On the major European and Russian fronts throughout World War II, the challenge of crossing rivers under fire was absolutely central to any advance. The Panzers that crossed the Meuse at Sedan in May 1940 cut the French Army in two. The Wehrmacht's ability to cross the great rivers of the western USSR was vital to the lightning advances of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, and in 1943–45 the Red Army had to drive the Germans back from a succession of river lines during their advance to the Reich, culminating in the Vistula and Oder lines. With World War II armies dependent on heavy mechanized equipment, the function which rivers played became essential for soldiers in all sides of the war. World War II River Assault Tactics details the methods, means and analysis of specific successes and failures. Featuring a wealth of wartime photos, particularly from German sources, and full-colour plates illustrating tactical scenarios, the subject is brought to life.

After the Normandy break-out, the Allies' headlong dash east came to a halt in the autumn with the ill-fated MARKET GARDEN operation and over-extended supply lines short of the Rhineland. After repulsing the Nazis' daring Ardennes offensive, Montgomery's and Bradley's Army Groups cleared the Reichwald and Rhineland and closed on the Rhine. With both sides aware of the strategic significance of this physical barrier the stakes could not have been higher. Eisenhower's plan involved a vast airborne assault by General Ridgway's XV11 Airborne Corps (codename VARSITY) and the simultaneously coordinated river crossing by Monty's 21 Army Group codename PLUNDER with Dempsey's British Second Army and General William H. Simpson's US Ninth Army. This superbly illustrated and researched book describes the March 1945 assault crossing involving naval amphibious craft, the air and artillery bombardment and diversionary attack by the British 1st Commando brigade at Wesel. In concert with VARSITY and PLUNDER, Patton's US Third Army Group crossed further south. As a result of this triumph of strategic planning and tactical execution, the fate of Hitler's 'Thousand Year Reich' was finally sealed.

CONTENTSPrefaceChapter 1. ConceptsGeneralTypes of CrossingsHastyDeliberateRetrogradeCrossing FundamentalsSurpriseExtensive PreparationFlexible PlanTraffic ControlOrganizationSpeedChapter 2. Terrain and EnemyGeneralEstimate of the SituationTactical RequirementsTerrainCharacteristicsMilitary AspectsCurrentWater MeasurementsWater ChangesObstructionsThe Friendly ShoreThe Enemy ShoreIntelligencePriority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)Information CollectionThreatRiver DefenseOffensive River CrossingChapter 3. Command and ControlGeneralOrganizationControl ElementsDivision HeadquartersBrigade HeadquartersCommunicationsControl MeasuresRelease Lines (RLs)Crossing AreasWaiting AreasEngineer Equipment Parks (EEPs)Traffic-Control PostsEngineer Regulating PointsCrossing PlanCrossing ControlAssault Across the RiverCrossing-Area OperationsTransfer of Support Forces to DivisionMovement ControlRetrograde CrossingsChapter 4. PlanningGeneralThe Planning ProcessAnalyzing the MissionDeveloping COAsAnalyzing COAsComparing COAsProducing OrdersChapter 5. Division Deliberate River CrossingGeneralPhases of a Deliberate River CrossingThe River CrossingAdvance to the River (Phase I)Assault Across the River (Phase II)Advance From the Exit Bank (Phase III)Secure the Bridgehead Line (Phase IV)Continuation of the AttackChapter 6. Retrograde OperationsGeneralRetrograde TypesDelayWithdrawalRetirementDenial MeasuresPlanningChapter 7. Crossing SitesGeneralCrossing-Site SelectionPlanningRequirementsEntry/Exit Routes or PathsRoutes and ApproachesWaiting AreasRiver ConditionsBanksBottomsEnemy SituationSite AnalysisField CalculationsMeasuring the Currents VelocityDetermining Slopes and DegreesMeasuring the River's WidthCalculating Downstream DriftRaftsSite PreparationRafting SitesRafting OperationsMaintenance and RefuelingBridgesSite OrganizationNight OperationsActions Under FireVehicle RecoveryOther Gap-Crossing EquipmentChapter 8. Assault CrossingGeneralTypes of Assault CrossingsRubber-Boat CrossingAir-Assault CrossingVehicle-Swim CrossingOrganizationSupport ForceAssault ForceEngineersPreparation Phase of the OperationFar-Shore ReconnaissanceFar-Shore PreparationNearshore ReconnaissanceAssault-Force RehearsalExecution Phase of the OperationAttack-Position ProceduresEmbarking ProceduresTactical Control AfloatWatermanshipObscuring With SmokeDirect-Fire ReactionIndirect-Fire ReactionDebarking ProceduresBoat ReturnMotor ProceduresCargo ProceduresCasualty ProceduresSafetyChapter 9. Engineer OperationsGeneralERP OperationsRafting OperationsBridging OperationsSwimming OperationsEngineer Contingency Bridging OperationsAssault Bridges, Long-Term UseMaintenanceAnchorageProtective SystemsApproachesLong-Term Gap-Crossing C2Multirole Bridge Company (MRBC)OrganizationBasic ConceptImplicationsTrainingAppendix A. Metric Conversion ChartAppendix B. Engineer-Planning CalculationsGeneralEngineer PlanningAppendix C. Crossing MeansGeneralDescriptions of Crossing MeansFording VehiclesAmphibious VehiclesAircraftBoatsAssault Launched BridgesRaftsBridges

Field Manual, US army. Reglement om kamp om- og overgang over vandløb udgivet af USA's hær 1972. Reglementet beskriver både planlægning og udførelse af operationen, der kan udføres som hastigt forberedt eller grundigt forberedt. Der er beskrivelse af overgangsmateriel og dets anvendelse.

Crossing a river against a defending enemy force is a difficult and complex task for any army. History has shown that preparation is necessary to avoid disasters during this type of operation. In 2003, the Third Infantry Division crossed the Euphrates River because it was prepared for this task and possessed the necessary equipment. Since then, no other divisions or corps has executed river crossing operations. While the United States Army focused on counterinsurgency operations during the last twelve years, it underwent significant changes to adapt to meet the adversities on the battlefield. It transformed its war-fighting organizations, trained its corps and divisions with computer simulations, and relegated field training to brigade and below units. In addition, its current doctrine now refers to river crossings as the deliberate wet gap crossing. Because of these changes, many questions arose as to the present corps and divisions’ preparedness to do large-scale operations, to include its ability to plan, prepare, and execute the deliberate wet gap crossing. If called today, could these organizations conduct this complex operation? Examining river crossings in Europe during the Second World War was appropriate for insight into how the previous generation of corps and divisions prepared and executed such a complex task. After analyzing how these units were able to cross the numerous waterways in Europe, the present Army should consider reassessing its doctrine, training, and organization and equipment to prepare its units for future deliberate wet gap crossings.