For many Americans, capitalism is a dynamic engine of prosperity that rewards the bold, the daring, and the hardworking. But to many outside the United States, capitalism seems like an initiative that serves only to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few hereditary oligarchies. As A History of Corporate Governance around the World shows, neither conception is wrong. In this volume, some of the brightest minds in the field of economics present new empirical research that suggests that each side of the debate has something to offer the other. Free enterprise and well-developed financial systems are proven to produce growth in those countries that have them. But research also suggests that in some other capitalist countries, arrangements truly do concentrate corporate ownership in the hands of a few wealthy families. A History of Corporate Governance around the World provides historical studies of the patterns of corporate governance in several countries-including the large industrial economies of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States; larger developing economies like China and India; and alternative models like those of the Netherlands and Sweden.

The volume focuses on privatisation in transition countries, addressing issues ranging from corporate governance to the relationship between privatisation and the emergence of markets, from a multi-disciplinary perspective. The contributors investigate both the theoretical groundwork of privatisation and enterprise restructuring as well as recent empirical evidence. The contributions show that changes in ownership titles are but one part of the story, being closely interwoven as they are with the transformation of corporate governance, enterprise restructuring, network transformation and the emergence of markets.

The mass privatization scheme put information about enterprise values in the public domain by allowing increasingly informed bidders to interact. This quickly differentiated enterprises with favorable prospects from those with unfavorable prospects. The design of the program served the objectives of speed and equity more than those of corporate governance.

In Eastern Europe privatization is now a mass phenomenon. The authors propose a model of it by means of an illustration from the example of Poland, which envisages the free provision of shares in formerly public undertakings to employees and consumers, and the provision of corporate finance from foreign intermediaries. One danger that emerges is that of bureaucratization. On the broader canvas, mass privatization implies the reform of the whole system, the creation of a suitable economic infrastructure for a market economy and the institutions of corporate governance. The authors point out the need for a delicate balance between evolution - which may be too slow - and design - which brings the risk of more government involvement than it is able to manage. A chapter originating as a European Bank working paper explores the banking implications of setting up a totally new financial sector with interlocking classes of assets. The economic effects merge into politics as the role of the state is investigated. Teachers and graduate students of public/private sector economies, East European affairs; advisers to bankers or commercial companies with Eastern European interests.

This publication examines the role of corporate governance arrangements in providing right incentives to contribute the value creation process within the private enterprises and the implications of the differences in ownership structures on corporate governance practices and frameworks.

This report examines the precise nature of the required institutional reforms needed to achieve higher sustained rates of growth and to make a dent in poverty reduction and provides a framework for their design and implementation. The more modest objective is to examine how the concepts of the new institutional economics are useful for analyzing and designing institutions and to evaluate how political economy concepts can be used to develop strategies for implementing institutional reforms. Employing some of these concepts, the report demonstrates that sound institutional reform can be technically and politically viable in the following key sectors: banking; capital markets and legal institutions; educational institutions; judicial reforms; and public administration.

This volume aims to explore the evolution of large enterprises in today's developed economies in the West. It focuses on the economic institution of the business group and understanding the factors behind its rise, growth, resilience, and/or fall; its behavioural and organizational characteristics; and its contributions to economic development.

Global private regulations—who wins, who loses, and why Over the past two decades, governments have delegated extensive regulatory authority to international private-sector organizations. This internationalization and privatization of rule making has been motivated not only by the economic benefits of common rules for global markets, but also by the realization that government regulators often lack the expertise and resources to deal with increasingly complex and urgent regulatory tasks. The New Global Rulers examines who writes the rules in international private organizations, as well as who wins, who loses--and why. Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli examine three powerful global private regulators: the International Accounting Standards Board, which develops financial reporting rules used by corporations in more than a hundred countries; and the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission, which account for 85 percent of all international product standards. Büthe and Mattli offer both a new framework for understanding global private regulation and detailed empirical analyses of such regulation based on multi-country, multi-industry business surveys. They find that global rule making by technical experts is highly political, and that even though rule making has shifted to the international level, domestic institutions remain crucial. Influence in this form of global private governance is not a function of the economic power of states, but of the ability of domestic standard-setters to provide timely information and speak with a single voice. Büthe and Mattli show how domestic institutions' abilities differ, particularly between the two main standardization players, the United States and Europe.

The last Asian financial crisis, coupled with the western series of corporate scandals, has caused investors and citizens to doubt mangers ability to guarantee credible financial information about organizations. Consequently, legislators all over the world have come to realise the necessity of legislating in the area of corporate governance.