A clear, original and systematic introduction to philosophy of science which examines the theories of Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend before proposing a new, temperate rationalist perspective.

Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The book emphasizes the epistemological aspects of scientific realism and contains an original solution to the problem of induction that rests on an appeal to the principle of uniformity of nature.

Rectifying misrepresentations of Popperian thought with a historical approach to Popper’s philosophy, Gattei reconstructs the logic of Popper’s development to show how one problem and its tentative solution led to a new problem.

In this important new work, Professor Trigg deals with the question of the rational foundations of science. In so doing, he explains and evaluates the views of Rorty, Wittgensteing, Quine, Putnam, and Hawking, amongst others. The limits of science and rationality are explored and the power of human reason is in the end upheld.

Mikael Stenmark examines four models of rationality and argues for a discussion of rationality that takes into account the function and aim of such human practices as science and religion.

Traditional philosophical accounts of the scientific enterprise represent it as a paradigm of institutionalized rationality. The scientist is held to possess a special method which he disinterestedly applied, generating an accumulation of scientific knowledge about the world, and the evolution of science is seen as being determined by the rational deliberations of scientists and not by psychological or sociological factors. More recently, various philosophers, historians and sociologists of science have held that this rational model is no longer tenable. Some have claimed that there is no such thing as a scientific method or scientific progress, and that theories are incommensurable and so there is no possibility of choice between alternative theories. The more extreme non-rationalists seek to explain scientific change exclusively in terms of psychological and sociological factors. In this book, the author explores the controversy between the two approaches and presents a strongly critical and independent view of both rationalists like Popper and Lakatos and non-rationalists such as Kuhn and Feyerabend. He goes on to develop his own account of the scientific enterprise--temperate rationalism, a vindication of the rationalist approach to science and of a realist construal of theories.--

This book argues that, to be healthy, human beings should love nature and stay in balance with it as much as possible. In other words: do not unbalance nature so that your own balance is not disturbed. The best and healthiest way for human beings to live is to find balance in life and nature. In this regard, the book discusses useful, nutritious, functional foods, nutraceuticals and antioxidants, and how natural molecules, which are provided by nature, can be the best medicine for human beings. At a molecular level, stress is defined by the presence of unbalanced free radicals in the body. Most diseases – especially type 2 diabetes, which accounts for the majority of diabetics – can be traced back to this problem. Our scientific evidence indicates that type 2 diabetes isn’t just a disease resulting from sugar, but also from stress. The book seeks to promote a healthier lifestyle by considering the psychoemotional dimension of wellness. And finally, it contends that good sleep is at the root of health and happiness for humanity, and that unbalanced free radicals are expelled from the body during restful sleep. The authors hope that this book will be a helpful guide and source of peace for readers, especially given their need for inner calm during the COVID-19 pandemic, and that the suggestions provided will show them the way to a better life.

In Agents Under Fire, Menuge defends a robust notion of agency and intentionaility against eliminative and naturalistic alternatives, showing the interconnections between the philosophy of mind, theology, and Intelligent Design.

It is fast becoming a cliche that scientific discovery is being rediscovered. For two philosophical generations (that of the Founders and that of the Followers of the logical positivist and logical empiricist movements), discovery had been consigned to the domain of the intractable, the ineffable, the inscrutable. The philosophy of science was focused on the so-called context of justification as its proper domain. More recently, as the exclusivity of the logical reconstruc tion program in philosophy of science came under question, and as the critique of justification developed within the framework of logical and epistemological analysis, the old question of scientific discovery, which had been put on the back burner, began to emerge once again. Emphasis on the relation of the history of science to the philosophy of science, and attention to the question of theory change and theory replacement, also served to legitimate a new concern with the origins of scientific change to be found within discovery and invention. How welcome then to see what a wide range of issues and what a broad representation of philosophers and historians of science have been brought together in the present two volumes of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science! For what these volumes achieve, in effect, is the continuation of a tradition which had once been strong in the philosophy of science - namely, that tradition which addressed the question of scientific discovery as a central question in the understanding of science.