and condition of the German units involved - has been overemphasized and frequently exaggerated. In fact, Germany was actually able to regenerate its forces to a remarkable degree with a steady flow of fresh men and equipment, and German field divisions on the Eastern Front were usually far stronger than the accepted narratives of the war would have one believe.

Throughout 1943, the German army, heirs to a military tradition that demanded and perfected relentless offensive operations, succumbed to the realities of its own overreach and the demands of twentieth-century industrialized warfare. In his new study, prizewinning author Robert Citino chronicles this weakening Wehrmacht, now fighting desperately on the defensive but still remarkably dangerous and lethal. Drawing on his impeccable command of German-language sources, Citino offers fresh, vivid, and detailed treatments of key campaigns during this fateful year: the Allied landings in North Africa, General von Manstein's great counterstroke in front of Kharkov, the German attack at Kasserine Pass, the titanic engagement of tanks and men at Kursk, the Soviet counteroffensives at Orel and Belgorod, and the Allied landings in Sicily and Italy. Through these events, he reveals how a military establishment historically configured for violent aggression reacted when the tables were turned; how German commanders viewed their newest enemy, the U.S. Army, after brutal fighting against the British and Soviets; and why, despite their superiority in materiel and manpower, the Allies were unable to turn 1943 into a much more decisive year. Applying the keen operational analysis for which he is so highly regarded, Citino contends that virtually every flawed German decision-to defend Tunis, to attack at Kursk and then call off the offensive, to abandon Sicily, to defend Italy high up the boot and then down much closer to the toe-had strong supporters among the army's officer corps. He looks at all of these engagements from the perspective of each combatant nation and also establishes beyond a shadow of a doubt the synergistic interplay between the fronts. Ultimately, Citino produces a grim portrait of the German officer corps, dispelling the longstanding tendency to blame every bad decision on Hitler. Filled with telling vignettes and sharp portraits and copiously documented, The Wehrmacht Retreats is a dramatic and fast-paced narrative that will engage military historians and general readers alike.

During World War II the uniformed heads of the U.S. armed services assumed a pivotal and unprecedented role in the formulation of the nation's foreign policies. Organized soon after Pearl Harbor as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these individuals were officially responsible only for the nation's military forces. During the war their functions came to encompass a host of foreign policy concerns, however, and so powerful did the military voice become on those issues that only the president exercised a more decisive role in their outcome. Drawing on sources that include the unpublished records of the Joint Chiefs as well as the War, Navy, and State Departments, Mark Stoler analyzes the wartime rise of military influence in U.S. foreign policy. He focuses on the evolution of and debates over U.S. and Allied global strategy. In the process, he examines military fears regarding America's major allies--Great Britain and the Soviet Union--and how those fears affected President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies, interservice and civil-military relations, military-academic relations, and postwar national security policy as well as wartime strategy.

World War II had many superlatives, but none like Operation Torch—a series of simultaneous amphibious landings, audacious commando and paratroop assaults, and the Atlantic’s biggest naval battle, fought across a two thousand mile span of coastline in French North Africa. The risk was enormous, the scale breathtaking, the preparations rushed, the training inadequate, and the ramifications profound. Torch was the first combined Allied offensive and key to how the Second World War unfolded politically and militarily. Nonetheless, historians have treated the subject lightly, perhaps because of its many ambiguities. As a surprise invasion of a neutral nation, it recalled German attacks against countries like Belgium, Norway, and Yugoslavia. The operation’s rationale was to aid Russia but did not do this. It was supposed to get Americans troops into the fight against Germany but did so only because it failed to achieve its short-term military goals. There is still debate whether Torch advanced the fight against the Axis, or was a wasteful dispersion of Allied strength and actually prolonged the war. Torch: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory is a fresh look at this complex and controversial operation. The book covers the fierce Anglo-American dispute about the operation and charts how it fits into the evolution of amphibious warfare. It recounts the story of the fighting, focusing on the five landings—Port Lyautey, Fédala, and Safi in Morocco, and Oran and Algiers in Algeria—and includes air and ground actions from the initial assault to the repulse of Allied forces on the outskirts of Tunis. Torch also considers the operation’s context within the larger war and it incorporates the French perspective better than any English-language work on the subject. It shows how Torch brought France, as a power, back into the Allied camp; how it forced the English and the Americans to work together as true coalitions partners and forge a coherent amphibious doctrine. These skills were then applied to subsequent operations in the Mediterranean, in the English Channel, and in the Pacific. The story of how this was accomplished is the story of how the Allies brought their power to bear on the enemy’s continental base and won World War II."

