In this work we introduce and analyze a new random Tug-of-War game in which one of the players has the power to decide at each turn whether to play a round of classical random Tug-of-War, or let the other player choose the new game position in exchange of a fixed payoff. We prove that this game has a value and identify the partial differential equation to which it is related. This is the first time that such equation is found to have a relation with game theory. Moreover, our analysis relies on comparison and viscosity tools, in contrast to probabilistic arguments which are more common in the literature. The work also includes a review of the infinity Laplacian and its connection to the classical random Tug-of-War game, as well as an introduction to the theory of viscosity solutions. Furthermore, some explicit examples of the new game are considered.

This graduate textbook provides a detailed introduction to the probabilistic interpretation of nonlinear potential theory, relying on the recently introduced notion of tug-of-war games with noise. The book explores both basic and more advanced constructions, carefully explaining the parallel between linear and nonlinear cases. The presentation is self-contained with many exercises, making the book suitable as a textbook for a graduate course, as well as for self-study. Extensive background and auxiliary material allow the tailoring of courses to individual student levels.

This volume is dedicated to the memory of the late Oded Schramm (1961-2008), distinguished mathematician. Throughout his career, Schramm made profound and beautiful contributions to mathematics that will have a lasting influence. In these two volumes, Editors Itai Benjamini and Olle Häggström have collected some of his papers, supplemented with three survey papers by Steffen Rohde, Häggström and Cristophe Garban that further elucidate his work. The papers within are a representative collection that shows the breadth, depth, enthusiasm and clarity of his work, with sections on Geometry, Noise Sensitivity, Random Walks and Graph Limits, Percolation, and finally Schramm-Loewner Evolution. An introduction by the Editors and a comprehensive bibliography of Schramm's publications complete the volume. The book will be of especial interest to researchers in probability and geometry, and in the history of these subjects.

The issue of regularity has played a central role in the theory of Partial Differential Equations almost since its inception, and despite the tremendous advances made it still remains a very fruitful research field. In particular considerable strides have been made in regularity estimates for degenerate and singular elliptic and parabolic equations over the last several years, and in many unexpected and challenging directions. Because of all these recent results, it seemed high time to create an overview that would highlight emerging trends and issues in this fascinating research topic in a proper and effective way. The course aimed to show the deep connections between these topics and to open new research directions through the contributions of leading experts in all of these fields.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2010, held in Stanford, USA, in December 2010. The 52 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 95 submissions. The papers are organized in 33 regular papers and 19 short papers.

The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. - Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior - Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory - Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics

This volume contains recent papers by several specialists in different fields of mathematical analysis. It offers a reasonably wide perspective of the current state of research, and new trends, in areas related to measure theory, harmonic analysis, non-associative structures in functional analysis and summability in locally convex spaces.Those interested in researching any areas of mathematical analysis will find here numerous suggestions on possible topics with an important impact today. Often, the contributions are presented in an expository nature and this makes the discussed topics accessible to a more general audience.

We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.