Process philosophy has established itself as one of the 20th century's prime contributions to philosophical thought and Nicholas Rescher has for many years figured among its prime exponents. His new book Process Philosophical Deliberations collects together ten studies illuminating various aspects of this many-sided philosophical approach. Among the topics treated are the nature of process philosophy itself, as well as its implementation in such areas as epistemology, value theory, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of science.

Gathering 115 entries written by 101 internationally renowned experts in their fields, the Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought aims at canvassing the current state of knowledge in Whiteheadian scholarship and at identifying promising directions for future investigations through (internal) cross-elucidation and (external) interdisciplinary development. Two kinds of entries are weaved together in order to interpret Whitehead secundum Whitehead and to read him from the vantage point of interdisciplinary and crossdisciplinary research. The “thematic ” entries provide (i) a broad contextualisation of the issue at stake; (ii) a focus on Whitehead's treatment (if any) or of a possible Whiteheadian treatment of the issue; (iii) a history of relevant scholarship; (iv) a personal assessment by the Author. The “biographical ” entries provide (i) a brief vita of the targeted thinker; (ii) a sketch of his/her categories relevant to the Whiteheadian scholarship; (iii) a personal assessment of the actual (or possible) Whiteheadian semantic transfer to or from the thinker.

This volume celebrates the life achievements of Jason W. Brown, who, along with Jean Piaget, Heinz Werner, Alexander Luria and the Würzburg school, has significantly contributed to the development of a process-based theory of brain/mind capable of challenging the currently fashionable modularist or cybernetic approaches to understanding human thought and feeling. As a paradigm, Brown's microgenetic theory is thus applicable in both brain science (where Brown was inspired by the pioneering work of Schilder and Pick) and the philosophy of mind (where the influence of Bergson, Whitehead, Cassirer, and Merleau-Ponty can be seen). Essays with a range of focus as wide as Brown's expertise have been collected in such diverse areas as neuropsychology (microstructure of action, symptomatology, neuro-rehabilitation, neurolinguistics, locationism), theoretical psychology (consciousness, hypnosis, morphogenesis, personality development, psychoanalysis, Buddhist psychology, mysticism), and philosophy of mind (evolutionary epistemology, emergence/novelty/creativity, subjectivity, will and action, Whiteheadian process philosophy).

Applies the principles of process philosophy and Deleuzian film aesthetics to animation as a genre and medium.

Philosophical Deliberations continues for the 2011/12 biennium Rescher longstanding practice of publishing groups of philosophical essays. Notwithstanding their thematic diversity, these discussions exhibit a uniformity of method in addressing philosophical issues and a commonality of objective: the elucidation of philosophically pivotal ideas.

Process Philosophy surveys the basic issues and controversies surrounding the philosophical approach known as "process philosophy." Process philosophy views temporality, activity, and change as the cardinal factors for our understanding of the real—process has priority over product, both ontologically and epistemically. Rescher examines the movement’s historical origins, reflecting a major line of thought in the work of such philosophers as Heracleitus, Leibniz, Bergson, Peirce, William James, and especially A. N. Whitehead. Reacting against the tendency to associate process philosophy too closely with this last-named thinker, Rescher writes, “Indeed, one cardinal task for the partisans of process at this particular juncture of philosophical history is to prevent the idea of 'process philosophy' from being marginalized through a limitation of its bearing to the work and influence of any one single individual or group.” This book will appeal to both students and professors of philosophy. Those teachers who have not been trained in process philosophy will welcome this new text by one one of North America’s foremost philosophers as a perspicuous and informative introduction.

One of the most important characteristics of present day ontological research is the growing interest in, and emphasis on, the dynamic aspects of being and the process-relational character of being itself. However, many important questions still await detailed answers. For example, what is the meaning of the concepts of “dynamics,” “dynamicity,” and “dynamic ontology,” among others? Are they identical to, or similar with, respectively, “processes,” “process ontology,” “process-relational ontology”? Is “process ontology” a type of “dynamic ontology”? Dynamic Being: Essays in Process-Relational Ontology examines these and many other questions, and suggests fruitful approaches in dealing with such questions. The book carries out two main tasks: first, investigating developments in the theory of dynamic and process-relational ontologies, and, second, exploring developments in the application of these ontologies. The second task is multidisciplinary in character. The authors of the chapters in this volume are specialists not only in philosophy, but also in other fields of science, including psychology, biology, mathematics, logic, and computer science, their work providing a “seed-bed” of novel possibilities for cooperative interdisciplinary research.

“A welcome renewal and defense of John Dewey's ethical naturalism, which Johnson claims is the only morality ‘fit for actual human beings.’” —Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews What is the difference between right and wrong? This is no easy question to answer, yet we constantly try to make it so, frequently appealing to absolutes, whether drawn from God, universal reason, or societal authority. Combining cognitive science with a pragmatist philosophical framework, Mark Johnson argues that appealing solely to absolute principles is not only scientifically unsound but even morally suspect. He shows that the standards for the kinds of people we should be and how we should treat one another are frequently subject to change. Taking context into consideration, he offers a nuanced, naturalistic view of ethics that sees us creatively adapt our standards according to given needs, emerging problems, and social interactions. Ethical naturalism is not just a revamped form of relativism. Indeed, Johnson attempts to overcome the absolutist-versus-relativist impasse that has been one of the most intractable problems in the history of philosophy. Much of our moral thought, he shows, is automatic and intuitive, gut feelings that we attempt to justify with rational analysis and argument. However, good moral deliberation is not limited to intuitive judgments supported after the fact by reasoning. Johnson points out a crucial third element: we imagine how our decisions will play out, how we or the world would change with each action we might take. Plumbing this imaginative dimension of moral reasoning, he provides a psychologically sophisticated view of moral problem solving, one perfectly suited for the embodied, culturally embedded, and ever-developing human creatures that we are.

Concentrating mainly on the process philosophy developed by Alfred North Whitehead, this series of essays brings together some of the newest developments in the application of process thinking to the physical and social sciences. These essays, by established scholars in the field, demonstrate how a wider and deeper understanding of the world can be obtained using process philosophical concepts, how the distortions and blockages inevitably inherent in substantivist talk can be set aside, and how new and fertile lines of research in the sciences can be opened as a result.

Using sources from classical to modern that broach the phenomenon of uncertainty and its relation to risk, this book creates a novel approach to the recognized but theoretically often unattended issue of uncertainty. Andreas Klinke develops a new, general theory of uncertainty that provides a taxonomy of categories which are deduced from a critical inventory in philosophy, social and natural sciences, and risk research. Comprising six parts, the philosophical grounding of uncertainty sets the stage for the following philosophical and social scientific accounts and explanation of four distinctive guises of uncertainty that form a taxonomic notion and rationale: ontological, epistemological, linguistic-communicative, and teleological uncertainty. The theoretical-conceptual rumination provides a complex, differentiated view of the anatomy of uncertainty and an understanding that can be used in further theoretical and empirical research, as well as socio-political practice. The latter is delineated in the final part addressing the societal domestication of uncertainty. This book will be of great interest to scholars and students in philosophy, social and natural sciences, risk research, as well as inter- and transdisciplinary science fields.