Over the past decade, dozens of studies, reports, directives, and commissions have recommended specific changes in the approach the Department of Defense (DoD) uses to acquire products (primarily major weapon systems). This Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study Task Force reviewed these prior studies and concluded that, by and large, the recommendations have ben implemented. Rather than adding to the list of 'what to do' recommendations, this Task Force concentrated on recommending 'how-to-implement' change. This is a departure from the typical technical recommendations, but the Task Force believes this 'how to' focus is urgently needed at this juncture.

Over the past decade, dozens of studies, reports, directives, and commissions have recommended specific changes in the approach the Department of Defense (DoD) uses to acquire products (primarily major weapon systems). This Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study Task Force reviewed these prior studies and concluded that, by and large, the recommendations have ben implemented. Rather than adding to the list of 'what to do' recommendations, this Task Force concentrated on recommending 'how-to-implement' change. This is a departure from the typical technical recommendations, but the Task Force believes this 'how to' focus is urgently needed at this juncture.

This report presents the recommendations of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study Task Force on Engineering in the Manufacturing Process. The terms of reference (TOR) for this Task Force represent a logical continuation of DSB manufacturing studies performed in prior years, particularly in the areas of integrated product and process development (IPPD)2and dual-use-manufacturing. In this study, however, the primary focus is on Science and Technology (S AND T) and the application of IPPD and dual-use concepts even earlier than previous studies have recommended. During its study, the Task Force addressed engineering and manufacturing management and technology approaches that can be used to achieve a better product and process balance in the S AND T phase, which precedes the formal acquisition process, and that result in both unit production and total life cycle cost reduction. It chose S AND T "exit criteria" and metrics as the means to demonstrate process as well as performance capability during the S AND T phase and to reduce downstream acquisition risks. The Task Force also examined a key enabler of IPPD and manufacturing enterprise control-advanced modeling and simulation technology. The work in this area by this Task Force relates to the work of another DSB Summer Study that specifically addressed simulation, the Readiness, Simulation, and Prototyping Task Force. The expanded use of best commercial products, practices, and manufacturing capabilities was also considered as an additional way to meet the Department of Defense (DOD) future needs for rapid transition to production and economic low-volume manufacturing. As a result of its deliberations, the Task Force developed specific recommendations for experiments to be conducted within S AND T Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) to validate the benefits of the new recommended approaches to S AND T contained in this report.

Globalization-the integration of the political, economic and cultural activities of geographically and/or nationally separated peoples-is not a discernible event or challenge, is not new, but it is accelerating. More importantly, globalization is largely irresistible. Thus, globalization is not a policy option, but a fact to which policymakers must adapt. Globalization has accelerated as a result of many positive factors, the most notable of which include: the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War; the spread of capitalism and free trade; more rapid and global capital flows and more liberal financial markets; the liberalization of communications; international academic and scientific collaboration; and faster and more efficient forms of transportation. At the core of accelerated global integration-at once its principal cause and consequence-is the information revolution, which is knocking down once-formidable barriers of physical distance, blurring national boundaries and creating cross-border communities of all types.

The Defense Science Board Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities was formed in early 2004 (the terms of reference are contained in Appendix A) and culminated in the production of a final report and summary briefing in August of 2004. The DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication conducted its deliberations within the overall Summer Study schedule and revisited a topic that was addressed in October 2001.1 Task Force members and Government advisors are identified in Appendix B. The current Strategic Communication Task Force re-examined the purposes of strategic communication and the salience of recommendations in the earlier study. It then considered the following questions: (1) What are the consequences of changes in the strategic communication environment? (2) What Presidential direction and strategic communication means are required? (3) What should be done about public diplomacy and open military information operations? The Task Force met with representatives from the National Security Council (NSC), White House Office of Global Communications, Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and the private sector (the schedule of meetings, briefings and discussions is contained in Appendix C). Based on extensive interaction with a broad range of sectors in the government, commercial, and academic worlds, as well as a series of highly interactive internal debates, we have reached the following conclusions and recommendations.

This report details the findings of the Defense Science Board Summer Study on Weapon Development and Production Technology. This Task Force was formed as a follow-up to last year's DSB recommendations regarding the need for a manufacturing technology strategy for the Department of Defense. In addition to the delineations in the Terms of Reference, the following general questions were posed for this study: Given reduced defense budgets, fewer programs, stretched out production far below past economic production rates, overcapacity, a shrinking industrial base, and reluctance of second/third tier suppliers and many commercial producers to participate in the defense industry. (1) How does one achieve unit production cost to a level at, or near equal to, that of higher production rates? (2) How does one incentivize the second/third tier, and commercial producers (where appropriate) to participate in the defense market? (3) How does one mitigate the past record of schedule slippages and cost growth on major programs, through improvements in the efficiency of the production process? (4) Given that production surge capability may be increasingly limited, how does one protect reconstitution of this capability?