"Secretary of Defense Harold Brown worked to counter the Soviet Union's growing military strength during the administration of President Jimmy Carter. The Soviet Union of the Carter years came closest to matching the United States in strategic power than at any other point in the Cold War. By most reckonings, the Kremlin surpassed the West in conventional arms and forces in Central Europe, posing a threat to NATO. In response, Brown--a nuclear physicist--advocated more technologically advanced weapon systems but faced Carter's efforts to reign in the defense budget. Backed by the JCS, the national security adviser, and key members of Congress, Brown persuaded Carter to increase the defense budget for the last two years of his term. The secretary championed the development and production of new weapons such as stealth aircraft, precision-guided bombs, and cruise missiles. These and other initiatives laid a solid foundation for the much-acclaimed Ronald Reagan defense revolution that actually began under Carter. The book also highlights Brown's policymaking efforts and his influence on President Carter as the administration responded to international events such as the Middle East peace process, the Iran revolution and hostage crisis, the rise of militant Islam, negotiations with the Soviets over arms limitations, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the creation of a security framework for the Persian Gulf region. Other topics cover policy toward Latin America and Africa. The book is also a history of the Defense Department, including the continual development of the All-Volunteer Force and the organizational changes that saw improved policy formulation and acquisition decisions."--Provided by publisher.+

This book aims at gauging whether the nature of US foreign policy decision-making has changed after the Cold War as radically as a large body of literature seems to suggest, and develops a new framework to interpret presidential decision-making in foreign policy. It locates the study of risk in US foreign policy in a wider intellectual landscape that draws on contemporary debates in historiography, international relations and Presidential studies. Based on developments in the health and environment literature, the book identifies the President as the ultimate risk-manager, demonstrating how a President is called to perform a delicate balancing act between risks on the domestic/political side and risks on the strategic/international side. Every decision represents a ‘risk vs. risk trade-off,’ in which the management of one ‘target risk’ leads to the development ‘countervailing risks.’ The book applies this framework to the study three major crises in US foreign policy: the Cuban Missile Crisis, the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, and the massacre at Srebrenica in 1995. Each case-study results from substantial archival research and over twenty interviews with policymakers and academics, including former President Jimmy Carter and former Senator Bob Dole. This book is ideal for postgraduate researchers and academics in US foreign policy, foreign policy decision-making and the US Presidency as well as Departments and Institutes dealing with the study of risk in the social sciences. The case studies will also be of great use to undergraduate students.

This book reconstructs and explains the arms relationship that successive U.S. administrations developed with the Shah of Iran between 1950 and 1979. This relationship has generally been neglected in the extant literature leading to a series of omissions and distortions in the historical record. By detailing how and why Iran transitioned from a primitive military aid recipient in the 1950s to America’s primary military credit customer in the late 1960s and 1970s, this book provides a detailed and original contribution to the understanding of a key Cold War episode in U.S. foreign policy. By drawing on extensive declassified documents from more than 10 archives, the investigation demonstrates not only the importance of the arms relationship but also how it reflected, and contributed to, the wider evolution of U.S.-Iranian relations from a position of Iranian client state dependency to a situation where the U.S. became heavily leveraged to the Shah for protection of the Gulf and beyond – until the policy met its disastrous end in 1979 as an antithetical regime took power in Iran. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Middle East studies, US Foreign Policy and Security studies and for those seeking better foundations for which to gain an understanding of U.S. foreign policy in the final decade of the Cold War, and beyond.

The official monthly record of United States foreign policy.

Did the United States know more than it acknowledges about growing unrest under the Shah in mid-1970s Iran? Have historians of American-Iranian relations focused too narrowly on prevailing historical theory and personal recollection? In a period of escalating tension between the United States and Iran, what can the two nations' history of conflict tell us about their diplomatic future? Covering Carter's policy from the end of the Shah's reign to the revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini, Babak Ganji explores the nature of their perpetually antagonistic relations and the mistrust and misunderstanding that fuels it. Politics of Confrontation is a penetrating critique of international relations theory within the historical framework of US-Iranian relations, as well as a thorough examination of American policy towards Iran. It is the first in-depth look at documents seized by revolutionary students from the American Embassy during the infamous hostage crisis, and debunks the myth that US officials were unaware of the nature of opposition to the Shah or of Soviet influence on senior clerics. These findings are an essential addition to the discourse of foreign policy theorists and invaluable for historians of the US, Iran and the Cold War.