Probability theory

Authoritative account of the development of Boole's ideas in logic and probability theory ranges from The Mathematical Analysis of Logic to the end of his career. The Laws of Thought formed the most systematic statement of Boole's theories; this volume contains incomplete studies intended for a follow-up volume. 1952 edition.

As a survey of many technical results in probability theory and probability logic, this monograph by two widely respected scholars offers a valuable compendium of the principal aspects of the formal study of probability. Hugues Leblanc and Peter Roeper explore probability functions appropriate for propositional, quantificational, intuitionistic, and infinitary logic and investigate the connections among probability functions, semantics, and logical consequence. They offer a systematic justification of constraints for various types of probability functions, in particular, an exhaustive account of probability functions adequate for first-order quantificational logic. The relationship between absolute and relative probability functions is fully explored and the book offers a complete account of the representation of relative functions by absolute ones. The volume is designed to review familiar results, to place these results within a broad context, and to extend the discussions in new and interesting ways. Authoritative, articulate, and accessible, it will interest mathematicians and philosophers at both professional and post-graduate levels.

This volume presents a definitive introduction to twenty core areas of philosophical logic including classical logic, modal logic, alternative logics and close examinations of key logical concepts. The chapters, written especially for this volume by internationally distinguished logicians, philosophers, computer scientists and linguists, provide comprehensive studies of the concepts, motivations, methods, formal systems, major results and applications of their subject areas. The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic engages both general readers and experienced logicians and provides a solid foundation for further study.

An introductory 2001 textbook on probability and induction written by a foremost philosopher of science.

Shows both the shortcomings and benefits of each technique, and even demonstrates useful combinations of the two.

While probabilistic logics in principle might be applied to solve a range of problems, in practice they are rarely applied - perhaps because they seem disparate, complicated, and computationally intractable. This programmatic book argues that several approaches to probabilistic logic fit into a simple unifying framework in which logically complex evidence is used to associate probability intervals or probabilities with sentences. Specifically, Part I shows that there is a natural way to present a question posed in probabilistic logic, and that various inferential procedures provide semantics for that question, while Part II shows that there is the potential to develop computationally feasible methods to mesh with this framework. The book is intended for researchers in philosophy, logic, computer science and statistics. A familiarity with mathematical concepts and notation is presumed, but no advanced knowledge of logic or probability theory is required.

Since the publication of the first edition in 1976, there has been a notable increase of interest in the development of logic. This is evidenced by the several conferences on the history of logic, by a journal devoted to the subject, and by an accumulation of new results. This increased activity and the new results - the chief one being that Boole's work in probability is best viewed as a probability logic - were influential circumstances conducive to a new edition.Chapter 1, presenting Boole's ideas on a mathematical treatment of logic, from their emergence in his early 1847 work on through to his immediate successors, has been considerably enlarged. Chapter 2 includes additional discussion of the ``uninterpretable'' notion, both semantically and syntactically. Chapter 3 now includes a revival of Boole's abandoned propositional logic and, also, a discussion of his hitherto unnoticed brush with ancient formal logic. Chapter 5 has an improved explanation of why Boole's probability method works. Chapter 6, Applications and Probability Logic, is a new addition. Changes from the first edition have brought about a three-fold increase in the bibliography.

Standard probability theory has been an enormously successful contribution to modern science. However, from many perspectives it is too narrow as a general theory of uncertainty, particularly for issues involving subjective uncertainty. This first-of-its-kind book is primarily based on qualitative approaches to probabilistic-like uncertainty, and includes qualitative theories for the standard theory as well as several of its generalizations.One of these generalizations produces a belief function composed of two functions: a probability function that measures the probabilistic strength of an uncertain event, and another function that measures the amount of ambiguity or vagueness of the event. Another unique approach of the book is to change the event space from a boolean algebra, which is closely linked to classical propositional logic, to a different event algebra that is closely linked to a well-studied generalization of classical propositional logic known as intuitionistic logic. Together, these new qualitative theories succeed where the standard probability theory fails by accounting for a number of puzzling empirical findings in the psychology of human probability judgments and decision making.

Paradoxes provide a vehicle for exposing misinterpretations and misapplications of accepted principles. This book discusses seven paradoxes surrounding probability theory. Some remain the focus of controversy; others have allegedly been solved, however the accepted solutions are demonstrably incorrect. Each paradox is shown to rest on one or more fallacies. Instead of the esoteric, idiosyncratic, and untested methods that have been brought to bear on these problems, the book invokes uncontroversial probability principles, acceptable both to frequentists and subjectivists. The philosophical disputation inspired by these paradoxes is shown to be misguided and unnecessary; for instance, startling claims concerning human destiny and the nature of reality are directly related to fallacious reasoning in a betting paradox, and a problem analyzed in philosophy journals is resolved by means of a computer program.​