Population centers have been leveled and society has regressed to a pre-industrialized state. An advanced city rises from the ashes, enabling the rebirth of more such cities, each one subtly different, the result of an experiment in finding the best machine-governed utopia. Sovereign forces mobilize to exploit their power, and others, to contain them. At the heart of this is an unlikely pair; a dejected anthropologist whose life's work has finally become useful, and a snarky pirate forced to serve a monastic cult. To survive, they must not only navigate the escalating conflict, but also understand the implications of the rising machine cities for all of humanity. * PROLIFERATION is a stand-alone novel in the same world as DETONATION *

The first systematic look at the different strategies that states employ in their pursuit of nuclear weapons Much of the work on nuclear proliferation has focused on why states pursue nuclear weapons. The question of how states pursue nuclear weapons has received little attention. Seeking the Bomb is the first book to analyze this topic by examining which strategies of nuclear proliferation are available to aspirants, why aspirants select one strategy over another, and how this matters to international politics. Looking at a wide range of nations, from India and Japan to the Soviet Union and North Korea to Iraq and Iran, Vipin Narang develops an original typology of proliferation strategies—hedging, sprinting, sheltered pursuit, and hiding. Each strategy of proliferation provides different opportunities for the development of nuclear weapons, while at the same time presenting distinct vulnerabilities that can be exploited to prevent states from doing so. Narang delves into the crucial implications these strategies have for nuclear proliferation and international security. Hiders, for example, are especially disruptive since either they successfully attain nuclear weapons, irrevocably altering the global power structure, or they are discovered, potentially triggering serious crises or war, as external powers try to halt or reverse a previously clandestine nuclear weapons program. As the international community confronts the next generation of potential nuclear proliferators, Seeking the Bomb explores how global conflict and stability are shaped by the ruthlessly pragmatic ways states choose strategies of proliferation.

Hagerty analyzes how India and Pakistan interacted in diplomatic and military crises before their 1998 nuclear tests. He presents detailed studies of the January 1987 Indo-Pakistani crisis, precipitated by India's Brasstacks military exercises, and the 1990 confrontation over Kashmir. Hagerty concludes that relations between India and Pakistan in recent years support the argument that nuclear proliferation does not necessarily destabilize international relations and may even reduce the risk of war.

Selected by Choice Magazine as an Outstanding Academic Title The intelligence community's flawed assessment of Iraq's weapons systems—and the Bush administration's decision to go to war in part based on those assessments—illustrates the political and policy challenges of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this comprehensive assessment, defense policy specialists Jason Ellis and Geoffrey Kiefer find disturbing trends in both the collection and analysis of intelligence and in its use in the development and implementation of security policy. Analyzing a broad range of recent case studies—Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, North Korea's defiance of U.N. watchdogs, Russia's transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Iran and China's to Pakistan, the Soviet biological warfare program, weapons inspections in Iraq, and others—the authors find that intelligence collection and analysis relating to WMD proliferation are becoming more difficult, that policy toward rogue states and regional allies requires difficult tradeoffs, and that using military action to fight nuclear proliferation presents intractable operational challenges. Ellis and Kiefer reveal that decisions to use—or overlook—intelligence are often made for starkly political reasons. They document the Bush administration's policy shift from nonproliferation, which emphasizes diplomatic tools such as sanctions and demarches, to counterproliferation, which at times employs interventionist and preemptive actions. They conclude with cogent recommendations for intelligence services and policy makers.

Some states have violated international commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. Yet the effects of international sanctions or positive inducements on their internal politics remain highly contested. How have trade, aid, investments, diplomacy, financial measures and military threats affected different groups? How, when and why were those effects translated into compliance with non-proliferation rules? Have inducements been sufficiently biting, too harsh, too little, too late or just right for each case? How have different inducements influenced domestic cleavages? What were their unintended and unforeseen effects? Why are self-reliant autocracies more often the subject of sanctions? Leading scholars analyse the anatomy of inducements through novel conceptual perspectives, in-depth case studies, original quantitative data and newly translated documents. The volume distils ten key dilemmas of broad relevance to the study of statecraft, primarily from experiences with Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea, bound to spark debate among students and practitioners of international politics.

