Up until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s and China’s worsening relations with the European Union and the United States meant that the world order was at risk of falling apart into two rival blocs, as during the Cold War: Europeans and Americans against Russians and Chinese. Since 24 February 2022, that is not so clear anymore. The more Russia escalates the violence in Ukraine, but also the strategic anxiety (by putting its nuclear forces on alert), the more difficult it becomes for other powers to stay completely aloof, let alone to simply align with Russia. The more EU and US sanctions reverberate throughout the global economy, the more it becomes impossible for other powers to avoid going at least partially along. China in particular has in fact already made a defining choice.

"Russian President Vladimir Putin's overarching goal is to create a multipolar world in which Russia is a leading entity. He will attempt to do this by regaining his control over Ukraine, expanding his interests in the Middle East, strengthening partnerships with China and undermining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Putin is a strong believer in the Spheres of Influence concept in which larger nations will attempt to exert leverage over smaller nations to advance their own strategic interests. While Russia's efforts may appear to be belligerently hostile to the Western world, they are not without reason. From Moscow's doorstep, Russian strategic analysts have been observing the actions of what they feel is an unchecked NATO, beginning with its intervention in Bosnia and ending in the Libyan bombing campaign. Putin believes that by creating a multipolar world, Russia will be in a better position to resist NATO's seemingly aggressive behavior. However, if he wants to solidify Russia's position as a leader in a multipolar world, he will not only try to resist NATO but will also endeavor to create a rift in the alliance by attempting to demonstrate to its members Russian diplomatic and military superiority over the United States"--Publisher's web site.

"Russia's recent aggression against Ukraine has disrupted nearly a generation of relative peace and stability between Moscow and its Western neighbors and raised concerns about its larger intentions. From the perspective of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the threat to the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -- former Soviet republics, now member states that border Russian territory -- may be the most problematic of these. In a series of war games conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, RAND Arroyo Center examined the shape and probable outcome of a near-term Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The games' findings are unambiguous: As presently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Fortunately, it will not require Herculean effort to avoid such a failure. Further gaming indicates that a force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades -- adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities -- could suffice to prevent the rapid overrun of the Baltic states"--Publisher's web site.

Modern political systems have been the products of liberal democracy, Marxism, or fascism. Dugin asserts a fourth ideology is needed to sift through the debris of the first three to look for elements that might be useful, but that remains innovative and unique in itself.

Nations and international organizations are increasingly using sanctions as a means to achieve their foreign policy aims. However, sanctions are ineffective if they are executed without a clear strategy responsive to the nature and changing behavior of the target. In The Art of Sanctions, Richard Nephew offers a much-needed practical framework for planning and applying sanctions that focuses not just on the initial sanctions strategy but also, crucially, on how to calibrate along the way and how to decide when sanctions have achieved maximum effectiveness. Nephew—a leader in the design and implementation of sanctions on Iran—develops guidelines for interpreting targets’ responses to sanctions based on two critical factors: pain and resolve. The efficacy of sanctions lies in the application of pain against a target, but targets may have significant resolve to resist, tolerate, or overcome this pain. Understanding the interplay of pain and resolve is central to using sanctions both successfully and humanely. With attention to these two key variables, and to how they change over the course of a sanctions regime, policy makers can pinpoint when diplomatic intervention is likely to succeed or when escalation is necessary. Focusing on lessons learned from sanctions on both Iran and Iraq, Nephew provides policymakers with practical guidance on how to measure and respond to pain and resolve in the service of strong and successful sanctions regimes.

