This paper focuses on the fact that the 2004–2005 conditionality review expands to include a review of the application of the new Guidelines on Conditionality, adopted in 2002. These guidelines were the culmination of a comprehensive and far-reaching review of conditionality that aimed to enhance the effectiveness of IMF-supported programs. They represented the first revision of the IMF’s conditionality guidelines since 1979, and were developed by the IMF after seeking input from civil society and public forums held in several countries. This review comes at an early stage of experience with the new guidelines, and further evidence will be needed before definite conclusions can be drawn. The ultimate test of conditionality is whether it contributes to better economic outcomes, including over the medium term, and these cannot yet be gauged. Moreover, although this review draws in part on case studies, no substitute exists for cross-country analysis for identifying broad trends, and at this stage such analysis is hampered by small sample sizes.

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This paper takes a fresh look at the purpose and modalities of conditionality for the use of the Fund’s resources. It is part of a broader review of Fund lending facilities that includes access levels, charges and maturities, the analytical basis for Fund lending, and facilities for low income countries. It aims to explore options for more flexible approaches that would be responsive to the changing needs and circumstances of the Fund’s members while providing adequate safeguards for Fund resources. While these options have been developed with General Resources Account (GRA) facilities in mind as a complement to the companion paper on the analytical framework, they could apply, as appropriate, to facilities and instruments used by low income members.

This evaluation examines factors influencing the effectiveness of the IMF structural conditionality in bringing about structural reform. It assesses the impact of the streamlining initiative launched in 2000 and of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines. These guidelines aimed at reducing the volume and scope of structural conditionality by requiring “parsimony” in the use of conditions and stipulated that conditions must be “critical” to the achievement of the program goals. The evaluation finds that during the period 1995–2004, there was extensive use of structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs, with an average of 17 conditions per program/year.

This paper reviews the design of conditionality in Fund-supported programs from 2002 to end-September 2011, with an emphasis on recent years. It focuses on the content and application of program conditionality—especially structural conditionality—in relation to the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines (the "Guidelines"), the Staff Statement on Principles Underlying the Guidelines on Conditionality, and subsequent revisions to operational guidance on conditionality. The analysis is based on the five key interrelated principles guiding the design of conditionality: national ownership of programs, parsimony in program-related conditions, tailoring to country circumstances, effective coordination with other multilateral institutions, and clarity in the specification of conditions. In particular, the principle of parsimony requires that program-related conditions be critical (or the minimum necessary) to achieve program objectives and goals, critical for monitoring program implementation, or necessary for implementing specific provisions under the Articles of Agreement (the "criticality criterion"). Beyond assessing compliance with these guidelines and principles, the paper also examines the implementation of conditionality

This note aims to provide guidance on the key principles and considerations underlying the design of Fund-supported programs. The note expands on the previous operational guidance notes on conditionality published over 2003-2014, incorporating lessons from the 2018-19 Review of Conditionality, and other recent key policy developments including the recommendation of the Management’s Implementation Plan in response to Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)’s report on growth and adjustment in IMF-supported programs. The note in particular highlights operational advice to (i) improve the realism of macroeconomic forecast in programs and fostering a more systematic analysis of contingency plans and risks; (ii) improve the focus, depth, implementation, and tailoring of structural conditions (SCs), with due consideration of growth effects; and (iii) help strengthen the ownership of country authorities. Designed as a comprehensive reference and primer on program design and conditionality in an accessible and transparent manner, the note refers in summary to a broad range of economic and policy considerations over the lifecycle of Fund-supported programs. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board Decisions remain the primary legal authority on matters covered in this note.

This paper examines the theoretical foundations for, and empirical evidence of, Fund support in preventing capital account crises. At a theoretical level, Fund supported programs can lower the crisis probability in two ways. First, such programs provide the member with additional external reserves, making a run for the exit by private creditors less likely. Second, such programs induce and signal better economic policies, though this needs to be supported by conditionality.