Explores the varied relationship between political leaders and naval experts, from the 16th to 21st centuries The shaping of national defence strategies is particularly difficult in the case of navies. Few political leaders have naval experience, in contrast to the case of armies where political leaders and army commanders have often shared similar social and professional backgrounds. Bringing together historical examples from Britain, the United States, Spain and France, the book provides insights into this key relationship.The authors highlight factors which have made for successful relationships between political leaders and naval experts, showing how changing circumstances have affected the dialogue and underlines the importance of good exchange of knowledge, expertise and understanding for successful policy making and strategic outcomes. Sea power continues to be crucial in the present world's increasingly unstable geopolitical situation, the mutual exchange of expertise between naval experts and political leaders is as important as ever, and the risk of political 'sea blindness' remains high. This book's historical examples provide good guidance on how to manage the relationship between political leaders and naval experts well.al leaders is as important as ever, and the risk of political 'sea blindness' remains high. This book's historical examples provide good guidance on how to manage the relationship between political leaders and naval experts well.al leaders is as important as ever, and the risk of political 'sea blindness' remains high. This book's historical examples provide good guidance on how to manage the relationship between political leaders and naval experts well.al leaders is as important as ever, and the risk of political 'sea blindness' remains high. This book's historical examples provide good guidance on how to manage the relationship between political leaders and naval experts well.

Shows how the system of supply was perfected during the later part of the Napoleonic Wars, enabling fleets to stay at sea on a permanent basis. After the Battle of Trafalgar, the navy continued to be the major arm of British strategy. Decades of practice and refinement had rendered it adept at executing operations - fighting battles, blockading and convoying - across theglobe. And yet, as late as 1807, fleets were forced from their stations due to an ineffective provisioning system. The Transformation of British Naval Strategy shows how sweeping administrative reforms enacted between 1808and 1812 established a highly-effective logistical system, changing an ineffective supply system into one which successfully enabled a fleet to remain on station for as long as was required. James Davey examines the logistical support provided for fleets sent to Northern Europe during the Napoleonic War and shows how this new supply system successfully transformed naval operations, enabling the navy to pursue crucial objectives of national importance, protect essential exports and imports and attack the economies of the Napoleonic Empire. The Transformation of British Naval Strategy is a detailed study of national policy, administrative and political reform and strategic viability. It delves into the nature of the British state, its relationship with the private sector and its ability to reform itself in a time of war. Bureaucratic restructuring represented the last stage in a century-long process of logistical improvement. As a result of the reforms, the navy was able to conduct operations beyond the realms of possibility even twenty years earlier and saw the reach of its power transformed. Military and Napoleonic historians will find this book invaluable. JAMES DAVEY is Research Curator at the National Maritime Museum and Visiting Lecturer at the University of Greenwich, where he teaches British naval history.

Tells the story of the growing Chinese Navy - The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) - and its expanding capabilities, evolving roles and military implications for the USA. Divided into four thematic sections, this special collection of essays surveys and analyzes the most important aspects of China's navel modernization.

Discusses the lessons which Britain learned in the war of 1739-48 which, when applied in later wars, brought about Britain's global naval supremacy.

First full investigation into the men of Agincourt - their service, backgrounds, lives and experiences.

The story of the war at sea in the reign of Edward III, including the important sea battles, and an analysis of the development of the English navy in the period. This book describes naval warfare during the opening phase of the Hundred Years War, a vital period in the development of the early Royal Navy, in which Edward III's government struggled to harness English naval power in a dramatic battle for supremacy with their French and Spanish adversaries. It shows how the escalating demands of Edward's astonishing military ambitions led to an intense period of evolution in the English navy and the growth of a cultureof naval specialism and professionalism. It addresses how this in turn affected the livelihoods of England's mariners and coastal communities. The book covers in detail the most important sea battles of Edward III's reign -Sluys, Winchelsea and La Rochelle - as well as raids and naval blockades. It highlights the systems by which ships were brought into service and mariners recruited, and explores how these were resisted by mariners and coastal communities. It also tells the story of the range of personalities, heroes and villains who influenced the development of the navy in the reign of Edward III. GRAHAM CUSHWAY holds a PhD in Maritime History from the University of Exeter.

English translation of one of the most significant medieval texts on fighting with swords.

Since its creation in 1963, United States Southern Command has been led by 30 senior officers representing all four of the armed forces. None has undertaken his leadership responsibilities with the cultural sensitivity and creativity demonstrated by Admiral Jim Stavridis during his tenure in command. Breaking with tradition, Admiral Stavridis discarded the customary military model as he organized the Southern Command Headquarters. In its place he created an organization designed not to subdue adversaries, but instead to build durable and enduring partnerships with friends. His observation that it is the business of Southern Command to launch "ideas not missiles" into the command's area of responsibility gained strategic resonance throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America, and at the highest levels in Washington, DC.

Reproduction of the original: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian Stafford Corbett