The recent financial crisis has once again stressed the importance of good corporate governance and corporate social responsibility in building trust in the European internal market. It has given rise to a discussion of whether a number of issues should be addressed through regulation or soft law at EU level. These issues relate in particular to the duties of directors in European companies as well as how the board of directors is composed and structured. Drawing attention first to duties of directors and then to the organisation of the board, this appropriately timed analysis takes stock of the status of the initiatives that have been debated so far, examines whether the rules which have been adopted form a coherent system, and suggests ways in which these initiatives affect national law. Topics covered include the following: directors' conflicts of interest; rules on shareholder transparency; duty to promote active ownership; whether it is possible to find a balance between corporate enterprise and risk control; integration of environmental and social concerns in the decision-making of the company; the board's role as a monitor of management; overcoming managerial deficiencies; the concept of independent directors; independence from a controlling shareholder; nomination of board members; disqualification of directors; and directors duties in groups of companies.

In the context of the financial and economic crisis, corporate governance and regulatory supervision failures, Laura Horn investigates one of the defining questions in social power relations in contemporary capitalism: who controls the modern corporation, and why.

This book examines corporate governance through a holistic lens that integrates financial, social and environmental goals, e.g. increasing transparency and disclosure. In addition, it investigates the theoretical assumptions guiding the current corporate governance practices adopted by companies in Central Europe and Russia. The book presents a dynamic study on the evolution of corporate governance systems, which were practically non-existent just 30 years ago. In turn, it addresses criticism leveled at corporate governance, its impact on the outbreak of the financial crisis, and recommendations for changes after the crisis. The book employs a regional focus, exploring a group of countries that have often been neglected in corporate governance research. Carefully selected data and a variety of case studies prepared by leading authors from the region provide evidence to support the analysis.

This successful textbook remains the only offering for students of European company law, and has been fully updated.

For the past two decades corporate governance reform in Europe has been guided by the ‘shareholder value’ model of the firm. That model has been discredited as one of the major causes of the financial and economic crisis. In a new book published by the ETUI an alternative approach to corporate governance is presented by members of the GOODCORP network of researchers and trade unionists. This new approach, entitled the Sustainable Company, draws on both traditional ‘stakeholder’ models of the firm and newer concerns with sustainability. The main elements of the Sustainable Company and the institutions needed to support it are presented. Key themes in the book are the need for worker ‘voice’ in corporate governance and for a binding legislative framework to promote sustainability. Individual chapters deal with the issues of worker involvement, employee shareholding, sustainability-oriented remuneration, international framework agreements, NGO-trade union relationships, reforming financial regulation and carbon taxes and emissions-trading schemes.

This volume provides an up-to-the-minute survey of the field of corporate governance, focusing particularly on issues of convergence and diversity. A number of topics are discussed including bankruptcy procedures, initial public offerings, the role of large stakes, comparative corporate governance, and institutional investors.

The reputation of corporate reporting has been in crisis. Trust in the process of financial accounting and auditing has been undermined by a series of high profile scandals involving major corporations, including Enron, Parmalat, Ahold, and Worldcom. In response, regulators and practitioners world-wide have put forward a series of initiatives to re

This ambitious volume explores the politics of recent changes in corporate governance regulation and the transnational forces driving the process. Corporate governance has in the 1990s become a catchphrase of the global business community. The Enron collapse and other recent corporate scandals, as well as growing worries in Europe about the rise of Anglo-Saxon finance, have made issues of corporate governance the subject of political controversies and of public debate. The contributors argue that the regulation of corporate governance is an inherently political affair. Given the context of the deepening globalization of the corporate world, it is also increasingly a transnational phenomenon. In terms of the content of regulation the book shows an increasing reliance on the application of market mechanisms and a tendency for corporations themselves to become commodities. The emerging new mode of regulation is characterized by increasing informalization and by forms of private regulation. These changes in content and mode are driven by transnational actors, first of all the owners of internationally mobile financial capital and their functionaries such as coordination service firms, as well as by key public international agencies such as the European Commission. The Transnational Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation will be of interest to students and researchers of international political economy, politics, economics and corporate governance.

The last Asian financial crisis, coupled with the western series of corporate scandals, has caused investors and citizens to doubt mangers ability to guarantee credible financial information about organizations. Consequently, legislators all over the world have come to realise the necessity of legislating in the area of corporate governance.

Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.