The nation is failing to deploy command and control systems commensurate with the nature of likely future warfare, with modern weapons systems, or with our available technological or industrial base. This quotation was the opening statement in a report on Command and Control Systems Management issued nearly a decade ago by a Task Force of the Defense Science Board. To correct the then perceived failings, that Task Force addressed itself to the following areas: how to assure the operational effectiveness of systems for the support of command and control; how to enable the military commands to upgrade and evolve their command and control systems within standards and specifications stemming from an overarching architectural framework to fit the specific needs of the commands; how to strengthen the capabilities of the Joint Chiefs, the Services and the Unified and Specified Commands for testing and exercising as well as evaluating and specifying functions to be performed by the command and control systems; how to modify the regulations for the acquisition of command and control systems in order to recognize the special attributes of these systems, especially the need for evolution, and finally; how to develop a coordinated program of research on command and control concepts to provide the intellectual base needed to guide the evolution of improved command and control systems.

The nation is failing to deploy command and control systems commensurate with the nature of likely future warfare, with modern weapons systems, or with our available technological or industrial base. This quotation was the opening statement in a report on Command and Control Systems Management issued nearly a decade ago by a Task Force of the Defense Science Board. To correct the then perceived failings, that Task Force addressed itself to the following areas: how to assure the operational effectiveness of systems for the support of command and control; how to enable the military commands to upgrade and evolve their command and control systems within standards and specifications stemming from an overarching architectural framework to fit the specific needs of the commands; how to strengthen the capabilities of the Joint Chiefs, the Services and the Unified and Specified Commands for testing and exercising as well as evaluating and specifying functions to be performed by the command and control systems; how to modify the regulations for the acquisition of command and control systems in order to recognize the special attributes of these systems, especially the need for evolution, and finally; how to develop a coordinated program of research on command and control concepts to provide the intellectual base needed to guide the evolution of improved command and control systems.

The 1994 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on Military Operations in Built-up Areas (MOBA) was asked to assess DoD's current capabilities to conduct military operations (including peacemaking and peacekeeping) in urban terrain. The Board focused on operations other than war (OOTW) in an urban environment OOTW can include periods of intense, localized combat. Many of the requirements and proposed solutions for OOTW are relevant to war in cities. The solutions are also relevant in low intensity conflict and in operations that provide humanitarian aid, where minimization of casualties is especially important. The guidance in the Terms of Reference (TOR, see Appendix A) requested that the Board examine: * The potential for U.S. involvement in MOBA * The characteristics of urban operations * Shortcomings in current capability and operational needs (especially regarding survivability, sensors, platforms, navigation, and communication) * Innovative solutions leading to a recommended focus for future efforts. Addressed, were operations that might involve combat, not solely deterrence, psychological operations (PSYOPS), or other noncombat forms of conflict resolution. The study examined: improvements to sensors; weapons (lethal and nonlethal); command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems; and doctrine. It also focused on solutions to issues that could be accomplished in a relatively short time, and that do not require beginning major new programs.

In 200, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT & L)) directed the Defense Science Board (DSB) to study the precision targeting of air-delivered munitions. The results of the 2001 Task Force were well-received within Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and in June 2003, USD(AT & L) directed the DSB to study the closely related topic of "integrated fire support in the battlespace." In this new study the 2003 Task Force applied an approach and methodology similar to the 2001 effort but focused instead on ground-based fires, sea-based fires, and close-air support. As directed in its terms of reference (TOR), the 2003 Task Force assessed the following: ̂ The adequacy of current and proposed munitions, ̂ The timeliness and accuracy of ISR systems, ̂ the adequacy of battlefield C(exp 3) systems, and ̂ Impediments to integrated fires. From October 2003 through April 2004, the Task Force met monthly to gather information.