This paper documents the evolution of gross and net capital flows to emerging market economies and surveys the large literature on the potential drivers. While the capital flow landscape has been shaped by the evolution of both global and country-specific factors, the relative importance of these factors has varied over time and differs depending on the type of capital flows. The findings from the survey of the literature thus underscores the importance of policies in both source and recipient countries in shaping capital flows.

This paper examines why surges in capital flows to emerging market economies (EMEs) occur, and what determines the allocation of capital across countries during such surge episodes. We use two different methodologies to identify surges in EMEs over 1980-2009, differentiating between those mainly caused by changes in the country's external liabilities (reflecting the investment decisions of foreigners), and those caused by changes in its assets (reflecting the decisions of residents). Global factors-including US interest rates and risk aversion¡-are key to determining whether a surge will occur, but domestic factors such as the country's external financing needs (as implied by an intertemporal optimizing model of the current account) and structural characteristics also matter, which explains why not all EMEs experience surges. Conditional on a surge occurring, moreover, the magnitude of the capital inflow depends largely on domestic factors including the country's external financing needs, and the exchange rate regime. Finally, while similar factors explain asset- and liability-driven surges, the latter are more sensitive to global factors and contagion.

This paper assesses empirically the key drivers of private capital flows to a large sample of emerging market economies in the last decade. It analyzes the effect of the global financial cycle, measured by the VIX, on capital flows and investigates the role of fundamentals and country characteristics in mitigating or amplifying its effect. Using interaction models, we find the effect of the VIX to be non-linear. For low levels of the VIX, capital flows are driven by fundamental factors. During periods of stress, the VIX becomes the dominant driver of capital flows while other determinants, with the exception of interest rate differentials, lose statistical significance. Our results also suggest that the effect of global financial conditions on gross private capital flows increases with the host country’s level of financial sector development. Finally, our results imply that countries cannot fully insulate themselves from global financial shocks, unless creating a fragmented global financial system.

Back in the early 1990s, economists and policy makers had high expectations about the prospects for domestic capital market development in emerging economies, particularly in Latin America. Unfortunately, they are now faced with disheartening results. Stock and bond markets remain illiquid and segmented. Debt is concentrated at the short end of the maturity spectrum and denominated in foreign currency, exposing countries to maturity and currency risk. Capital markets in Latin America look particularly underdeveloped when considering the many efforts undertaken to improve the macroeconomic environment and to reform the institutions believed to foster capital market development. The disappointing performance has made conventional policy recommendations questionable, at best. 'Emerging Capital Markets and Globalization' analyzes where we stand and where we are heading on capital market development. First, it takes stock of the state and evolution of Latin American capital markets and related reforms over time and relative to other countries. Second, it analyzes the factors related to the development of capital markets, with particular interest on measuring the impact of reforms. And third, in light of this analysis, it discusses the prospects for capital market development in Latin America and emerging economies and the implications for the reform agenda.

This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.

In this paper, we provide an overview of the concerns surrounding the variations in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) across banks and jurisdictions and how this might undermine the Basel III capital adequacy framework. We discuss the key drivers behind the differences in these calculations, drawing upon a sample of systemically important banks from Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific. We then discuss a range of policy options that could be explored to fix the actual and perceived problems with RWAs, and improve the use of risk-sensitive capital ratios.

This global handbook provides an up-to-date and comprehensive overview of shadow banking, or market-based finance as it has been recently coined. Engaging in financial intermediary services outside of normal regulatory parameters, the shadow banking sector was arguably a critical factor in causing the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This volume focuses specifically on shadow banking activities, risk, policy and regulatory issues. It evaluates the nexus between policy design and regulatory output around the world, paying attention to the concept of risk in all its dimensions—the legal, financial, market, economic and monetary perspectives. Particular attention is given to spillover risk, contagion risk and systemic risk and their positioning and relevance in shadow banking activities. Newly introduced and incoming policies are evaluated in detail, as well as how risk is managed, observed and assessed, and how new regulation can potentially create new sources of risk. Volume I concludes with analysis of what will and still needs to happen in the event of another crisis. Proposing innovative suggestions for improvement, including a novel Pigovian tax to tame financial and systemic risks, this handbook is a must-read for professionals and policy-makers within the banking sector, as well as those researching economics and finance.

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the 2009 global recession. Most emerging market and developing economies weathered the global recession relatively well, in part by using the sizable fiscal and monetary policy ammunition accumulated during prior years of strong growth. However, their growth prospects have weakened since then, and many now have less policy space. This study provides the first comprehensive stocktaking of the past decade from the perspective of emerging market and developing economies. Many of these economies have now become more vulnerable to economic shocks. The study discusses lessons from the global recession and policy options for these economies to strengthen growth and prepare for the possibility of another global downturn.

Since the inception of development economics in the post-World War II period, most of its proponents have prescribed the adoption of western institutions as the path for prosperity – the unequivocal solution for poverty, illiteracy, hunger, inequality, and violence in the world. Seventy years of attempts, or at least the pretense thereof, to reproduce the western model in completely different historical and cultural contexts have proven to be no more than a mirage for most. Faced with this scenario, why do economists insist on the ideas of development, convergence, and emulation of the lifestyle of western countries? Is it possible to disassociate development from multidimensional instability, dependency, subordination, and exploitation? Is the current social, political, ecological, and economic organized destabilization observed in the western countries a model to follow, a desirable end of history? These questions raised earlier by some fellow economists, have become ever more pressing in the present context of generalized instability. The book questions how ethical and professionally responsible it is for economists to continue to undiscerningly prescribe miraculous one-size-fits-all market-oriented models to solve socio-economic problems everywhere. The contributors of this edited volume invite the readers to consider these questions and further similar inquiries in the future. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of the journal Review of Political Economy.

Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.