Scholarpedia’s Encyclopedia of Touch provides a comprehensive collection of peer-reviewed articles written by leading researchers, detailing our current scientific understanding of tactile sensing and its neural substrates in animals including humans. The encyclopedia allows ideas and insights to be shared between researchers working on different aspects of touch and in different species, including research in synthetic touch systems. In addition, this encyclopedia raises awareness of research in tactile sensing and increases scientific and public interest in the field. The articles address subjects including tactile control, whiskered robots, vibrissal coding, the molecular basis of touch, invertebrate mechanoreception, fingertip transducers and tactile sensing. All the articles in this encyclopedia provide in-depth and state-of-the-art scholarly treatment of the academic topics concerned, making it an excellent reference work for academics, professionals and students.

Hebb's postulate provided a crucial framework to understand synaptic alterations underlying learning and memory. Hebb's theory proposed that neurons that fire together, also wire together, which provided the logical framework for the strengthening of synapses. Weakening of synapses was however addressed by "not being strengthened", and it was only later that the active decrease of synaptic strength was introduced through the discovery of long-term depression caused by low frequency stimulation of the presynaptic neuron. In 1994, it was found that the precise relative timing of pre and postynaptic spikes determined not only the magnitude, but also the direction of synaptic alterations when two neurons are active together. Neurons that fire together may therefore not necessarily wire together if the precise timing of the spikes involved are not tighly correlated. In the subsequent 15 years, Spike Timing Dependent Plasticity (STDP) has been found in multiple brain brain regions and in many different species. The size and shape of the time windows in which positive and negative changes can be made vary for different brain regions, but the core principle of spike timing dependent changes remain. A large number of theoretical studies have also been conducted during this period that explore the computational function of this driving principle and STDP algorithms have become the main learning algorithm when modeling neural networks. This Research Topic will bring together all the key experimental and theoretical research on STDP.

An examination of the two most radical dissociation syndromes of the human pain experience—pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain—and what they reveal about the complex nature of pain and its sensory, cognitive, and behavioral components. In Feeling Pain and Being in Pain, Nikola Grahek examines two of the most radical dissociation syndromes to be found in human pain experience: pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain. Grahek shows that these two syndromes—the complete dissociation of the sensory dimension of pain from its affective, cognitive, and behavioral components, and its opposite, the dissociation of pain's affective components from its sensory-discriminative components (inconceivable to most of us but documented by ample clinical evidence)—have much to teach us about the true nature and structure of human pain experience. Grahek explains the crucial distinction between feeling pain and being in pain, defending it on both conceptual and empirical grounds. He argues that the two dissociative syndromes reveal the complexity of the human pain experience: its major components, the role they play in overall pain experience, the way they work together, and the basic neural structures and mechanisms that subserve them. Feeling Pain and Being in Pain does not offer another philosophical theory of pain that conclusively supports or definitively refutes either subjectivist or objectivist assumptions in the philosophy of mind. Instead, Grahek calls for a less doctrinaire and more balanced approach to the study of mind–brain phenomena.

A thought-provoking argument that consciousness—more widespread than previously assumed—is the feeling of being alive, not a type of computation or a clever hack In The Feeling of Life Itself, Christof Koch offers a straightforward definition of consciousness as any subjective experience, from the most mundane to the most exalted—the feeling of being alive. Psychologists study which cognitive operations underpin a given conscious perception. Neuroscientists track the neural correlates of consciousness in the brain, the organ of the mind. But why the brain and not, say, the liver? How can the brain—three pounds of highly excitable matter, a piece of furniture in the universe, subject to the same laws of physics as any other piece—give rise to subjective experience? Koch argues that what is needed to answer these questions is a quantitative theory that starts with experience and proceeds to the brain. In The Feeling of Life Itself, Koch outlines such a theory, based on integrated information. Koch describes how the theory explains many facts about the neurology of consciousness and how it has been used to build a clinically useful consciousness meter. The theory predicts that many, and perhaps all, animals experience the sights and sounds of life; consciousness is much more widespread than conventionally assumed. Contrary to received wisdom, however, Koch argues that programmable computers will not have consciousness. Even a perfect software model of the brain is not conscious. Its simulation is fake consciousness. Consciousness is not a special type of computation—it is not a clever hack. Consciousness is about being.

Updated and revised, the highly-anticipated second edition of The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness offers a collection of readings that together represent the most thorough and comprehensive survey of the nature of consciousness available today. Features updates to scientific chapters reflecting the latest research in the field Includes 18 new theoretical, empirical, and methodological chapters covering integrated information theory, renewed interest in panpsychism, and more Covers a wide array of topics that include the origins and extent of consciousness, various consciousness experiences such as meditation and drug-induced states, and the neuroscience of consciousness Presents 54 peer-reviewed chapters written by leading experts in the study of consciousness, from across a variety of academic disciplines

We're used to thinking about the self as an independent entity, something that we either have or are. In The Ego Tunnel, philosopher Thomas Metzinger claims otherwise: No such thing as a self exists. The conscious self is the content of a model created by our brain - an internal image, but one we cannot experience as an image. Everything we experience is ''a virtual self in a virtual reality.'' But if the self is not ''real,'' why and how did it evolve? How does the brain construct it? Do we still have souls, free will, personal autonomy, or moral accountability? In a time when the science of cognition is becoming as controversial as evolution, The Ego Tunnel provides a stunningly original take on the mystery of the mind.

The visual world of animals is highly diverse and often very different from that of humans. This book provides an extensive review of the latest behavioral and neurobiological research on animal vision, detailing fascinating species similarities and differences in visual processing.

Active touch can be described as the control of the position and movement of tactile sensing systems to facilitate information gain. In other words, it is finding out about the world by reaching out and exploring—sensing by ‘touching’ as opposed to ‘being touched’. In this Research Topic (with cross-posting in both Behavioural Neuroscience and Neurorobotics) we welcomed articles from junior researchers on any aspect of active touch. We were especially interested in articles on the behavioral, physiological and neuronal underpinnings of active touch in a range of species (including humans) for submission to Frontiers in Behavioural Neuroscience. We also welcomed articles describing robotic systems with biomimetic or bio-inspired tactile sensing systems for publication in Frontiers in Neurorobotics.

Surveying normal hand function in health individuals, this book presents a conceptual framework for analysing what is known about it. It organises human-hand research on a continuum that ranges from activities that are sensory to those with a strong motor component. It is useful for researchers in neuroscience, cognitive science, and gerontology.

How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioural expressions in psychology, design concerns in artificial intelligence and robotics, and debates about embodied experience in the phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Shaun Gallagher's book aims to contribute to the formulation of that common vocabulary and to develop a conceptual framework that will avoid both the overly reductionistic approaches that explain everything in terms of bottom-up neuronal mechanisms, and inflationistic approaches that explain everything in terms of Cartesian, top-down cognitive states. Gallagher pursues two basic sets of questions. The first set consists of questions about the phenomenal aspects of the structure of experience, and specifically the relatively regular and constant features that we find in the content of our experience. If throughout conscious experience there is a constant reference to one's own body, even if this is a recessive or marginal awareness, then that reference constitutes a structural feature of the phenomenal field of consciousness, part of a framework that is likely to determine or influence all other aspects of experience. The second set of questions concerns aspects of the structure of experience that are more hidden, those that may be more difficult to get at because they happen before we know it. They do not normally enter into the content of experience in an explicit way, and are often inaccessible to reflective consciousness. To what extent, and in what ways, are consciousness and cognitive processes, which include experiences related to perception, memory, imagination, belief, judgement, and so forth, shaped or structured by the fact that they are embodied in this way?