This collection brings together some of the main contributions to an important area of this work, the economics of contract law.

This unique and timely book offers an up-to-date, clear and comprehensive review of the economic literature on contract law. The topical chapters written by leading international scholars include: precontractual liability, misrepresentation, duress, gratuitous promises, gifts, standard form contracts, interpretation, contract remedies, penalty clauses, impracticability and foreseeability. Option contracts, warranties, long-term contracts, marriage contracts, franchise contracts, quasi-contracts, behavioral approaches, and civil contract law are also discussed. This excellent resource on contract law and economics will be particularly suited to contract law scholars, law teachers, policy makers, and judges. For experts in and practitioners of contract law this will be a key book to buy.

Providing students with a solid grounding in the economic analysis of the law, this reader brings together edited versions of diverse and challenging journal articles into a unified collection. Chosen to provoke thought and discussion, these carefully streamlined articles apply economic theories to many aspects of the law, from intellectual property, corporate finance, and contracts to property rights, family law, and criminal law. Provides real-life examples and implications of economic theory. Creates a unified vision of the law, showing the interconnections between the various fields. Covers a broad range of topics, from intellectual property and corporate finance to family and criminal law. Encourages intuitive understanding and applications of the economic principles, due to reduced mathematical content.

This important volume presents a rich collection of ideas on and insights into the law and economics of contracts. It includes material relevant to a large number of legal fields. Many of the articles are classics that have, over the years, become focal points for continuing debate; others provide an easily accessible account of particular areas. The editor's comprehensive introduction provides an overview of law and economics scholarship in contracts over the past few decades and a portal into an evolving field. Topics include: the economics of contracting; efficient breach and renegotiation; expectation damages and its alternatives; default rules and mass markets.

This unique and timely book offers an up-to-date, clear and comprehensive review of the economic literature on contract law. The topical chapters written by leading international scholars include: precontractual liability, misrepresentation, duress, gratuitous promises, gifts, standard form contracts, interpretation, contract remedies, penalty clauses, impracticability and foreseeability. Option contracts, warranties, long-term contracts, marriage contracts, franchise contracts, quasi-contracts, behavioral approaches, and civil contract law are also discussed. This excellent resource on contract law and economics will be particularly suited to contract law scholars, law teachers, policy makers, and judges. For experts in and practitioners of contract law this will be a key book to buy.

This book examines the most controversial issues concerning the use of pre-drafted clauses in fine print, which are usually included in consumer contracts and presented to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. By applying a multi-disciplinary approach that combines consumer’s psychology and seller’s drafting power in the logic of efficiency and good faith, the book provides a fresh and unconventional analysis of the existing literature, both theoretical and empirical. Moving from the unconscionability doctrine, it criticizes (and in some cases refutes) its main conclusions based on criteria which are usually invoked to sustain the need for public intervention to protect consumers, and specifically related to Law (contract complexity), Psychology (consumer lack of sophistication criterion) and Economics (market structure criterion). It also analyzes the effects of different regulations, such as banning vexatious clauses or mandating disclosure clauses, showing that none of them protect consumers, but in fact prove to be harmful when consumers are more vulnerable, that is whenever sellers can exploit some degree of market power. In closing, the book combines these disparate aspects, arguing that the solution (if any) to the problem of consumer exploitation and market inefficiency associated with the use of contracts of adhesion in these contexts cannot be found in removing or prohibiting hidden clauses, but instead has to take into account the effects of these clauses on the contract as a whole.