Public Policy and Private Interest explains the complexities of the policy making process in a refreshingly clear way for students who are new to this subject. The key topics it explains are: How policy originates, is refined, legitimised, implemented, evaluated and terminated in the forms of theoretical models of the policy process; Which actors and institutions are most influential in determining the nature of policy; The values that shape the policy agenda such as ideology, institutional self-interest and resource capabilities; The outcome of policies, and why they succeed or fail; The main policy theories including the very latest insights from network theory and post-modernism; How national policy is influenced by globalization. The text is fully illustrated throughout with a broad range of national and international case studies on subjects such as the banking crisis, the creation of unitary authorities and global environmental policy and regulation. Combining both a clear summary of debates and theories in public policy and a new and original approach to the subject, this book is essential reading for students of public policy and policy analysis.

According to conventional wisdom, government may intervene when private markets fail to provide goods and services that society values. This view has led to the passage of much legislation and the creation of a host of agencies that have attempted, by exquisitely detailed regulations, to compel legislatively defined behavior in a broad range of activities affecting society as a whole—health care, housing, pollution abatement, transportation, to name only a few. Far from achieving the goals of the legislators and regulators, these efforts have been largely ineffective; worse, they have spawned endless litigation and countless administrative proceedings as the individuals and firms on who the regulations fall seek to avoid, or at least soften, their impact. The result has been long delays in determining whether government programs work at all, thwarting of agreed-upon societal aims, and deep skepticism about the power of government to make any difference. Strangely enough in a nation that since its inception has valued both the means and the ends of the private market system, the United States has rarely tried to harness private interests to public goals. Whenever private markets fail to produce some desired good or service (or fail to deter undesirable activity), the remedies proposed have hardly ever involved creating a system of incentives similar to those of the market place so as to make private choice consonant with public virtue. In this revision of the Godkin Lectures presented at Harvard University in November and December 1976, Charles L. Schultze examines the sources of this paradox. He outlines a plan for government intervention that would turn away from the direct "command and control" regulating techniques of the past and rely instead on market-like incentives to encourage people indirectly to take publicly desired actions.

What is the impact of lobbying on the policymaking process? And who benefits? This book argues that most research overlooks the lobbying of regulatory agencies even though it accounts for almost half of all lobbying - even though bureaucratic agencies have considerable leeway in how they choose to implement law.

Draws on interviews with interest groups, lobbyists and government officials to assess private organizations' efforts to influence federal policy in agriculture, energy, health and labour policy. They reveal and explain the absence of any central core of influentials in the policy process.

As a book on public policy, this book is unique in addressing explicitly the role of human nature. Only with a good understanding of human nature can policy makers address their foremost needs and anticipate how people may respond to specific designs in policy. This way policy makers can avoid "unintended consequences." The book also provides a new perspective on the meaning of public interest, which is based on intellectual roots dating back to J.S.Mill and more recently Harsanyi and Rawls. Traditionally, economists have referred to either the Hicksian criterion or the Kaldorian criterion as the yardstick to whether a policy is welfare enhancing, not realizing that both of these criteria fail abjectly in producing a convincing test for welfare improvement. This is because ex post, typically some people will gain and some people will lose from any policy. The author argues for an alternative, ex ante welfare increase criterion that is based on how people would assess a policy if they were completely impartial and totally ignored their personal interests. It applies the principles to key policy concerns such as health policy, tort law reform, education and cultural policy, and pension reform. The healthcare reform proposals in the book illustrate the application of the principles. The author proposes a basic protection plan under which standard basic healthcare services are priced the same whether they are provided by public or private caregivers—at levels that can contain both demand side and supply side moral hazard. Annual eligible healthcare expenses are capped to alleviate worries. A "Lifetime Healthcare Supplement" that includes an element of risk sharing adds to patients’ choice and protection without compromising fiscal sustainability.

At a time when pollution, urban sprawl, and condo booms are leading municipal governments to adopt prescriptive laws and regulations, this book lays the groundwork for a more informed debate between those trying to preserve private property rights and those trying to assert public interests. Rather than asking whether community interests should prevail over the rights of private property owners, Public Interest, Private Property delves into the heart of the argument to ask key questions. Under what conditions should public interests take precedence? And when they do, in what manner should they be limited? Drawing on case studies from across Canada, the contributors examine the tensions surrounding expropriation, smart growth, tree bylaws, green development, and municipal water provision. They also explore frustrations arising from the perceived loss of procedural rights in urban-planning decision making, the absence of a clear definition of “public interest,” and the ambiguity surrounding the controls property owners have within a public-planning system.

In this book, Gary Mucciaroni examines the shifting fortunes of economic interest groups in Washington. Mucciaroni compares and contrasts four policy areas-- tax incentives, anti-competitive regulations, trade barriers, and agricultural subsidies-- where it is possible for interest groups to gain substantial benefits while paying little of the costs. He finds that the fortunes of these groups vary considerably across policies over time.

In recent decades Washington has seen an alarming rise in the number of "revolving door lobbyists"—politicians and officials cashing in on their government experience to become influence peddlers on K Street. These lobbyists, popular wisdom suggests, sell access to the highest bidder. Revolving Door Lobbying tells a different, more nuanced story. As an insider interviewed in the book observes, where the general public has the "impression that lobbyists actually get things done, I would say 90 percent of what lobbyists do is prevent harm to their client from the government." Drawing on extensive new data on lobbyists’ biographies and interviews with dozens of experts, authors Timothy M. LaPira and Herschel F. Thomas establish the facts of the revolving door phenomenon—facts that suggest that, contrary to widespread assumptions about insider access, special interests hire these lobbyists as political insurance against an increasingly dysfunctional, unpredictable government. With their insider experience, revolving door lobbyists offer insight into the political process, irrespective of their connections to current policymakers. What they provide to their clients is useful and marketable political risk-reduction. Exploring this claim, LaPira and Thomas present a systematic analysis of who revolving door lobbyists are, how they differ from other lobbyists, what interests they represent, and how they seek to influence public policy. The first book to marshal comprehensive evidence of revolving door lobbying, LaPira and Thomas revise the notion that lobbyists are inherently and institutionally corrupt. Rather, the authors draw a complex and sobering picture of the revolving door as a consequence of the eroding capacity of government to solve the public’s problems.