A state-of-the-art consensus report on what is known about peroxisome proliferation, the mechanisms involved, and their relevance to carcinogenesis. Peroxisomes are single, membrane-limited, cytoplasmic organelles that are found in cells of animals, plants, fungi, and protozoa. Peroxisome proliferators include certain hypolipidaemic drugs, phthalate ester plasticizers, industrial solvents, herbicides, food flavours, leukotriene D4 antagonists, and hormones. Numerous studies in rats and mice have demonstrated the hepatocarcinogenic effects of peroxisome proliferators, and these compounds have been unequivocally established as carcinogens. Since humans are exposed to peroxisome proliferators to a significant extent, assessment of the adverse biological effects of this group of compounds, and particularly their potential carcinogenicity, has become an important issue. The report has two parts. The first records the consensus reached by a group of eleven experts, including several of the leading investigators in this field. Questions addressed include the mechanisms by which peroxisome proliferators exert their carcinogenic effects in rodents, the relevance of animal studies to the evaluation of carcinogenic risk in humans, and the potential use of peroxisome proliferation as a biological marker for liver cancer. The report concludes that compounds inducing peroxisome proliferation in rats and mice have little, if any, effect on human liver. The report also issues advice on the interpretation of peroxisome proliferation, demonstrated in animal studies, when evaluating the carcinogenic risk to humans. The second part consists of three background papers presented by members of the working group.

Holland-Frei Cancer Medicine, Ninth Edition, offers a balanced view of the most current knowledge of cancer science and clinical oncology practice. This all-new edition is the consummate reference source for medical oncologists, radiation oncologists, internists, surgical oncologists, and others who treat cancer patients. A translational perspective throughout, integrating cancer biology with cancer management providing an in depth understanding of the disease An emphasis on multidisciplinary, research-driven patient care to improve outcomes and optimal use of all appropriate therapies Cutting-edge coverage of personalized cancer care, including molecular diagnostics and therapeutics Concise, readable, clinically relevant text with algorithms, guidelines and insight into the use of both conventional and novel drugs Includes free access to the Wiley Digital Edition providing search across the book, the full reference list with web links, illustrations and photographs, and post-publication updates

Stephen M. Meyer steps back from the emotions and rhetoric surrounding the nuclear arms debates to provide a systematic examination of the underlying determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation. Looking at current theories of nuclear proliferation, he asks: Must a nation that acquires the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons eventually do so? In an analysis, remarkable for its rigor and accessibility, Meyer provides the first empirical, statistical model explaining why particular countries became nuclear powers when they did. His findings clearly contradict the notion that the pace of nuclear proliferation is controlled by a technological imperative and show that political and military factors account for the past decisions of nations to acquire or forgo the development of nuclear weapons.

This two-volume set is the output from an extensive research project focused on developing the first forecasting model for nuclear proliferation. The Case Study volume (Volume 2) addresses a set of overarching questions regarding the propensity of selected states from different regions of the world to "go nuclear," the sources of national decisions to do so.

The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from the Cold War to the present, led by the United States, show a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, and an unwarranted underprioritization of the civilian energy development and disarmament pillars of the treaty. This book argues that the way in which nuclear-weapon States have interpreted the Treaty has laid the legal foundation for a number of policies related to trade in civilian nuclear energy technologies and nuclear weapons disarmament. These policies circumscribe the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States under Article IV of the Treaty by imposing conditions on the supply of civilian nuclear technologies. They also provide for the renewal and maintaintenance, and in some cases further development of the nuclear weapons arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The book provides a legal analysis of this trend in treaty interpretation by nuclear-weapon States and the policies for which it has provided legal justification. It argues, through a close and systematic examination of the Treaty by reference to the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that this disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty leads to erroneous legal interpretations in light of the original balance of principles underlying the Treaty, prejudicing the legitimate legal interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.