Syrian-Saudi relations have been a paradox in inter-Arab politics during the oil era. Commentators and analysts have questioned why the two states pursued mutually conflicting aims in almost every major regional or international foreign policy issue and often propagated contrasting ideological banners over the past thirty years; while both acting as though some form of an alignment existed between them? Here, Sonoko Sunayama explores the logic behind the paradoxical longevity of this cooperative relationship and argues that what ultimately makes Saudis and Syrians so indispensable to each other is the perception and the historical appeal of 'shared identities', be they Arabism or Islam.

The author in the book looks into the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran which forms a very important part in understanding the nature and dynamics of the Syrian conflict which is a quest to achieve regional domination.

Examines Saudi and Syrian policies during three pivotal wars, to understand how identity and power influence state behaviour in the Middle East.

In Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, two noted Middle East scholars, present the first detailed examination of Syria's role in the long struggle for an Arab-Israeli peace. They paint a surprising portrait of a county whose power is out of proportion to its size, economy, and resources. They explore the reasons behind this phenomeno most importantly, the Machiavellian brilliance of its leader, Hafez al-Asad. The authors address the origins of the Asad regime, Syrias strategy toward its Arab neighbors, its conflict with Israel, and the history of its relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States. The authors argue forcefully that Syrian involvement is vital in an effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Over the last eight years the Syrian conflict has developed into one of the worst humanitarian tragedies of modern times. More than half a million victims, 5 million refugees abroad and 6 million internally displaced: the figures only capture part of Syria’s catastrophe. In addition, there is the less quantifiable damage to the country’s social fabric. Against this dramatic backdrop, this ISPI Report aims to answer a few crucial questions: how can a country whose society has gone through such traumas and destruction reimagine itself and its future? What conditions would allow those Syrians who were forced to leave their homes to return? And what are the regional and international dynamics and interests that will shape Syria’s future? The Report provides the reader with key tools to understand where Syria is headed and what can be done to avoid the worst scenarios.

Since 1979, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran – the two major powers in the Muslim world – has played a prominent role in shaping Middle Eastern politics. Political in nature yet couched in Islamic rhetoric, this rivalry reflects a desire to ensure regime security and legitimacy while also increasing influence across the Middle East. Since the 2003 Iraq War, the relationship has become increasingly vitriolic, resulting in the emergence of proxy conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. This book argues that to understand regional politics, comprehension of the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran is essential. An electronic version of this book is available under a creative commons licence: manchesterhive.com/view/9781526150844/9781526150844.xml

This book analyzes the impact and relevance of the Syrian crisis on regional and international relations. Developing into a proxy war, the Syrian crisis has been a battleground for regional dominance. It has also created an opportunity for new states to emerge on the world affairs scene. Russia, for instance, had been keeping a low profile since the fall of the Soviet Union, but took a leading role in the Syrian crisis reasserting itself against the West regionally. The Syrian crisis has also been a catalyst in reshaping many interstate relations and allowing countries such as Russia, Iran, Turkey and China to play an increasingly important geopolitical role. There have been many international ramifications to the Syrian crisis. While the crisis led to an Iranian-Russian rapprochement, it was also a catalyst to more cooperation between Russia and Saudi Arabia; more importantly, it also forced states with opposing views about the crisis -- Turkey, Iran and Russia -- to forge an alliance. Further, the crisis created tensions between the US and Turkey with China on the one hand balancing its interests between the Gulf and Iran whilst focusing on its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative and trying on the other hand to contain Islamic militancy in Syria. The book looks at issues that are usually ignored when discussing Syria such as the strategic control over its hydrocarbon resources, as well as the power of propaganda in portraying realities. It features the use of non-state actors by regional competing powers and the role of local councils in stabilizing the country. The edited volume brings together contributions by authors with different backgrounds who present conflicting views reflecting the divergence between the various stakeholders about the Syrian crisis.

The United States'' relationship with Saudi Arabia has been one of the cornerstones of U.S. policy in the Middle East for decades. Despite their substantial differences in history, culture, and governance, the two countries have generally agreed on important political and economic issues and have often relied on each other to secure mutual aims. The 1990-91 Gulf War is perhaps the most obvious example, but their ongoing cooperation on maintaining regional stability, moderating the global oil market, and pursuing terrorists should not be downplayed. Yet for all the relationship''s importance, it is increasingly imperiled by mistrust and misunderstanding. One major question is Saudi Arabia''s stability. In this Council Special Report, sponsored by the Center for Preventive Action, F. Gregory Gause III first explores the foundations of Riyadh''s present stability and potential sources of future unrest. It is difficult not to notice that Saudi Arabia avoided significant upheaval during the political uprisings that swept the Middle East in 2011, despite sharing many of the social and economic problems of Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. But unlike their counterparts in Cairo, Sanaa, and Tripoli, Riyadh''s leadership was able to maintain order in large part by increasing public spending on housing and salaries, relying on loyal and well-equipped security forces, and utilizing its extensive patronage networks. The divisions within the political opposition also helped the government''s cause. This is not to say that Gause believes that the stability of the House of Saud is assured. He points out that the top heirs to the throne are elderly and the potential for disorderly squabbling may increase as a new generation enters the line of succession. Moreover, the population is growing quickly, and there is little reason to believe that oil will forever be able to buy social tranquility. Perhaps most important, Gause argues, the leadership''s response to the 2011 uprisings did little to forestall future crises; an opportunity for manageable political reform was mostly lost. Turning to the regional situation, Gause finds it no less complex. Saudi Arabia has wielded considerable influence with its neighbors through its vast oil reserves, its quiet financial and political support for allies, and the ideological influence of salafism, the austere interpretation of Islam that is perhaps Riyadh''s most controversial export. For all its wealth and religious influence, however, Saudi Arabia''s recent record has been less than successful. It was unable to counter Iranian influence in post-Saddam Iraq, it could not prevent Hezbollah taking power in Lebanon, and its ongoing efforts to reconcile Hamas and the Palestinian Authority have come to naught. The U.S.-Saudi relationship has, unsurprisingly, been affected by these and other challenges, including Saudi unhappiness with Washington''s decision to distance itself from Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and Iran. For its part, the United States is unhappy with the Saudi intervention in Bahrain and Saudi support for radical Islamists around the region and the world. The two traditional anchors of the U.S.-Saudi relationship-the Cold War and U.S. operation of Riyadh''s oil fields-are, Gause notes, no longer factors. It is no wonder, he contends, that the relationship is strained when problems are myriad and the old foundations of the informal alliance are gone. It would be far better, Gause argues, to acknowledge that the two countries can no longer expect to act in close concert under such conditions. He recommends that the United States reimagine the relationship as simply transactional, based on cooperation when interests-rather than habit-dictate. Prioritizing those interests will therefore be critical. Rather than pressuring Riyadh for domestic political reform, or asking it to reduce global oil prices, Gause recommends that the United States spend its political capital where it really matters: on maintaining regional security, dismantling terrorist networks, and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There have been few relationships more important to the United States than that with Saudi Arabia, and it is vital that, as it enters a new phase, the expectations and priorities of both countries are clear. In Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East, Gause effectively assesses the challenges and opportunities facing Saudi Arabia and makes a compelling argument for a more modest, businesslike relationship between Washington and Riyadh that better reflects modern realities. As the United States begins reassessing its commitments in the Greater Middle East, this report offers a clear vision for a more limited-but perhaps more appropriate and sustainable-future partnership.