K. E. Boxer explores moral responsibility, and whether it is compatible with causal determinism. She suggests that to answer this question we must focus on responsibility in the sense of liability, and that an incompatibilist view may only be preserved on an understanding of the moral desert of punishment that many find morally problematic.

Faith in the power and righteousness of retribution has taken over the American criminal justice system. Approaching punishment and responsibility from a philosophical perspective, Erin Kelly challenges the moralism behind harsh treatment of criminal offenders and calls into question our society’s commitment to mass incarceration. The Limits of Blame takes issue with a criminal justice system that aligns legal criteria of guilt with moral criteria of blameworthiness. Many incarcerated people do not meet the criteria of blameworthiness, even when they are guilty of crimes. Kelly underscores the problems of exaggerating what criminal guilt indicates, particularly when it is tied to the illusion that we know how long and in what ways criminals should suffer. Our practice of assigning blame has gone beyond a pragmatic need for protection and a moral need to repudiate harmful acts publicly. It represents a desire for retribution that normalizes excessive punishment. Appreciating the limits of moral blame critically undermines a commonplace rationale for long and brutal punishment practices. Kelly proposes that we abandon our culture of blame and aim at reducing serious crime rather than imposing retribution. Were we to refocus our perspective to fit the relevant moral circumstances and legal criteria, we could endorse a humane, appropriately limited, and more productive approach to criminal justice.

The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany’s post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China’s rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany’s armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so. Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany’s current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin’s European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that: Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than rejecting the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power – including military power – in international affairs. The authors show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy.

Winner of the 2007 Paul Guggenheim Prize! Today's terrorists possess unprecedented power, but the State still plays a crucial role in the success or failure of their plans. Terrorists count on governmental inaction, toleration or support. And citizens look to the State to protect them from the dangers that these terrorists pose. But the rules of international law that regulate State responsibility for preventing terrorism were crafted for a different age. They are open to abuse and poorly suited to hold States accountable for sponsoring or tolerating contemporary terrorist activity. It is time that these rules were reconceived. Tal Becker's incisive and ground-breaking book analyses the law of State responsibility for non-State violence and examines its relevance in a world coming to terms with the threat of catastrophic terrorism. The book sets out the legal duties of States to prevent, and abstain from supporting, terrorist activity and explores how to maximise State compliance with these obligations. Drawing on a wealth of precedents and legal sources, the book offers an innovative approach to regulating State responsibility for terrorism, inspired by the principles and philosophy of causation. In so doing, it presents a new conceptual and legal framework for dealing with the complex interactions between State and non-State actors that make terrorism possible, and offers a way to harness international law to enhance human security in a post-9/11 world.

This book examines topical issues in global corporate social responsibility (CSR) from both scholarly and practical perspectives. It offers a variety of viewpoints and cases from countries around the globe and combines them with current academic knowledge. Intended for students, academics, and managers wishing to keep abreast of the challenges and opportunities for corporations operating in our ever-more-complex globalized world, this book provides fresh insights into responsible business conduct.

This book explores moral responsibility, and whether it is compatible with causal determinism. Its author, K. E. Boxer, started out with deeply incompatibilist intuitions but became dissatisfied with the arguments that she and other contemporary incompatibilists marshalled in support of this view. Rethinking Responsibility has evolved out of her search for a more adequate argument. Boxer suggests that if incompatibilists are to be in a position to provide such an argument, they must shift their attention away from metaphysics and back to what H. L. A. Hart deemed the primary sense of the concept of moral responsibility, viz., the sense of liability. To say that an agent is morally responsible for an action in this sense is to say that she satisfies the necessary causal and capacity conditions for desert of certain forms of response. If incompatibilists are to show that among those conditions is a requirement for some form of ultimate responsibility incompatible with determinism, they must first clarify their understanding of moral desert and the moral responses associated with attributions of responsibility. The book examines different possible understandings of moral liability-responsibility based on different possible accounts of the nature of moral blame, the moral desert of punishment, and the relation between desert of moral blame and desert of punishment. A focal point throughout the discussion is whether, on any of the possible understandings, moral responsibility would require agents to be ultimately responsible for their actions in a way incompatible with causal determinism. Other issues discussed include what renders a defect a moral defect or a particular criticism a moral criticism, whether moral obligations are act-governing or will-governing, the connection between the moral reactive attitudes and the retributive sentiments, the relevance of the capacity to participate in ordinary interpersonal relationships, and whether it is possible to understand the moral desert of punishment in communicative terms. Boxer concludes that incompatibilists face an unenviable choice: either they must adopt an understanding of the moral desert of punishment that many find morally problematic, or they must abandon incompatibilism.

Using an interdisciplinary focus, this book combines the research disciplines of philosophy, business management and sustainability to aid and advance scholar and practitioner understanding of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

This volume examines the concept of responsibility amidst current societal challenges that require its rethinking. Assigning responsibility to an agent proves problematic when technological or social structures have become too complex. Concepts of responsibility which retrospectively name a responsible party often fail due to this complexity, diffusing responsibility to a minimum that can no longer be perceived. The contributions explore the foundations of responsibility in order to engage constructively with contemporary issues. The first part approaches conceptual challenges through examples concerning artificial intelligence, while the second discusses the anthropological presuppositions of responsibility and connects them with the broader continental philosophical tradition. The third part deals with concepts of how intergenerational responsibility can be included both conceptually and legally.

Calling on philosophers as the custodians of rationality to reconsider their responsibility toward their communities and the state of civilization at large, this book considers philosophy to be a practical discipline. Largely foreign to philosophers and non-philosophers alike, this conception of philosophy discloses the relevance of its unique contributions to contemporary society. The book offers a compelling and accessible analysis of philosophy also in relation to religion, psychology, the New Age Movement, and globalization, and exemplifies through a wide range of current problems how philosophers can fulfil their responsibility. Its argument that responsibility lies where one is capable of doing what is needed, and even more so, when no one else can do it, targets philosophers. However, its innovative study of contemporary philosophy coupled with its original contributions to the problems at hand will engage academics and students from other disciplines, as well as a general readership.

Rethinking Finance in the Face of New Challenges provides an overview of the new research perspectives devoted to financial activity, reconsidering the opposition between orthodox and heterodox schools of finance.