"Supplement to Presidential vetoes, 1789-1988"--Preface.

The veto power is one of the most important aspects of checks and balances in the United States Government, as it helps the executive branch to check the legislative. A bill presented by Congress needs the signature of the President to become law, except when the Congress successfully overrides a veto with a 2/3 majority vote in both houses. This book provides important information about vetoes from the 1st session of the 2nd Congress under George Washington to the 1st session of the 105th Congress under Bill Clinton.

Combining game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party Presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile congress.

The Committee on House Administration is pleased to present this revised book on our United States Government. This publication continues to be a popular introductory guide for American citizens and those of other countries who seek a greater understanding of our heritage of democracy. The question-and-answer format covers a broad range of topics dealing with the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of our Government as well as the electoral process and the role of political parties.--Foreword.

During the 1990s Argentina was the only country in Latin America to combine radical economic reform and full democracy. In 2001, however, the country fell into a deep political and economic crisis and was widely seen as a basket case. This book explores both developments, examining the links between the (real and apparent) successes of the 1990s and the 2001 collapse. Specific topics include economic policymaking and reform, executive-legislative relations, the judiciary, federalism, political parties and the party system, and new patterns of social protest. Beyond its empirical analysis, the book contributes to several theoretical debates in comparative politics. Contemporary studies of political institutions focus almost exclusively on institutional design, neglecting issues of enforcement and stability. Yet a major problem in much of Latin America is that institutions of diverse types have often failed to take root. Besides examining the effects of institutional weakness, the book also uses the Argentine case to shed light on four other areas of current debate: tensions between radical economic reform and democracy; political parties and contemporary crises of representation; links between subnational and national politics; and the transformation of state-society relations in the post-corporatist era. Besides the editors, the contributors are Javier Auyero, Ernesto Calvo, Kent Eaton, Sebasti&án Etchemendy, Gretchen Helmke, Wonjae Hwang, Mark Jones, Enrique Peruzzotti, Pablo T. Spiller, Mariano Tommasi, and Juan Carlos Torre.

This text discusses the successes and failures of constitutional design. Chapters analyse the effect of presidential and parliamentary systems, federalism and autonomy, and electoral systems.