In Reliability and Alliance Interdependence, Iain D. Henry argues for a more sophisticated approach to alliance politics and ideas of interdependence. It is often assumed that if the United States failed to defend an ally, then this disloyalty would instantly and irrevocably damage US alliances across the globe. Henry proposes that such damage is by no means inevitable and that predictions of disaster are dangerously simplistic. If other allies fear the risks of military escalation more than the consequences of the United States abandoning an ally, then they will welcome, encourage, and even praise such an instance of disloyalty. It is also often assumed that alliance interdependence only constrains US policy options, but Henry shows how the United States can manipulate interdependence to set an example of what constitutes acceptable allied behavior. Using declassified documents, Henry explores five case studies involving US alliances with South Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Reliability and Alliance Interdependence makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of how America's alliances in Asia function as an interdependent system.

Throughout the Cold War, US officials feared that Washington's disloyalty to one ally would automatically cause other allies to doubt America's security reliability. These doubts could prompt allies to adopt policies of neutrality, or even defect to the Communist bloc. This dissertation challenges the conventional wisdom - that alliance interdependence is underpinned by loyalty - by proposing the "alliance audience effect". The alliance audience effect framework shows that discrete alliance commitments can be practically interdependent, but that this interdependence is not underpinned by loyalty. Through an investigation of Cold War case studies, using a process tracing methodology and archival research, this dissertation argues that US allies in Asia were unconcerned about whether America was loyal to other allied states. Instead, they monitored America's behaviour in order to reassure themselves that the US was reliable: that their own alliance did not pose risks of either abandonment or entrapment. When allies feared abandonment, they encouraged America to solidify its presence in Asia and adopt a more aggressive posture. But when allies feared entrapment, they encouraged conciliatory US policies and worked to restrain Washington, thus reducing the risk of conflict. In some cases, American disloyalty to one ally was welcomed, or even encouraged, by other allies, as this disloyalty better served their own interests. Like the adage that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter", this dissertation shows that one state's disloyal ally can be another state's reliable ally. Because US allies have different interests, they will have different views of American behaviour: one ally might praise an instance of US disloyalty as proof of reliability, while another ally might condemn Washington for unreliability. In short, reliability is not synonymous with loyalty, and America does not have a collective alliance loyalty reputation. Beyond the allied perspective, this research also demonstrates how the United States managed its alliances and used alliance interdependence to achieve its own ends. This dissertation's findings have relevance for the alliance politics literature, theories about international reputation, and the practical management of alliances.

In Reliability and Alliance Interdependence, Iain D. Henry argues for a more sophisticated approach to alliance politics and ideas of interdependence. It is often assumed that if the United States failed to defend an ally, then this disloyalty would instantly and irrevocably damage US alliances across the globe. Henry proposes that such damage is by no means inevitable and that predictions of disaster are dangerously simplistic. If other allies fear the risks of military escalation more than the consequences of the United States abandoning an ally, then they will welcome, encourage, and even praise such an instance of disloyalty. It is also often assumed that alliance interdependence only constrains US policy options, but Henry shows how the United States can manipulate interdependence to set an example of what constitutes acceptable allied behavior. Using declassified documents, Henry explores five case studies involving US alliances with South Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Reliability and Alliance Interdependence makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of how America's alliances in Asia function as an interdependent system.

Alliances are important to understanding international peace and conflict, but disagreement exists among scholars regarding alliance reliability with findings of allies fulfilling alliance obligations 25-75% of the time (Sabrosky, 1980; Leeds, et al., 2000; Berkemeier and Fuhrmann, 2018). What mechanism ultimately lies at the center of this puzzle? I argue that alliance cohesion, specifically differences in cohesion relating to internal dynamics of alliance structure and power distribution, lie at the center of this empirical disconnect. I define alliance cohesion as the ability of allies to agree on security preferences and appropriate methods to meet these ends. In this study I ask how alliance cohesion varies between bilateral and multilateral alliances. I hypothesize that bilateral alliances with asymmetric power distribution between allies increase cohesion, whereas multilateral alliances with symmetric power distribution between allies decrease cohesion. Findings support these hypotheses and suggest that more cohesive allies are more reliable allies.

Military alliances are a constant feature in international politics, and a better understanding of them can directly impact world affairs. This book examines why alliances endure or collapse. As a distinctive feature, it analyses asymmetric alliances focusing on the junior allies’ decision to continue or terminate a military agreement. It deepens our knowledge of alliance cohesion and erosion, investigating the relevance of the weaker side’s preferences and behavior in alliance politics. The author examines the literature on alliance persistence and termination and puts forward a theoretical model that helps interpret historical and contemporary cases in a way that is useful for expert researchers and non-expert readers alike.

The Oxford Handbook of Space Security focuses on the interaction between space technology and international and national security processes. Saadia M. Pekkanen and P.J. Blount have gathered a group of key scholars who bring a range of analytical and theoretical perspectives to take an analytically-eclectic approach to assessing space security from an international relations (IR) theory perspective. Bringing together scholarship from a group of leading experts, this volume explains how these contemporary changes will affect future security in, from, and through space.

The Supply Side of Security conceptualizes military alliances as contracts for exchanging goods and services. At the international level, the market for these contracts is shaped by how many countries can supply security. Tongfi Kim identifies the supply of policy concessions and military commitments as the main factors that explain the bargaining power of a state in a potential or existing alliance. Additionally, three variables of a state's domestic politics significantly affect its negotiating power: whether there is strong domestic opposition to the alliance, whether the state's leader is pro-alliance, and whether that leader is vulnerable. Kim then looks beyond existing alliance literature, which focuses on threats, to produce a deductive theory based on analysis of how the global power structure and domestic politics affect alliances. As China becomes stronger and the U.S. military budget shrinks, The Supply Side of Security shows that these countries should be understood not just as competing threats, but as competing security suppliers.