This authoritative guide presents the reasons behind industry regulation and the legal basis for it. Text discusses calculating rate base and rate of return, cost allocation, and rate design. Added attention is given to many of the new market-oriented forms of regulation, such as service unbundling, equal access to bottleneck facilities, competitive contracting, managed competition in health care, and incentive regulation.

An authority on regulation who has served on the Council of Economic Advisers calls attention to the explosive growth in regulation since the late 1960s and its effects and examines movements for reform and deregulation

Risk and Return for Regulated Industries provides a much-needed, comprehensive review of how cost of capital risk arises and can be measured, how the special risks regulated industries face affect fair return, and the challenges that regulated industries are likely to face in the future. Rather than following the trend of broad industry introductions or textbook style reviews of utility finance, it covers the topics of most interest to regulators, regulated companies, regulatory lawyers, and rate-of-return analysts in all countries. Accordingly, the book also includes case studies about various countries and discussions of the lessons international regulatory procedures can offer. - Presents a unified treatment of the regulatory principles and practices used to assess the required return on capital - Addresses current practices before exploring the ways methods play out in practice, including irregularities, shortcomings, and concerns for the future - Focuses on developed economies instead of providing a comprehensive global reviews - Foreword by Stewart C. Myers

Expanding Competition in Regulated Industries reviews the changing regulatory environment, notably incentive regulation and competition in regulated industries. Some of the major changes in electricity, gas, and telephone utilities allow for competition in local service through unbundling. This book is of interest to researchers, utility managers, regulatory commissions, and the Federal Government.

The nation's approach to regulating its transportation, telecommunications, and energy industries has undergone a great transformation in the last quarter-century. The original paradigm of regulation, which was established with the Interstate Commerce Act's regulation of railroads beginning in 1887, was characterized by legislative creation of an administrative agency charged with general regulatory oversight of particular industries. This approach did not depend on whether the regulated industry was naturally competitive or was a natural monopoly, and it was designed to advance accepted goals of reliability and, in particular, non-discrimination. By contrast, under the new paradigm, which is manifested most clearly in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the goals of regulation have become the promotion of competition and maximization of consumer choice. The role of agencies has been reduced to monitoring access and pricing of 'bottleneck' monopolies such as the local telecommunications loop and electricity distribution systems. Having described this transformation in six core common carrier and public utility industries-railroads, airlines, trucks, telecommunications, electricity, and natural gas-the Article sets out on a quest to find its causes. No consistent pattern of institutional leadership can be discerned in any of the three types of government actors with the power to compel change: the regulatory agencies, the courts, and the Congress. This suggests that the causes are rooted in deep-seated economic and social forces, such as technological changes, and chain reactions that have emerged as regulatory reform in one industry segment has spread to another segment. The Article concludes that the two most persuasive explanations are that key interest groups have discovered that regulatory change is in their interests, and that an ideological consensus has emerged among economists and other policy elites that the original paradigm entails risks of regulatory failure that exceed the risks of market failure under the new paradigm.

This paper seeks to assess the impact of liberalisation and privatisation on performance in the generation segment of the electricity supply industry. Regulatory indicators for a panel of 19 OECD countries over a 10 year time period were constructed to examine the influence of regulatory reform on efficiency, price, and quality, and to assess the relative efficacy of different reform strategies. The presence of data with both cross-country and time-series dimensions allows separate identification of country specific and regulatory effects. The primary findings are that while changes in legal rules may be slow to translate into changes in conduct, unbundling of generation, private ownership, expanded access to transmission networks, and the introduction of electricity markets impact the performance measures in a statistically significant way, on average.