Problems For Moral Debunkers
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Author |
: Peter Königs |
Publisher |
: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG |
Total Pages |
: 166 |
Release |
: 2022-02-21 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9783110750218 |
ISBN-13 |
: 311075021X |
Rating |
: 4/5 (18 Downloads) |
Synopsis Problems for Moral Debunkers by : Peter Königs
One the most interesting debates in moral philosophy revolves around the significance of empirical moral psychology for moral philosophy. Genealogical arguments that rely on empirical findings about the origins of moral beliefs, so-called debunking arguments, take center stage in this debate. Looking at debunking arguments based on evidence from evolutionary moral psychology, experimental ethics and neuroscience, this book explores what ethicists can learn from the science of morality, and what they cannot. Among other things, the book offers a new take on the deontology/utilitarianism debate, discusses the usefulness of experiments in ethics, investigates whether morality should be thought of as a problem-solving device, shows how debunking arguments can tell us something about the structure of philosophical debate, and argues that debunking arguments lead to both moral and prudential skepticism. Presenting a new picture of the relationship between empirical moral psychology and moral philosophy, this book is essential reading for moral philosophers and moral psychologists alike.
Author |
: Hanno Sauer |
Publisher |
: Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages |
: 257 |
Release |
: 2018-07-26 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9781108423694 |
ISBN-13 |
: 1108423698 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (94 Downloads) |
Synopsis Debunking Arguments in Ethics by : Hanno Sauer
Offers the first book-length discussion of debunking arguments in ethics and the reliability of moral judgment.
Author |
: Peter Königs |
Publisher |
: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG |
Total Pages |
: 154 |
Release |
: 2022-02-21 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9783110750195 |
ISBN-13 |
: 3110750198 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (95 Downloads) |
Synopsis Problems for Moral Debunkers by : Peter Königs
One the most interesting debates in moral philosophy revolves around the significance of empirical moral psychology for moral philosophy. Genealogical arguments that rely on empirical findings about the origins of moral beliefs, so-called debunking arguments, take center stage in this debate. Looking at debunking arguments based on evidence from evolutionary moral psychology, experimental ethics and neuroscience, this book explores what ethicists can learn from the science of morality, and what they cannot. Among other things, the book offers a new take on the deontology/utilitarianism debate, discusses the usefulness of experiments in ethics, investigates whether morality should be thought of as a problem-solving device, shows how debunking arguments can tell us something about the structure of philosophical debate, and argues that debunking arguments lead to both moral and prudential skepticism. Presenting a new picture of the relationship between empirical moral psychology and moral philosophy, this book is essential reading for moral philosophers and moral psychologists alike.
Author |
: Michael Bergmann |
Publisher |
: Berkeley Tanner Lectures |
Total Pages |
: 321 |
Release |
: 2014-05 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780199669776 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0199669775 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (76 Downloads) |
Synopsis Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief by : Michael Bergmann
Fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists explore the challenges to moral and religious belief posed by disagreement and evolution. The collection represents both sceptical and non-skeptical positions about morality and religion, cultivates new insights, and moves the discussion forward in illuminating ways.
Author |
: Uri D. Leibowitz |
Publisher |
: Oxford University Press |
Total Pages |
: 327 |
Release |
: 2016-05-26 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780191084263 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0191084263 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (63 Downloads) |
Synopsis Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics by : Uri D. Leibowitz
How far should our realism extend? For many years philosophers of mathematics and philosophers of ethics have worked independently to address the question of how best to understand the entities apparently referred to by mathematical and ethical talk. But the similarities between their endeavours are not often emphasised. This book provides that emphasis. In particular, it focuses on two types of argumentative strategies that have been deployed in both areas. The first--debunking arguments--aims to put pressure on realism by emphasising the seeming redundancy of mathematical or moral entities when it comes to explaining our judgements. In the moral realm this challenge has been made by Gilbert Harman and Sharon Street; in the mathematical realm it is known as the 'Benacerraf-Field' problem. The second strategy--indispensability arguments--aims to provide support for realism by emphasising the seeming intellectual indispensability of mathematical or moral entities, for example when constructing good explanatory theories. This strategy is associated with Quine and Putnam in mathematics and with Nicholas Sturgeon and David Enoch in ethics. Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics addresses these issues through an explicitly comparative methodology which we call the 'companions in illumination' approach. By considering how argumentative strategies in the philosophy of mathematics might apply to the philosophy of ethics, and vice versa, the papers collected here break new ground in both areas. For good measure, two further companions for illumination are also broached: the philosophy of chance and the philosophy of religion. Collectively, these comparisons light up new questions, arguments, and problems of interest to scholars interested in realism in any area.
