The second half of the 20th century featured a strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition avoided World War III in part because during the 1950s, scholars like Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter analyzed the fundamental nature of nuclear deterrence. Decades of arms control negotiations reinforced these early notions of stability and created a mutual understanding that allowed U.S.-Soviet competition to proceed without armed conflict. The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about.

The rock band Forever, just a bunch of kids really. They’re good, good enough to make it, just so long as the fame-fanatical, frontman James can hold his emotions together. Obsessed with the immortality achieved by Monroe, Cobain or Hendrix, he is determined to achieve the same notoriety.

Every day and everywhere, China figures prominently in global attention: companies and banks weigh billions in investments; hedge fund managers assess and speculate on downside risks; commodity traders and natural resource producers salivate over China’s energy appetite; intelligence agencies carefully track China’s growing global footprint; militaries monitor China’s growing military capabilities; diplomats grapple with a new assertiveness in China’s diplomatic posture; scholars try to understand the shifting dynamics and sources of China’s behaviour; while journalists track the latest changes in China’s economy, polity, and society. Charting China’s Future provides informed analysis on the complexities of today’s China, and where these complexities may lead, from some of the world’s leading Asia experts. The contributors have provided clear, intelligible, and forward-looking analyses, free of social science jargon and extensive footnotes. Probing into many of the key domestic and external issues facing China today from political, economic and social perspectives the book proffers a forward-looking analysis that will appeal to anyone with a professional, academic or personal interest in the big issues facing today's China and its interaction with the world. Readers will find much to contemplate about China’s future in this volume, and will gain a clearer sense of the key variables and possible trajectories of one of the most consequential countries on the planet.

This study examines China’s interests in the Middle East and assesses China’s economic, political, and security activities there to determine whether China has a strategy toward the region and what such a strategy means for the United States. The study focuses on China’s relations with two of its key partners in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Realism and constructivism are often viewed as competing paradigms for understanding international relations, though scholars are increasingly arguing that the two are compatible. Edited by one of the leading proponents of realist constructivism, this volume shows what realist constructivism looks like in practice by innovatively combining exposition and critiques of the realist constructivist approach with a series of international case studies. Each chapter addresses a key empirical question in international relations and provides important guidance for how to combine both approaches effectively in research. Addressing future directions and possibilities for realist constructivism in international relations, this book makes a significant contribution to the theorizing of global politics.

This volume brings together an international group of distinguished scholars to provide a fresh assessment of China's strategic military capabilities, doctrines, and its political perceptions in light of rapidly advancing technologies, an expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal, and increased great-power competition with the United States.

Many authoritarian leaders want nuclear weapons, but few manage to acquire them. Autocrats seeking nuclear weapons fail in different ways and to varying degrees—Iraq almost managed it; Libya did not come close. In Unclear Physics, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer compares the two failed nuclear weapons programs, showing that state capacity played a crucial role in the trajectory and outcomes of both projects. Braut-Hegghammer draws on a rich set of new primary sources, collected during years of research in archives, fieldwork across the Middle East, and interviews with scientists and decision makers from both states. She gained access to documents and individuals that no other researcher has been able to consult. Her book tells the story of the Iraqi and Libyan programs from their origins in the late 1950s and 1960s until their dismantling. This book reveals contemporary perspectives from scientists and regime officials on the opportunities and challenges facing each project. Many of the findings challenge the conventional wisdom about clandestine weapons programs in closed authoritarian states and their prospects of success or failure. Braut-Hegghammer suggests that scholars and analysts ought to pay closer attention to how state capacity affects nuclear weapons programs in other authoritarian regimes, both in terms of questioning the actual control these leaders have over their nuclear weapons programs and the capability of their scientists to solve complex technical challenges.

This book offers an empirically rich study of Chinese nuclear weapons behaviour and the impact of this behaviour on global nuclear politics since 1949. China's behaviour as a nuclear weapons state is a major determinant of global and regional security. For the United States, there is no other nuclear actor — with the exception of Russia— that matters more to its long-term national security. However, China's behaviour and impact on global nuclear politics is a surprisingly under-researched topic. Existing literature tends to focus on narrow policy issues, such as misdemeanours in China's non-proliferation record, the uncertain direction of its military spending, and nuclear force modernization, or enduring opaqueness in its nuclear policy. This book proposes an alternative context to understand both China's past and present nuclear behaviour: its engagement with the process of creating and maintaining global nuclear order. The concept of global nuclear order is an innovative lens through which to consider China as a nuclear weapons state because it draws attention to the inner workings —institutional and normative— that underpin nuclear politics. It is also a timely subject because global nuclear order is considered by many actors to be under serious strain and in need of reform. Indeed, today the challenges to nuclear order are numerous, from Iranian and North Korean nuclear ambitions to the growing threat of nuclear terrorism. This book considers these challenges from a Chinese perspective, exploring how far Beijing has gone to the aid of nuclear order in addressing these issues.

China has emerged in the 21st century as a sophisticated, and sometimes contentious, actor in the United Nations Security Council. This is evident in a range of issues, from negotiations on Iran's nuclear program to efforts to bring peace to Darfur. Yet China's role as a veto-holding member of the Council has been left unexamined. How does it formulate its positions? What interests does it seek to protect? How can the international community encourage China to be a contributor, and not a spoiler? This book is the first to address China's role and influence in the Security Council. It develops a picture of a state struggling to find a way between the need to protect its stakes in a number of 'rogue regimes', on one hand, and its image as a responsible rising power on the world stage, on the other. Negotiating this careful balancing act has mixed implications, and means that whilst China can be a useful ally in collective security, it also faces serious constraints. Providing a window not only into China's behaviour, but into the complex world of decision-making at the UNSC in general, the book covers a number of important cases, including North Korea, Iran, Darfur, Burma, Zimbabwe, Libya and Syria. Drawing on extensive interviews with participants from China, the US and elsewhere, this book considers not only how the world affects China, but how China impacts the world through its behaviour in a key international institution. As such, it will be of great interest to students and scholars working in the fields of Chinese politics and Chinese international relations, as well as politics, international relations, international institutions and diplomacy more broadly.