This is Laski’s most important book after A Grammar of Politics. It discusses, on a grand scale, every aspect of American public life. Laski surveys American traditions and the American spirit, political institutions, the entire educational, religious, economic and social scene, America as a world power, and Americanism as a principle of civilisation. Laski’s unsurpassed knowledge of American constitutional, social and cultural history is set in the perspective of his deep study of comparative constitutional history and political theory. He was one of very few people to see U.S. politics from the inside, as a result of his friendships with Roosevelt, Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes.

Harold J. Laski saw World War Two as a period of revolutionary change as profound as any in the modern history of the human race. In his view, the period's inner nature was as significant in its essentials as those which saw the fall of the Roman Empire; the birth in the Reformation of capitalist society; or, as in 1789, the final chapter in the dramatic rise of the middle class to power. All of these were not revolutions made by thinkers, though some of them may have foreseen its coming, but of ordinary people who shaped the large outlines of the direction of these changes. Laski held that revolutions of our time have been rooted in all that goes to give its present character to our society. We can recognize its advent and prepare for it; in that event, we might build a civilization richer and more secure than any of which we so far have knowledge. Or we may chose to resist its onset; in which case, it will appear to some future generation that our age has sought rather to sweep back the tides of the ocean than to oppose the decrees of men. The curse of our social order is its persistent inequalities. Either we must find ourselves able to co-operate in their removal, or we shall move rapidly to conflict about them. Laski argues that the middle class must co-operate with workers in essential revisions, as the aristocracy was wise enough to do a century ago over the Reform Bill, or violent revolution will be unleashed by means that transforms the ends of either party to the conflict in view. This is the choice that lies before us. Just how accurate or wide of the mark Laski was is brilliantly articulated in the critical introduction by Sidney A. Pearson, Jr.

Populism is a powerful force today, but its full scope has eluded the analytical tools of both orthodox and heterodox ‘populism studies’. This book provides a valuable alternative perspective. It reconstructs in detail for the first time the sociological analyses of US demagogues by members of the Frankfurt School and compares these with contemporary approaches. Modern demagogy emerges as a key under-researched feature of populism, since populist movements, whether 'left' or 'right', are highly susceptible to 'demagogic capture'. The book also details the culture industry’s populist contradictions – including its role as an incubator of modern demagogues – from the 1930s through to today’s social media and ‘Trumpian psychotechnics’. Featuring a previously unpublished text by Adorno on modern demagogy as an appendix, it will be of interest to researchers and students in critical theory, sociology, politics, German studies, philosophy and history of ideas, as well as all those concerned about the rise of demagogic populism today.

This book, originally published in 1952, unfinished and perhaps imperfect, is the last book of one of the most acute political thinkers of the twentieth century. Laski’s earlier optimism about a swing to the Left was beginning to be reversed, and in this volume he saw the defects of his previous optimistic surveys, which, in his opinion, still had value, but needed to be brought up-to-date and consquently he began to write an additional chapter which was never completed. It remains a valuable last word of an author who for thirty years was respected and listened to on the topic of civilisation’s survial through change.

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It is a notable irony that as democracy replaces other forms of governing throughout the world, citizens of the most established and prosperous democracies (the United States and Canada, Western European nations, and Japan) increasingly report dissatisfaction and frustration with their governments. Here, some of the most influential political scientists at work today examine why this is so in a volume unique in both its publication of original data and its conclusion that low public confidence in democratic leaders and institutions is a function of actual performance, changing expectations, and the role of information. The culmination of research projects directed by Robert Putnam through the Trilateral Commission and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, these papers present new data that allow more direct comparisons across national borders and more detailed pictures of trends within countries than previously possible. They show that citizen disaffection in the Trilateral democracies is not the result of frayed social fabric, economic insecurity, the end of the Cold War, or public cynicism. Rather, the contributors conclude, the trouble lies with governments and politics themselves. The sources of the problem include governments' diminished capacity to act in an interdependent world and a decline in institutional performance, in combination with new public expectations and uses of information that have altered the criteria by which people judge their governments. Although the authors diverge in approach, ideological affinity, and interpretation, they adhere to a unified framework and confine themselves to the last quarter of the twentieth century. This focus--together with the wealth of original research results and the uniform strength of the individual chapters--sets the volume above other efforts to address the important and increasingly international question of public dissatisfaction with democratic governance. This book will have obvious appeal for a broad audience of political scientists, politicians, policy wonks, and that still sizable group of politically minded citizens on both sides of the Atlantic and Pacific.