Cold War-era strategic thinking was driven by the belief that individuals, organizations, and foreign states could be deterred from offensive action by the threat of reprisal. That assurance was shaken with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; suddenly, it seemed that no threat was powerful enough to deter individuals or organizations that valued political objectives over their own lives and the lives of their members. More than a decade later, new research and theory are bringing deterrence back into currency as a viable counterterrorism strategy. Alex S. Wilner updates deterrence theory for conflict in the twenty-first century, arguing for its value against challengers such as rogue states, cyber warriors, and transnational terrorist organizations. Deterring Rational Fanatics provides a full-scale discussion of deterrence theory concepts and controversies, assessing the utility of relying on the logic of deterrence and coercion to counter contemporary terrorism. In particular, targeted killings directed against the Taliban of Afghanistan provide a vivid illustration of the impact deterrence can have on militant behavior: precision strikes that eliminate militant leaders represent a significant cost to planning and participating in political violence, a cost that can coerce, manipulate, and alter behavior. Though deterrence theory is not a panacea for terrorism, insurgency, or militancy, it can serve as a strategic guide for state responses; as Wilner shows, terrorist violence can indeed be deterred.

Is justice only achievable by means of bureaucratization or might it first arrive with the end of bureaucracy? Bureaucratic Fanatics shows how this ever more contentious question in contemporary politics belongs to the political-theological underpinnings of bureaucratization itself. At the end of the 18th century, a new and paradoxical kind of fanaticism emerged - rational fanaticism - that propelled the intensive biopolitical management of everyday life in Europe and North America as well as the extensive colonial exploitation of the earth and its peoples. These excesses of bureaucratization incited in turn increasingly fanatical forms of resistance. And they inspired literary production that provocatively presented the outrageous contours of rationalization. Combining political theory with readings of Kleist, Melville, Conrad, and Kafka, this genealogy of bureaucratic fanaticism relates two extreme figures: fanatical bureaucrats driven to the ends of the earth and to the limits of humanity by the rationality of the apparatuses they serve; and peculiar fanatics who passionately, albeit seemingly passively, resist the encroachments of bureaucratization.

This book examines the question of how to deter a non-state terrorist actor. Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state’s counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor’s grand strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition – which is the non-state organization’s strategy for victory. To escape the attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become critical educational moments. The case studies presented here uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic deterrence successes. Some terrorist organizations abandoned the use of force altogether, while others abandoned their aspirational goals or resorted to lower levels of violence. These findings should enable policymakers to transition from the failed policy that sought to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the unending war in Afghanistan to a policy that successfully applies deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, and security studies.

Bruce Hoffman's Inside Terrorism has remained the seminal work for understanding the historical evolution of terrorism and the terrorist mind-set. In this revised third edition of his classic text, Hoffman analyzes the latest developments in global terrorism, offering insight into new adversaries, motivations, strategies, and tactics. He focuses on the rise of ISIS and the resilience of al-Qaeda; terrorist exploitation of the Internet and embrace of social media; radicalization of foreign fighters; and potential future trends, including the repercussions of a post-caliphate ISIS. Hoffman examines the demographics of contemporary terrorist leaders and recruits; the continued use of suicide bombers; and the likelihood of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorist strike. He also considers the resurgence of violent antigovernment militants, including white supremacists and opponents of abortion. He argues that the war on terrorism did not end with Osama bin Laden's death and that ongoing instability and strife in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Yemen, among other places, will both sustain terrorist movements and have broad implications for domestic and international security around the globe.

A genealogy of fanaticism—unearthing its long history, before it became a tool in the Clash of Civilizations It is commonplace to hear fanaticism described as a deviant or extreme variant of an already irrational set of religious beliefs, an assertion that helps to demonize convictions outside political orthodoxy. Alberto Toscano’s compelling and erudite counter-history explodes this accepted convention by exploring the critical role fanaticism played in the formation of modern politics and the liberal state. Showing how fanaticism results from a failure to formulate an adequate emancipatory politics, this illuminating history sheds new light on an idea that continues to dominate debates about faith and secularism. This expanded edition includes new material that revisits the idea of fanaticism as it operates at the limits of the liberal political imaginary, highlighting its relation to fraternal violence, political purity and the refusal of compromise, as well as its centrality to times of social crisis and international conflict.

"The Shahids analyzes the general phenomenon of Islamic suicide attacks, and provides the reader with tools, comparative analyses, and comprehensive information enabling enlightened examination about suicide attacks worldwide. It explores the possibilities and recommendations for an international struggle against suicide attacks through the implementation of recently published innovative ideas proposed by UN organizations, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch."--BOOK JACKET.

Offering full coverage of major subthemes and subfields within political science this reference handbook includes entries on topics from theory and methodology to international relations and institutions.

All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa?ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa?ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase ?war on terrorism? since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa?ida.

President George W. Bush maintained in his address of 20 September 2001, that the successful prosecution of the war against terrorism will require the judicious use of 'every resource at our command - every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war'. Unlike the Cold War, the War on Terrorism is neither a battle against some ideology nor bounded by physical boundaries or conventional political units such as nation-states. The War on Terrorism is the internationalisation, or rather, globalisation of previous wars. Terror is not a nation, and the enemies in such wars are not nations; any regime such as Libya simply by repudiating terrorism, can become an ally of the anti-terror coalition. Regimes that continue to practice terrorism against domestic opponents qualify to participate in the wider war if they conform to certain norms in external affairs. The 28 articles reprinted here consider aspects of that most amorphous of animals - the War on Terrorism. They do not set out to provide all of the answers; nor do they radiate a unified vision of what constitutes the war on terrorism; the pieces begin from a range of political and intellectual outlooks. Taken as a group, however, the difficulties of determining the limits and nature of the war on terrorism receive important attention. The authors address several major themes within the war on terrorism: what falls within its perimeters, its shifting manifestations, implications, responses and future directions.