Author |
: Joshua May |
Publisher |
: Oxford University Press |
Total Pages |
: 281 |
Release |
: 2018-05-04 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780192539601 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0192539604 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (01 Downloads) |
Synopsis Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind by : Joshua May
The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral thought and action, we're told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, shows the pervasive role played by reason our moral minds, and ultimately defuses sweeping debunking arguments in ethics. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue don't come easily. However, despite the heavy influence of automatic and unconscious processes that have been shaped by evolutionary pressures, we needn't reject ordinary moral psychology as fundamentally flawed or in need of serious repair. Reason can be corrupted in ethics just as in other domains, but a special pessimism about morality in particular is unwarranted. Moral judgment and motivation are fundamentally rational enterprises not beholden to the passions.
Author |
: Johan De Smedt |
Publisher |
: Springer Nature |
Total Pages |
: 223 |
Release |
: 2021-05-04 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9783030688028 |
ISBN-13 |
: 303068802X |
Rating |
: 4/5 (28 Downloads) |
Synopsis Empirically Engaged Evolutionary Ethics by : Johan De Smedt
A growing body of evidence from the sciences suggests that our moral beliefs have an evolutionary basis. To explain how human morality evolved, some philosophers have called for the study of morality to be naturalized, i.e., to explain it in terms of natural causes by looking at its historical and biological origins. The present literature has focused on the link between evolution and moral realism: if our moral beliefs enhance fitness, does this mean they track moral truths? In spite of the growing empirical evidence, these discussions tend to remain high-level: the mere fact that morality has evolved is often deemed enough to decide questions in normative and meta-ethics. This volume starts from the assumption that the details about the evolution of morality do make a difference, and asks how. It presents original essays by authors from various disciplines, including philosophy, anthropology, developmental psychology, and primatology, who write in conversation with neuroscience, sociology, and cognitive psychology.
Author |
: Richard Joyce |
Publisher |
: Oxford University Press |
Total Pages |
: 285 |
Release |
: 2016 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780198754879 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0198754876 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (79 Downloads) |
Synopsis Essays in Moral Skepticism by : Richard Joyce
This volume draws together Richard Joyce's work from the last decade on moral skepticism, the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. Joyce's radical view is that in making moral judgments speakers attempt to state truths but that the world isn't furnished with the properties and relations necessary to render such judgments true.
Author |
: Michael Bergmann |
Publisher |
: OUP Oxford |
Total Pages |
: 321 |
Release |
: 2014-05-22 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780191648540 |
ISBN-13 |
: 019164854X |
Rating |
: 4/5 (40 Downloads) |
Synopsis Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief by : Michael Bergmann
Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting one or both of those belief sources? Should evolutionary accounts of the origins of our moral beliefs and our religious beliefs undermine our confidence in their veracity? This volume places challenges to moral belief side-by-side with challenges to religious belief, sets evolution-based challenges alongside disagreement-based challenges, and includes philosophical perspectives together with theological and social science perspectives, with the aim of cultivating insights and lines of inquiry that are easily missed within a single discipline or when these topics are treated in isolation. The result is a collection of essays—representing both skeptical and non-skeptical positions about morality and religion—that move these discussions forward in new and illuminating directions.
Author |
: John Fraser |
Publisher |
: |
Total Pages |
: 267 |
Release |
: 2021 |
ISBN-10 |
: OCLC:1280420759 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (59 Downloads) |
Synopsis Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Theism by : John Fraser
Recent debates in the area of metaethics and moral epistemology have centered around evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). These arguments purport to show that the conclusions of Darwinian evolution pose a serious problem for moral knowledge. I argue that attempts to resolve the issues around debunking arguments from a non-theistic framework fail. I also agree with some atheists who argue that the evidence shows universal benevolence to be an attitude-independent moral truth. I then show that non-theistic approaches do not adequately account for this, whereas theism does. Theism not only explains the cosmic coincidence between our moral beliefs and moral facts, but it also explains the deeper cosmic coincidence between universal benevolence and human flourishing. I examine several prominent EDAs, with particular attention given to those of Sharon Street, Richard Joyce, and Michael Ruse, as well as several other less well-known arguments. Some EDAs aim at undermining moral realism in general, while others target certain moral intuitions. I examine both types of EDA, along with some preliminary objections aimed at keeping EDAs from getting off the ground. Various counterarguments from moral realists are examined, including general objections that EDAs overreach into other domains besides morality, as well as extended discussion of third-factor arguments which attempt to neutralize the debunking challenge by arguing that evolution could select for some third factor which correlates with moral truths. I argue that all of these non-theistic responses by moral realists fail due to the fact that they are question-begging or illegitimate attempts to shift the burden of proof. The solution proposed by debunkers to the challenge to moral realism is to adopt moral antirealism. Special attention is given to Street’s Humean metaethical constructivism, which she thinks provides the only way to evade moral skepticism in the light of debunking arguments. I argue that antirealism does not avoid skepticism because it is a form of skepticism. Non-theistic arguments between debunkers and moral realists result in a standoff in which both sides have to beg important questions. Very little attention has been given in the literature to possible implications of EDAs for theistic views. This dissertation aims at providing a remedy for this.