Investigates the probabilities of the revival of Japanese militarism, seen in terms of the sending of Japanese naval vessels and troops to Southeast Asia to potect Japan's economic interests in the region within the context of the accelerating conditions for the emergence of militarism - domestic needs, spiritual preparation, large-scale armament and international environment.

A considerable amount of writing has been published on Japan at war in the Second World War, and more recently scholars have been revisiting the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5; whereas this volume strives to examine Japan’s twentieth-century approach to war and militarism in a wider perspective, bringing hitherto unexamined new themes and subject-matter under scrutiny up to the present day. Among the topics covered are the February 26 Incident in Theatre and Film, Ethnicity and Gender in Wartime Japanese Revue Theatre, Military Festivals and the Japanese Self-Defence Forces, Major Trends in Japanese Treatment of POWs in Modern Times, and Japan’s ‘Tug of War’after the Russian War. Published to mark the distinguished academic career of Ben-Ami Shillony, who retired in 2006, this volume also offers valuable new insights into the theme of the Japanese and the Jews, including the Story and Myth of Anne Frank and Sadako Sasaki, the involvement of Jewish scientists in the making of the atomic bomb, and Japan’s Jewish Policy in the late 1930s.

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.

A burgeoning Japanese role in the Asia-Pacific region has been one of the most contentious issues to the Southeast Asian countries in recent years with its positive and negative implications. It is thus timely and significant to come to terms with Japan's "design" in the region from a historical perspective. Attributing Japan's active involvement in Southeast Asian affairs to the proclamation of the so-called Fukuda Doctrine of August 1977, this study traces the origins of Japan's political role in the region and analyses the development and effects of the very first Japanese foreign policy doctrine. As perhaps the most exclusive scrutiny on the Fukuda Doctrine as well as on Japan-ASEAN relations, this study renders a comprehensive history of Japan-Southeast Asia relations in the post-war period.

Femten videnskabsmænd inden for politik, sociogi og historie har bidraget til indholdet. Inden for hovedemnet skrives om Japan, Kina, Burma, Thailand, Indonesien, Irak, Ægypten og Syrien.