This book is Ellery Eells' influential examination and analysis of theories of rational decision making.

First published in 1982, Ellery Eells' original work on rational decision making had extensive implications for probability theorists, economists, statisticians and psychologists concerned with decision making and the employment of Bayesian principles. His analysis of the philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian decision theories, causal decision theories and Newcomb's paradox continues to be influential in philosophy of science. His book is now revived for a new generation of readers and presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, including a specially commissioned preface written by Brian Skyrms, illuminating its continuing importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry.

Causality has been a subject of study for a long time. Often causality is confused with correlation. Human intuition has evolved such that it has learned to identify causality through correlation. In this book, four main themes are considered and these are causality, correlation, artificial intelligence and decision making. A correlation machine is defined and built using multi-layer perceptron network, principal component analysis, Gaussian Mixture models, genetic algorithms, expectation maximization technique, simulated annealing and particle swarm optimization. Furthermore, a causal machine is defined and built using multi-layer perceptron, radial basis function, Bayesian statistics and Hybrid Monte Carlo methods. Both these machines are used to build a Granger non-linear causality model. In addition, the Neyman-Rubin, Pearl and Granger causal models are studied and are unified. The automatic relevance determination is also applied to extend Granger causality framework to the non-linear domain. The concept of rational decision making is studied, and the theory of flexibly-bounded rationality is used to extend the theory of bounded rationality within the principle of the indivisibility of rationality. The theory of the marginalization of irrationality for decision making is also introduced to deal with satisficing within irrational conditions. The methods proposed are applied in biomedical engineering, condition monitoring and for modelling interstate conflict.

This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves a long-standing problem for Jeffrey's theory by showing for the first time how to obtain a unique utility and probability representation for preferences and judgements of comparative likelihood. The book also contains a major new discussion of what it means to suppose that some event occurs or that some proposition is true. The most complete and robust defence of causal decision theory available.

The papers collected here are, with three exceptions, those presented at a conference on probability and causation held at the University of California at Irvine on July 15-19, 1985. The exceptions are that David Freedman and Abner Shimony were not able to contribute the papers that they presented to this volume, and that Clark Glymour who was not able to attend the conference did contribute a paper. We would like to thank the National Science Foundation and the School of Humanities of the University of California at Irvine for generous support. WILLIAM HARPER University of Western Ontario BRIAN SKYRMS University of California at Irvine Vll INTRODUCTION PART I: DECISIONS AND GAMES Causal notions have recently corne to figure prominently in discussions about rational decision making. Indeed, a relatively influential new approach to theorizing about rational choice has come to be called "causal decision theory". 1 Decision problems such as Newcombe's Problem and some versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma where an act counts as evidence for a desired state even though the agent knows his choice of that act cannot causally influence whether or not the state obtains have motivated causal decision theorists.

Develops insights into solving complex problems in engineering, biomedical sciences, social science and economics based on artificial intelligence. Some of the problems studied are in interstate conflict, credit scoring, breast cancer diagnosis, condition monitoring, wine testing, image processing and optical character recognition. The author discusses and applies the concept of flexibly-bounded rationality which prescribes that the bounds in Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality theory are flexible due to advanced signal processing techniques, Moore’s Law and artificial intelligence. Artificial Intelligence Techniques for Rational Decision Making examines and defines the concepts of causal and correlation machines and applies the transmission theory of causality as a defining factor that distinguishes causality from correlation. It develops the theory of rational counterfactuals which are defined as counterfactuals that are intended to maximize the attainment of a particular goal within the context of a bounded rational decision making process. Furthermore, it studies four methods for dealing with irrelevant information in decision making: Theory of the marginalization of irrelevant information Principal component analysis Independent component analysis Automatic relevance determination method In addition it studies the concept of group decision making and various ways of effecting group decision making within the context of artificial intelligence. Rich in methods of artificial intelligence including rough sets, neural networks, support vector machines, genetic algorithms, particle swarm optimization, simulated annealing, incremental learning and fuzzy networks, this book will be welcomed by researchers and students working in these areas.

Causal reasoning is one of our most central cognitive competencies, enabling us to adapt to our world. Causal knowledge allows us to predict future events, or diagnose the causes of observed facts. We plan actions and solve problems using knowledge about cause-effect relations. Without our ability to discover and empirically test causal theories, we would not have made progress in various empirical sciences. The handbook brings together the leading researchers in the field of causal reasoning and offers state-of-the-art presentations of theories and research. It provides introductions of competing theories of causal reasoning, and discusses its role in various cognitive functions and domains. The final section presents research from neighboring fields.

In the Second Edition of Rational Choice in an Uncertain World the authors compare the basic principles of rationality with actual behaviour in making decisions. They describe theories and research findings from the field of judgment and decision making in a non-technical manner, using anecdotes as a teaching device. Intended as an introductory textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, the material not only is of scholarly interest but is practical as well. The Second Edition includes: - more coverage on the role of emotions, happiness, and general well-being in decisions - a summary of the new research on the neuroscience of decision processes - more discussion of the adaptive value of (non-rational heuristics) - expansion of the graphics for decision trees, probability trees, and Venn diagrams.

Newcomb's problem is a controversial paradox of decision theory. It is easily explained and easily understood, and there is a strong chance that most of us have actually faced it in some form or other. And yet it has proven as thorny and intractable a puzzle as much older and better-known philosophical problems of consciousness, scepticism and fatalism. It brings into very sharp and focused disagreement several long-standing philosophical theories on practical rationality, on the nature of free will, and on the direction and analysis of causation. This volume introduces readers to the nature of Newcomb's problem, and ten chapters by leading scholars present the most recent debates around the problem and analyse its ramifications for decision theory, metaphysics, philosophical psychology and political science. Their chapters highlight the status of Newcomb's problem as a live and continuing issue in modern philosophy.