The book has been developed in conjunction with NERS 462, a course offered every year to seniors and graduate students in the University of Michigan NERS program. The first half of the book covers the principles of risk analysis, the techniques used to develop and update a reliability data base, the reliability of multi-component systems, Markov methods used to analyze the unavailability of systems with repairs, fault trees and event trees used in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), and failure modes of systems. All of this material is general enough that it could be used in non-nuclear applications, although there is an emphasis placed on the analysis of nuclear systems. The second half of the book covers the safety analysis of nuclear energy systems, an analysis of major accidents and incidents that occurred in commercial nuclear plants, applications of PRA techniques to the safety analysis of nuclear power plants (focusing on a major PRA study for five nuclear power plants), practical PRA examples, and emerging techniques in the structure of dynamic event trees and fault trees that can provide a more realistic representation of complex sequences of events. The book concludes with a discussion on passive safety features of advanced nuclear energy systems under development and approaches taken for risk-informed regulations for nuclear plants.

Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is a structured, comprehensive, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems, such as the nuclear power plants. It is also known as probabilistic risk assessment – PRA. This book presents the theoretical basis to understand the numerous and complex aspects that are covered by PSA and it will help the reader to better understand and to effectively manage risks. The book provides PSA methods and techniques and it includes recommended procedures that are based on the experience of the authors and applicable to different levels and types of PSA that are used for nuclear power plants applications. It can be used as extra reading for PSA courses for practitioners and it provides quantitative risk methodology documentation for PSA.

In addition to presenting methodology, it shows how to identify accident vulnerability in the two industries. It reviews the causes of the two major nuclear accidents and many fatal accidents in the chemical industry, including Bhopal. Many examples of applications of PSA to both industries are presented."--BOOK JACKET. "Problems are included at the end of many chapters with answers at the back of the book."--Jacket.

The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. "Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants" is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. "Lessons Learned" makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, "Lessons Learned" is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations.

Probabilistic Risk Assessment: An Emerging Aid to Nuclear Power Plant Safety Regulation

The technological age has seen a range of catastrophic and preventable failures, often as a result of decisions that did not appropriately consider safety as a factor in design and engineering. Through more than a dozen practical examples from the author‘s experience in nuclear power, aerospace, and other potentially hazardous facilities, Choosing Safety is the first book to bring together probabilistic risk assessment and decision analysis using real case studies. For managers, project leaders, engineers, scientists, and interested students, Michael V. Frank focuses on methods for making logical decisions about complex engineered systems and products in which safety is a key factor in design - and where failure can cause great harm, injury, or death.

Over the past 30 years, numerous concerns have been raised in the literature regarding the capability of static modeling approaches such as the event-tree (ET)/fault-tree (FT) methodology to adequately account for the impact of process/hardware/software/firmware/human interactions on nuclear power plant safety assessment, and methodologies to augment the ET/FT approach have been proposed. Often referred to as dynamic probabilistic risk/safety assessment (DPRA/DPSA) methodologies, which use a time-dependent phenomenological model of system evolution along with a model of its stochastic behavior to model for possible dependencies among failure events. The book contains a collection of papers that describe at existing plant level applicable DPRA/DPSA tools, as well as techniques that can be used to augment the ET/FT approach when needed.