Were the religion clauses of the First Amendment intended to protect individuals' right to religious freedom and equality or the states' traditional right to legislate on religion? This book examines all the arguments and historical evidence relating to this question, and demonstrates, contrary to the views of some scholars and Supreme Court justices, that the clauses were sought, drafted, and originally understood not as guarantees of states' rights but as normative restraints on the national government's power over religion.

Traditional models of constitutional secularism have struggled to accommodate the modern revival of religious politics. The concept has been criticised as empty or illegitimate, while political and legal struggles have contested its meaning. This book gathers leading experts to examine the scope and substance of constitutional secularism today.

Chief Justice John Marshall argued that a constitution "requires that only its great outlines should be marked [and] its important objects designated." Ours is "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." In recent years, Marshall's great truths have been challenged by proponents of originalism and strict construction. Such legal thinkers as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argue that the Constitution must be construed and applied as it was when the Framers wrote it. In Keeping Faith with the Constitution, three legal authorities make the case for Marshall's vision. They describe their approach as "constitutional fidelity"--not to how the Framers would have applied the Constitution, but to the text and principles of the Constitution itself. The original understanding of the text is one source of interpretation, but not the only one; to preserve the meaning and authority of the document, to keep it vital, applications of the Constitution must be shaped by precedent, historical experience, practical consequence, and societal change. The authors range across the history of constitutional interpretation to show how this approach has been the source of our greatest advances, from Brown v. Board of Education to the New Deal, from the Miranda decision to the expansion of women's rights. They delve into the complexities of voting rights, the malapportionment of legislative districts, speech freedoms, civil liberties and the War on Terror, and the evolution of checks and balances. The Constitution's framers could never have imagined DNA, global warming, or even women's equality. Yet these and many more realities shape our lives and outlook. Our Constitution will remain vital into our changing future, the authors write, if judges remain true to this rich tradition of adaptation and fidelity.

Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia once remarked that the theory of an evolving, "living" Constitution effectively "rendered the Constitution useless." He wanted a "dead Constitution," he joked, arguing it must be interpreted as the framers originally understood it. In The Living Constitution, leading constitutional scholar David Strauss forcefully argues against the claims of Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Robert Bork, and other "originalists," explaining in clear, jargon-free English how the Constitution can sensibly evolve, without falling into the anything-goes flexibility caricatured by opponents. The living Constitution is not an out-of-touch liberal theory, Strauss further shows, but a mainstream tradition of American jurisprudence--a common-law approach to the Constitution, rooted in the written document but also based on precedent. Each generation has contributed precedents that guide and confine judicial rulings, yet allow us to meet the demands of today, not force us to follow the commands of the long-dead Founders. Strauss explores how judicial decisions adapted the Constitution's text (and contradicted original intent) to produce some of our most profound accomplishments: the end of racial segregation, the expansion of women's rights, and the freedom of speech. By contrast, originalism suffers from fatal flaws: the impossibility of truly divining original intent, the difficulty of adapting eighteenth-century understandings to the modern world, and the pointlessness of chaining ourselves to decisions made centuries ago. David Strauss is one of our leading authorities on Constitutional law--one with practical knowledge as well, having served as Assistant Solicitor General of the United States and argued eighteen cases before the United States Supreme Court. Now he offers a profound new understanding of how the Constitution can remain vital to life in the twenty-first century.

The way that Americans understand their Constitution and wider legal tradition has been dominated in recent decades by two exhausted approaches: the originalism of conservatives and the “living constitutionalism” of progressives. Is it time to look for an alternative? Adrian Vermeule argues that the alternative has been there, buried in the American legal tradition, all along. He shows that US law was, from the founding, subsumed within the broad framework of the classical legal tradition, which conceives law as “a reasoned ordering to the common good.” In this view, law’s purpose is to promote the goods a flourishing political community requires: justice, peace, prosperity, and morality. He shows how this legacy has been lost, despite still being implicit within American public law, and convincingly argues for its recovery in the form of “common good constitutionalism.” This erudite and brilliantly original book is a vital intervention in America’s most significant contemporary legal debate while also being an enduring account of the true nature of law that will resonate for decades with scholars and students.

Examines how medieval people at all social levels thought about law, justice and politics, as well as their role in society. Provides a clear, structured view of judicial developments and experience of litigation in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Offers a new perspective on both law and politics by focusing on the medium of legal consciousness and legal culture.. Makes the specialised area of law accessible for the general reader interested in the medieval period.

This volume contains studies on Nicholas of Cusa and his times. The first section is concerned with Cusanus' context, beginning with a historiographic essay by Francis Oakley on the impact of Brian Tierney's Foundations of the Conciliar Theory. Among the topics addressed are the long-term continuation of the Council of Basel (1431-1449) and the issues of ecclesiastical income which it addressed. The second part is concerned with Cusanus' thought on the Church, both in his conciliarist and papalist phases. Included is the first translation into English of Nicholas' Reformatio generalis. Attention also is paid to Cusanus' reforming efforts and the relationship of his thought on these issues to his earliest speculative writings. The third part is concerned with Nicholas' ideas on Christ and mystical experience. Particular attention is paid to the De visione dei, including its relationship to Renaissance art. The volume concludes with wide-ranging essays on the larger significance of Cusanus' speculative thought. An update of Thomas M. Izbicki's bibliography of Cusanus scholarship in English is included.

Addressing a host of hot-button issues, from the barring of Christian student groups and military recruiters from law schools and universities to churches’ immunity from civil rights legislation in hiring and firing ministers, Paul Horwitz proposes a radical reformation of First Amendment law. Arguing that rigidly doctrinal approaches can’t account for messy, real-world situations, he suggests that the courts loosen their reins and let those institutions with a stake in First Amendment freedoms do more of the work of enforcing them. Universities, the press, libraries, churches, and various other institutions and associations are a fundamental part of the infrastructure of public discourse. Rather than subject them to ill-fitting, top-down rules and legal categories, courts should make them partners in shaping public discourse and First Amendment law, giving these institutions substantial autonomy to regulate their own affairs. Self-regulation and public criticism should be the key restraints on these institutions, not judicial fiat. Horwitz suggests that this approach would help the law enhance the contribution of our “First Amendment institutions” to social and political life. It would also move us toward a conception of the state as a participating member of our social framework, rather than a reigning and often overbearing sovereign. First Amendment Institutions offers a new vantage point from which to evaluate ongoing debates over topics ranging from campaign finance reform to campus hate speech and affirmative action in higher education. This book promises to promote—and provoke—important new discussions about the shape and future of the First Amendment.

In a major original study, Graham Maddox analyses the role of religion in the development of democracy from the tribes of ancient Israel to the present day. The book contrasts Athenian direct democracy with the Old Testament monarchy in which the concept of religious opposition - vital to modern democracy - arose. Maddox then develops his discussion of the relationship between religion and democracy through early christianity to the Reformation and Calvinism, ending with a chapter on modern democracy. Maddox's contentious thesis concerning the development of democracy is truly interdisciplinary drawing on political science, religious history and theology.