In an earlier paper (Briault, 1999) I put forward the case for a single national financial services regulator. Such a regulator, covering a broad range of financial services activities and spanning both prudential and conduct of business regulation, should be well placed to deliver effective, efficient and properly differentiated regulation in the current financial environment in the UK. That paper described the formation of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) and similar developments in other countries. It also discussed the factors which supported the creation of an integrated financial services regulator and commented on the relationship between a single regulator and a central bank.So why revisit this case now? The purpose of this paper 1 is not simply to repeat the arguments set out in the earlier paper, but to review developments over the last three and a half years in the UK in an attempt to measure the performance of the FSA against the rationale for creating it in the first place. The FSA has gained some useful experience over this period from which to begin to draw some tentative conclusions about the success or otherwise of a single financial services regulator in the UK, even if these conclusions must be subject to qualifications at this stage. And although the FSA has been acting in most respects as a single regulator for the last three and a half years (see Briault, 1999, page 7), it only came fully into existence at midnight on 30 November 2001, when the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) came into force. The quot;alphabet soupquot; of the previous regulatory bodies, as Michael Taylor once described them (Taylor, 1995, page 7), has finally disappeared.

The single statutory regulator for financial services which is being established in the UK (the Financial Services Authority, quot;FSAquot;) will be the broadest financial regulator in the world, combining prudential, conduct of business and market conduct regulation across the full range of financial services, including banking, securities, investment management and insurance. A few other countries already have single financial services regulators, but the FSA will be the first in a major international financial centre.This paper considers the rationale for establishing a single national financial services regulator. The institutional structure of financial services regulation is important because of the impact of the efficiency and effectiveness of this regulation on the direct and indirect costs of regulation and on the success of regulation in meeting its statutory objectives. To what extent should the structure of financial regulation be driven by the functions which financial services firms undertake, reflecting market developments in the financial services industry? Is there a first-best institutional arrangement which is independent of these market developments, arising perhaps from economies of scale and scope in undertaking financial regulation, or from some underlying logic linking the structure of regulation with the objectives of regulation or with the institutional arrangements for monetary policy and for addressing systemic risk? Are there also implications here for the structure of regulation internationally, not just within national borders?Although the structure of financial regulation must depend in part on what is being regulated and why it is being regulated, this paper takes as given the rationale for financial services regulation as set out in Davies (1998a), Goodhart et al (1998) and Llewellyn (1999). This is not to deny the crucial importance of determining the rationale for intervention - and indeed the key interrelationships between this rationale and the choice of the tools of supervision - but this is too large a subject to cover within this paper.

In this paper, we provide an overview of the concerns surrounding the variations in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) across banks and jurisdictions and how this might undermine the Basel III capital adequacy framework. We discuss the key drivers behind the differences in these calculations, drawing upon a sample of systemically important banks from Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific. We then discuss a range of policy options that could be explored to fix the actual and perceived problems with RWAs, and improve the use of risk-sensitive capital ratios.

Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.

The financial system and its regulation have undergone exponential growth and dramatic reform over the last thirty years. This period has witnessed major developments in the nature and intensity of financial markets, as well as repeated cycles of regulatory reform and development, often linked to crisis conditions. The recent financial crisis has led to unparalleled interest in financial regulation from policymakers, economists, legal practitioners, and the academic community, and has prompted large-scale regulatory reform. The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation is the first comprehensive, authoritative, and state of the art account of the nature of financial regulation. Written by an international team of leading scholars in the field, it takes a contextual and comparative approach to examine scholarly, policy, and regulatory developments in the past three decades. The first three parts of the Handbook address the underpinning horizontal themes which arise in financial regulation: financial systems and regulation; the organization of financial system regulation, including regional examples from the EU and the US; and the delivery of outcomes and regulatory techniques. The final three Parts address the perennial objectives of financial regulation, widely regarded as the anchors of financial regulation internationally: financial stability, market efficiency, integrity, and transparency; and consumer protection. The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation is an invaluable resource for scholars and students of financial regulation, economists, policy-makers and regulators.

This interdisciplinary examination of corporate insolvency law assesses recent reforms and anticipates new legislation.

This book provides an extensive and critical assessment of the current regulatory and supervisory framework of investment services in the European Union (EU) and proposes alternative institutional structures. Recent trends in financial services at EU level as well as regulatory and institutional developments at national level make the focus of this book very timely. The book contributes to the debate by making specific suggestions with regard to the institutional structure and the operational sphere of a central pan-European regulator.

Analyzing ongoing changes in the design of regulatory and supervisory authorities over the banking and financial industry in Europe, this comprehensive Handbook pays particular attention to the role of national central banks, the new financial supervisory authorities and the European Central Bank (ECB).