Bernard Gert's moral theory is among the clearest and most comprehensive on the contemporary scene. It touches on elements of the dominant ethical orientations---utilitarianism, Kantianism, contractionism, and virtue ethics--without fitting neatly into any of those categories. For that reason, Gert's moral theory appeals to many ethicists dissatisfied with each of the dominant formulations. Rationality, Rules, and Ideals presents Gert's Morality, the reactions by a number of prominent scholars, and Gert's response. All told, it is a remarkably wide-ranging study of ethical theory. The work is broken down into six parts, making Rationality, Rules, and Ideals perfect for a broad-ranging course on ethical theory, following Gert's critiques of utilitariansim, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. Both students and professionals will find much material to work with in this volume. The papers contribute not only to the understanding of Gert's wide-ranging theory but to a number of important topics in ethic theory, the theory of rationality, and applied ethics.

It is an obvious fact that human agency is constrained and structured by many kinds of rules: rules that are constitutive for communication, morality, persons, and society, and juridical rules. So the question is: what roles are played by social rules and the structural traits of human agency in rational decision making? What bearing does this have on the theory of practical rationality? These issues can only be discussed within an interdisciplinary setting, with researchers drawn from philosophy, decision theory and the economic and social sciences. The problem is of profound, fundamental concern to the social scientist and has attracted a great deal of intellectual effort. Contributors include distinguished researchers in their respective fields and the book thus presents state-of-the-art theory. It can also be used as a textbook in advanced philosophy, economics and social science classes.

Moral systems, like normative systems more broadly, involve complex mental representations. Rational Rules proposes that moral learning can be understood in terms of general-purpose rational learning procedures. Nichols argues that statistical learning can help answer a wide range of questions about moral thought: Why do people think that rules apply to actions rather than consequences? Why do people expect new rules to be focused on actions rather than consequences? How do people come to believe a principle of liberty, according to which whatever is not expressly prohibited is permitted? How do people decide that some normative claims hold universally while others hold only relative to some group? The resulting account has both empiricist and rationalist features: since the learning procedures are domain-general, the result is an empiricist theory of a key part of moral development, and since the learning procedures are forms of rational inference, the account entails that crucial parts of our moral system enjoy rational credentials. Moral rules can also be rational in the sense that they can be effective for achieving our ends, given our ecological settings. Rational Rules argues that at least some central components of our moral systems are indeed ecologically rational: they are good at helping us attain common goals. Nichols argues that the account might be extended to capture moral motivation as a special case of a much more general phenomenon of normative motivation. On this view, a basic form of rule representation brings motivation along automatically, and so part of the explanation for why we follow moral rules is that we are built to follow rules quite generally.

Politics and regulation -- A threatening synthesis -- Staying in bounds -- A retreat from reason -- The illusion of costs without benefits -- Erasing public health science -- Resurrecting discredited models -- Ignoring indirect benefits -- Trivializing climate change -- Manipulating transfers -- Future directions -- Improving the guardrails.

A defense of a contemporary natural law theory of practical rationality.

We've all heard the arguments that Christianity is irrelevant, irrational and even immoral. But what if the Christian faith makes sense of all that matters? In this thoughtful, engaging book, Simon Edwards challenges the assumptions that may lead us to reject a faith and doubt something that we've never really had the chance to understand in the first place. From our need for meaning and significance, to our desires for truth, goodness, love and hope, he explores the things that matter to us as human beings and shows us why the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ might just make sense of them all. The Sanity of Belief is a fresh take on apologetics, faith and doubt, that will leave you with a stronger understanding of Christian belief and how it relates to today's world. It is ideal for anyone looking for a clear, down-to-earth introduction to Christianity, or for those wanting to reaffirm the foundations on which their faith is based.

For thousands of years, humanity has attempted to enforce ethics through supernatural and secular punishments; this rabid aggression has been both necessary and ridiculous. It has been necessary because a rational proof of secular ethics has never been achieved; it has been ridiculous because it is impossible to imagine any scientific or mathematical argument being advanced in such a hysterical and violent manner."Ethics" has been one of the great government programs of history; since kings and priests ruled mankind, only those philosophers who served their interests tended to get promoted to prominence, rather than imprisoned, poisoned or burned. Thus, over 2,500 years since its inception, the discipline of ethics remains largely subjectivist, relativist and cultural - and was not only unable to restrain, but may have played a part in promoting the horrors, wars and genocides of the 20th century, the bloodiest hundred years of history of our species.Stefan Molyneux, host of Freedomain Radio, has written "Universally Preferable Behavior: A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics," which presents radical and rational arguments for a nonreligious, non-statist, entirely secular set ethical standards which validate the nonaggression principle - thou shalt not initiate force against thy fellow human - and the fundamental logic for respecting property rights.Rigorous, analytical and challenging, "Universally Preferable Behavior" provides a solid foundation for secular ethics. This book solves the ancient philosopher Petrarch's dichotomy, which is that it is better to will the good than know the truth. Armed with the arguments in "Universally Preferable Behavior," you can both know the truth and will the good.

Reason and rationality represent crucial elements of the self-image of human beings and have unquestionably been among the most debated issues in Western philosophy, dating from ancient Greece, through the Middle Ages, and to the present day. Many words and thoughts have already been spent trying to define the nature and standards of reason and rationality, what they could or ought to be, and under what conditions something can be said to be rational. This volume focuses instead on the relationships of reason and rationality to some relevant specific topics, i.e., science, knowledge, gender, politics, ethics, religion, aesthetics, language, logic, and metaphysics, trying to uncover and clarify both the connections and differences in their various characterisations and uses.

Economists broadly define financial asset price bubbles as episodes in which prices rise with notable rapidity and depart from historically established asset valuation multiples and relationships. Financial economists have for decades attempted to study and interpret bubbles through the prisms of rational expectations, efficient markets, equilibrium, arbitrage, and capital asset pricing models, but they have not made much if any progress toward a consistent and reliable theory that explains how and why bubbles (and crashes) evolve and are defined, measured, and compared. This book develops a new and different approach that is based on the central notion that bubbles and crashes reflect urgent short-side rationing, which means that, as such extreme conditions unfold, considerations of quantities owned or not owned begin to displace considerations of price.

Scholars of ethics, and of human behavior more generally, will find this book consistently stimulating and rewarding.