Every nuclear weapons program for decades has relied extensively on illicit imports of nuclear-related technologies. This book offers the most detailed public account of how states procure what they need to build nuclear weapons, what is currently being done to stop them, and how global efforts to prevent such trade could be strengthened. While illicit nuclear trade can never be stopped completely, effective steps to block illicit purchases of nuclear technology have sometimes succeeded in slowing nuclear weapons programs and increasing their costs, giving diplomacy more chance to work. Hence, this book argues, preventing illicit transfers wherever possible is a key element of an effective global non-proliferation strategy.

Every nuclear weapons program for decades has relied extensively on illicit imports of nuclear-related technologies. This book offers the most detailed public account of how states procure what they need to build nuclear weapons, what is currently being done to stop them, and how global efforts to prevent such trade could be strengthened. While illicit nuclear trade can never be stopped completely, effective steps to block illicit purchases of nuclear technology have sometimes succeeded in slowing nuclear weapons programs and increasing their costs, giving diplomacy more chance to work. Hence, this book argues, preventing illicit transfers wherever possible is a key element of an effective global non-proliferation strategy.

"The arrest and public confession of Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan in 2004 revealed the existence of a global proliferation network which had, over almost two decades, provided nuclear technology, expertise, and designs to Iran, North Korea, Libya and possibly other countries. Khan was not the only nuclear arms merchant and Pakistan was not the only country implicated in his shadowy network. It spanned three continents and eluded both national and international systems of export controls that had been designed to prevent illicit trade. The discovery of the network highlighted concerns that nuclear technology is no longer the monopoly of industrially advanced countries, but can be purchased off-the-shelf by both states and terrorist groups. The IISS Strategic Dossier on nuclear black markets provides a comprehensive assessment of the Pakistani nuclear programme from which the Khan network emerged, the network's onward proliferation activities, and the illicit trade in fissile materials. In addition, the Strategic Dossier provides an overview of the clandestine nuclear procurement activities of other states, along with the efforts made both by Pakistan and the international community to prevent the reoccurrence of further proliferation networks and to secure nuclear technology. The final chapter assesses policy options for further action.

Of the roughly two dozen countries that have pursued or obtained nuclear weapons during the last fifty years, almost all of them depended importantly on foreign supplies. As a short term projection over the next five to ten years, illicit nuclear trade is likely to be conducted by several nations seeking nuclear weapons or wanting to maintain existing nuclear weapons arsenals or capabilities. Additional states in regions of proliferation concern may utilize smuggling methods to acquire advanced, ostensibly civilian, nuclear technology including uranium enrichment and plutonium production and separation capabilities. And despite many recent, particularly United States-led, successes, stopping this trade will remain difficult. Absent mitigating actions, several existing or expected trends are projected to make it easier for smugglers to succeed in acquiring nuclear and nuclear-related goods and technology. Future illicit trade can be stopped through measures taken today as long as the political will is there to foresee and address future threats. A range of countermeasures aimed at mitigating or eliminating these future threats must be employed today to stop them from emerging in the next five to ten years. Preventing the future world of illicit trade is imperative to U.S. and international security and to the creation of a world safer from the spread and use of nuclear weapons.

This book addresses ways that governments, international organizations, and other stakeholders can utilize data to uncover illicit trade in materials and equipment that could be used to support chemical, biological, nuclear, and advanced conventional weapons systems. Key concepts of strategic trade are introduced, including examples of strategic goods and their potential uses in weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and weapons systems, the interplay between the Harmonized System and strategic trade control regimes, and the data available for analysis in the field. Innovative, yet practical methodologies to analyze strategic trade cover the use of crime scripts, risk assessment indicators, mirror statistics, market share analysis, and transshipment and re-export analysis. There are also chapters on leading-edge techniques involving machine learning and network analysis that have shown promise in other areas of crime and illicit trade investigations. Each chapter provides step-by-step instructions on applying the technique, numerous case studies and examples, and discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. This volume is designed to provide all types of analysts with practical pathways for understanding, detecting, and disrupting illicit procurement of materials and equipment needed to produce WMDs and advanced weapons.

Smuggling Armageddon looks at one of the most troubling international concerns of the 1990s and beyond: the illegal trade in nuclear materials that has erupted in the Newly-Independent States (NIS) and Europe since the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Rensselaer Lee raises the seldom-asked question of whether such traffic poses a threat of consequence to international security and stability while showing readers a Russia beset with a variety of criminal proliferation channels, increasingly sophisticated smuggling operations, and nuclear stockpiles with breached security. Smuggling Armageddon is sure to provoke controversy and raise the specter of nuclear destruction once again.

Nuclear materials have never been more plentiful or more accessible to rogue states and terrorists. In this study, the authors analyze the consequences of such nuclear leakage for United States national security and argue that it is possibly the nation's h

Climate change is a key problem of the 21st century. China, as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, has committed to stabilize its current emissions and dramatically increase the share of electricity production from non-fossil fuels by 2030. However, this is only a first step: in the longer term, China needs to aggressively strive to reach a goal of zero-emissions. Through detailed discussions of electricity pricing, electric vehicle policies, nuclear energy policies, and renewable energy policies, this book reviews how near-term climate and energy policies can affect long-term decarbonization pathways beyond 2030, building the foundations for decarbonization in advance of its realization. Focusing primarily on the electricity sector in China - the main battleground for decarbonization over the next century – it provides a valuable resource for researchers and policymakers, as well as energy and climate experts.