In a career that paralleled the emergence of the United States as an international power, Marshall was a participant in every significant event contributing to the nation's status as a superpower. From his first combat duty in the Philippines at the turn of the century, through both World Wars, into the cold war and the Korean conflict, Marshall was a key figure in devising and implementing US military strategies and foreign policies. Stoler emphasizes the years 1939-1951, when Marshall served as World War II army chief of staff, special presidential representative to China, secretary of state at the beginning of the cold war and Korean War secretary of defense. The book is unique in its merging of military and diplomatic history with biography. It includes a chronology and a bibliographic essay. “Drawing on more detailed works, supplemented by his sound judgments based on his own careful research, Stoler has successfully caught the spirit of the man and his work.” — Forrest C. Pogue, official biographer of Marshall, former director of the George C. Marshall Foundation “Useful, fascinating and very informative... Stoler illuminates many historical debates and events...” — David Eisenhower, author of Eisenhower at War: 1943-1945 “A very readable book based on the most recent scholarship and presented in a way that students can understand.” — Michael J. Hogan, Ohio State University “In a skillful work of compression and synthesis, Mark A. Stoler... sets himself an ambitious dual task: to render comprehensible the life of an individual almost no one knew well and to ground this life firmly in the context of the revolution in American foreign relations during the first half of the twentieth century. The enterprise succeeds admirably, partly because Marshall’s career lends itself to such treatment and partly because Stoler demonstrates a flair for selecting the essential from the immaterial.” — H. W. Brands, The American Historical Review “This is the best available one-volume biography of this distinguished man... Stoler demonstrates Marshall’s intellectual growth as he came to understand international politics and the limits of power.” — Daniel R. Beaver, The Historian “[A] richly researched and balanced assessment... Stoler’s insights into Marshall are many and valuable. He perfectly captures his sterling integrity and the extent of his exemplary nonpartisanship... this is the best single-volume about a true hero.” — Barry F. Machado, The Journal of Military History “[A]n excellent book... There have been short one-volume biographies of Marshall before, but this is the best of the lot... Among the strengths of Stoler’s treatment are his careful exposition of the factors in Marshall’s youth crucial to the formation of his character, the importance of his various experiences with the National Guard, the Plattsburg volunteers, and the Civilian Conservation Corps in conditioning his faith in citizen soldiers, and the formative role of his professional education at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and the Infantry School at Fort Benning.” — I. B. Holley, Jr., The Journal of American History “[Stoler] is able to present the issues faced by the new chief of staff lucidly and with great insight... In sum, Professor Stoler, with style and verve, has produced an excellent summary volume on George C. Marshall and his times... the book [is] insightful, readable, provocative, and manageable. I highly recommend it.” — Douglas Kinnard, Naval War College Review “[T]he book breaks through the general’s deliberately cultivated stoic persona and demonstrates the humanity that made him so admired in public and private. Stoler’s work stands as a model of its genre, a concise study that incorporates themes from the large body of current scholarship in the field without ever losing sight of its central character... Stoler captures the complexity of the man and his times in a book that is a pleasure to read.” — Donald A. Ritchie, The Oral History Review “This is a useful volume for those who lack the time to read all four volumes of Forrest Pogue’s biography.” — Gaddis Smith, Foreign Affairs

Two weeks after the Americans, British, and Canadians invaded Western Europe on D-Day, June 6, 1944, the Soviet Union launched Operation Bagration on the Eastern Front, its massive attempt to clear German forces from Belarus. In one of the largest military campaigns of all time, involving 2 million Soviets and 800,000 Germans, the Red Army advanced 170 miles in two weeks and destroyed German Army Group Center. Using recently declassified Soviet documents as well as German and Soviet unit histories, Dunn recounts this landmark operation of World War II.

He was a legendary man of strength-but no man is without his weaknesses. Revered for his strength of character when Britain stood alone against Nazi Germany, Winston Churchill is painted as one of World War II's most heroic figures-a characterization that overshadows his faults, which have had their own devastating legacy. This book examines the decisions and policies of Churchill between June 1940 and December 1941 that actually hindered the Allied cause, extended the conflict, and even destabilized several regions that remain in chaos to this day. With profound insight into Churchill's early colonial experiences as well as his first tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty, Christopher Catherwood offers an honest appraisal of Churchill's strategies in a unique and fascinating perspective that separates the myth from the man.