The publication of this issue on Future for Europe marks a new milestone for TPQ. The journal was founded in 2002 and we celebrated its 20th anniversary with the last issue on Artificial Intelligence and Democratic Values. Among many academics and AI policy professionals, it was considered a landmark publication. Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ) now has a new identity as Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ). Our plans to move with this name have been ongoing for a while. The success of the last issue was a perfect illustration of the necessity of this change. TPQ's editorial and curatorial policies have and will continue to reflect a global perspective without sacrificing its roots. This means we will extend our coverage beyond what we currently offer. In the wake of the Russian incursion into the Ukraine, European soil has seen a return of tragedy. As memories of the Second World War on the continent have receded, it has been argued that the European project has lost appeal over the past few decades. This is no longer the case. The war has also exposed the EU's deficiencies and highlighted the fact that it must be reformed to fulfill the needs of the twenty-first century. The Covid-19 pandemic is also one of the most significant events in our lifetime, and it has radically altered the way Europeans perceive their own societies and the world in general. Nonetheless, one of the most important lessons we can learn from these tragic events is that we must show a strong, constant, and united capability to deter and confront acts of violence. Professor Thomas Diez writes that the war in Ukraine fundamentally challenges the post-Cold War international order. In that regard, he believes that alternative visions of a European order should be developed to counter the scenario of a renewed Cold War. The author reassesses the concepts of interdependence, socialization, normative power, and international society in his contribution to uncover some general lessons for the European order, as well as provide concrete suggestions for alternative policy strategies. As he points out, such an order would require more honest engagement, a system of great power management with social links, and a creative approach to thinking about joint institutions and regional overlaps. Professor Knud Erik Jørgensen starts with a timely question: Europe's hour of reckoning? In his view, the hour of reckoning refers to when one must confront past mistakes and determine a course of action. He says Russia's war in Ukraine exposes numerous mistakes Europe made in the past and accelerates the development of a new foreign policy paradigm. As a result, he examines the role played by the emerging policy paradigm in shaping the politics of EU foreign policy. Furthermore, the article argues that the emerging paradigm is closely linked, if not dependent, on the ongoing processes of reckoning, that is, to the extent with which past mistakes are acknowledged. Lastly, the article makes a case that the twin processes of reckoning and paradigm change make up a crucial element of Europe's future. Professor Giuseppe Bertola explores a different perspective. According to her, the common-market project, that after World War II aimed to prevent future wars among European nations, has evolved through crises into a complex and unstable set of policies and institutions to govern the European Union. A pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus and the war in Ukraine strengthened coordination and added issuance of common debt to the supranational policy toolkit. Nevertheless, NextGenEU relies heavily on government subsidies rather than on market incentives, and Russian invasion of the Ukraine demonstrates that economic integration can only shift the boundaries of war from nation-based to those of the integrated economic area. We invite you to learn more about the factors that will shape the future of Europe.

A New York Times and Sunday Times bestseller | A New York Times Book Review Editors' Choice Named a best book of the year by The Economist | Financial Times | New Statesman | The Telegraph "[Putin's People] will surely now become the definitive account of the rise of Putin and Putinism." —Anne Applebaum, The Atlantic "This riveting, immaculately researched book is arguably the best single volume written about Putin, the people around him and perhaps even about contemporary Russia itself in the past three decades." —Peter Frankopan, Financial Times Interference in American elections. The sponsorship of extremist politics in Europe. War in Ukraine. In recent years, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has waged a concerted campaign to expand its influence and undermine Western institutions. But how and why did all this come about, and who has orchestrated it? In Putin’s People, the investigative journalist and former Moscow correspondent Catherine Belton reveals the untold story of how Vladimir Putin and the small group of KGB men surrounding him rose to power and looted their country. Delving deep into the workings of Putin’s Kremlin, Belton accesses key inside players to reveal how Putin replaced the freewheeling tycoons of the Yeltsin era with a new generation of loyal oligarchs, who in turn subverted Russia’s economy and legal system and extended the Kremlin's reach into the United States and Europe. The result is a chilling and revelatory exposé of the KGB’s revanche—a story that begins in the murk of the Soviet collapse, when networks of operatives were able to siphon billions of dollars out of state enterprises and move their spoils into the West. Putin and his allies subsequently completed the agenda, reasserting Russian power while taking control of the economy for themselves, suppressing independent voices, and launching covert influence operations abroad. Ranging from Moscow and London to Switzerland and Brooklyn’s Brighton Beach—and assembling a colorful cast of characters to match—Putin’s People is the definitive account of how hopes for the new Russia went astray, with stark consequences for its inhabitants and, increasingly, the world.

Explores the evidence for Russia's long-term imperialist ambitions toward the transatlantic alliance.