Despite the criticality of tax administration (TA) reforms in enhancing domestic revenue mobilization, few studies have attempted to quantify the revenue impact of such reforms. This paper fills this gap by estimating the revenue yields associated with various tax administration capabilities, based on the International Survey on Tax Administration (ISORA), the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT), and TA reform episodes datasets (identified by Akitoby et al., 2020). It uses a Hausman-Taylor cross-country panel regression and an event study for specific TA reform episodes. Our results (using the ISORA data) show that an increase in the overall strength of TA from the 40th percentile to the 60th percentile is associated with an increase in tax revenue by 1.8 pp. of GDP (with a 95 percent confidence range of 0.5‒2.6 pp. of GDP). Similarly, the event-study assessment shows that sustained TA reforms led to an increase in tax revenues between 2 to 3 pp. of GDP, in line with the experience in three country cases (Jamaica, Rwanda, and Senegal). Also, the revenue yields are increasing over time to more than 3 pp. of GDP after the 6th year following a comprehensive reform. The analysis also highlights the significant impact of specific measures including: i) strengthening compliance risks management, ii) enhancing public accountability, iii) establishing Large Taxpayer Offices (LTO), iv) strengthening accountability and transparency, and v) enhancing timely filing of tax declarations.

This paper addresses core challenges that all tax administrations face in dealing with noncompliance—which are now receiving renewed attention. Long a priority in developing countries, assuring strong compliance has acquired greater priority in countries facing intensified revenue needs, and is critical for fairness and statebuilding. Series: Policy Papers

The Fund has long played a lead role in supporting developing countries’ efforts to improve their revenue mobilization. This paper draws on that experience to review issues and good practice, and to assess prospects in this key area.

Tax administration improvements have contributed significantly to a doubling of China’s tax-to-GDP ratio and the substantial reduction in taxpayers’ compliance costs since the mid-1990s. This paper describes the key features of China’s tax administration and their evolution over the last 20 years. It also identifes emerging challenges to the tax system and areas where further tax administration improvements are needed to sustain tax revenue and reduce taxpayers’ compliance costs in the future.

This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. Its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions—the “enforcement elasticity of tax revenue”—that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.

Building on previous FAD work in the tax administration field, this paper defines broad criteria for diagnosing the problems in a country’s tax administration and formulating an appropriate reform strategy. To be effective, this strategy should be based on the size of the tax gap and the country’s particular circumstances. This paper discusses some guiding principles which have provided the basis for successful reforms, including: reducing the tax system’s complexity, encouraging taxpayers’ voluntary compliance, differentiating the treatment of taxpayers by their revenue potential, and ensuring the reform’s effective management. Also discussed are specific bottlenecks that hinder the effectiveness of the tax administration’s operations.

How can Low-Income Countries (LICs) enhance tax revenue collection to finance their vast development needs? We address this question by analyzing seven tax reform experiences in LICs (Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Maldives, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda). Three lessons stand out, although reforms must be tailored to individual circumstances: (i) Tax reforms require first and foremost political commitment and buy-in from key stakeholders; (ii) Countries that pursue both revenue administration and tax policy reforms tend to see much larger and persistent gains; and (iii) A successful strategy often starts with fiscal reform measures with immediate effect to build momentum. These can include: simplifying the tax system; curbing exemptions; reforming indirect taxes on goods and services (e.g., excises); and better managing compliance risks through strengthening taxpayer segmentation (often beginning with strengthening the Large Taxpayers Office). A comprehensive reform strategy (e.g., a medium-term revenue strategy) can help to properly sequence reform measures and facilitate their implementation.

This paper examines the role of tax administration in developing countries from an economic perspective. The traditional separation of tax policy and tax administration in the literature is shown to break down in developing countries, where tax administrators decide in what manner complicated tax legislation should actually be applied. After surveying economic literature dealing with tax administration, the paper offers guidelines on how tax administrators can help implement more efficient and equitable tax systems.

This paper examines the role of minimum taxes and attempts to quantify their impact on economic activity. Minimum taxes can be effective at shoring up the corporate tax base and enhancing the perceived equity of the tax system, potentially motivating broader taxpayer compliance. Where political and administrative constraints prevent reforms to the standard corporate income tax, a minimum tax can help mitigate base erosion from excessive tax incentives and avoidance. Using a new panel dataset that catalogues changes in minimum tax regimes over time around the world, firm-level analysis suggests that the introduction or reform of a minimum tax is associated with an increase in the average effective tax rate of just over 1.5 percentage points with respect to turnover and of around 10 percent with respect to operating income. Minimum taxes based on modified corporate income lead to the largest increases in effective tax rates, followed by those based on assets and turnover.

Tax compliance costs tend to be disproportionately higher for small and young businesses. This paper examines how the quality of tax administration affects firm performance for a large sample of firms in emerging market and developing economies. We construct a novel, internationally comparable, and multidimensional index of tax administration quality (the TAQI) using information from the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool. We show that better tax administration attenuates the productivity gap of small and young firms relative to larger and older firms, a result that is robust to controlling for other aspects of tax policy and of economic governance, alternative definitions of small and young firms, and measures of the quality of tax administration. From a policy perspective, we provide evidence that countries can reap growth and productivity dividends from improvements in tax administration that lower compliance costs faced by firms.