What can the United States learn from other militaries about how better to prepare for full-spectrum operations and deployments? The authors examine the militaries of China, France, the UK, India, and Israel to (1) identify different approaches to readiness, adaptability, and operational issues and (2) assess the ways in which units are trained both for specific and general deployments and for train, advise, and assist missions.

The RAND Corporation was asked to analyze how China, France, the UK, India, and Israel approach training for full-spectrum operations and deployments. This monograph should be of interest to those concerned with military training requirements. Material in the text was current as of October 2008, when research for the study was completed. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and conducted within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

"The difficult and continually evolving operations in Iraq and Afghanistan show the complexities of what is now termed irregular warfare and highlight the need for new approaches to the security challenges with which the United States is now contending and will likely confront in the future. The research reported in this monograph focused on answering a rather straightforward, but thus far largely unanswered, question: What can the U.S. military learn from other militaries about how better to prepare for full-spectrum operations and deployments? To this end, RAND was asked by the OSD for Personnel and Readiness to examine the militaries of China, France, the UK, India, and Israel."--P. xiii.

The United States Army is currently at a major crossroads with respect to training. Experiences from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the introduction of Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, and its equal importance placed on offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations, combined with the necessity to be prepared for future conflicts all present a complex problem for Army. Further complicating the situation is increasingly limited resources for the military. The lack of resources includes limited time available to train due to a very demanding operational tempo and finite defense funding. In light of these issues, the Army leadership is faced with making training decisions that not only affect today's fight, but also future operations. No one can predict where, when, why, and how the next conflict will be fought. If the nation calls upon the Army to accomplish an objective, the Army must be prepared to achieve success. As General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, states, "It is simply impossible to plan and train for every possible scenario our Soldiers and their leaders may encounter within the complex reality of the contemporary operating environment." The decisions made today regarding how the Army should train are the cornerstone for success during the next conflict or task. To determine what the future training concepts of the Army should be, this monograph reviews three areas which develop how the Army should train for future operations. The three areas which impact future training are the requirements given to Army from the Army's current operations, national strategy documents, and finally the future operational environment. Integrated into the analysis of those three areas is an analysis of the Army's current training doctrine from Field Manual 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations to determine the current training doctrine prepares the Army for its future operations. The analysis addresses how the Army can best train for future operations when it has a wide range of missions, a lack of time to train, is preoccupied with current operations, is facing a complex and ambiguous future operating environment, and shrinking resources. Adding to the problem is a training doctrine which does not fully prepare the Army for future operations and take into account the current operational environment. Finally the monograph presents recommendations for preparing the Army for future operations. Based on this analysis of the Army's current operational environment, national strategy documents, and the future operational environment, the Army should prepare for the next mission or conflict by training on core tasks which span the spectrum of conflict, increase focus on leadership training, and train intangible attributes such as discipline, adaptability, initiative, and problem solving skills. The Army does not have enough time and resources to train for every mission and conflict, and focusing on a core task list which spans the spectrum of conflict, it can adapt those core skills to succeed in an ambiguous and complex future. Complimenting the core competency task list is an increased focus on leaders and leadership training. Future leaders must have the attributes necessary to succeed in a complex and constantly changing operating environment. The intangible attributes required by not only leaders, units and Soldiers are discipline, initiative, problem solving skills, and adaptability.

FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, establishes the Army's keystone doctrine for training. Since FM 7-0 was last published, enough has changed in the nature of operational environments worldwide to merit a full review of its content and form. FM 7-0 is the guide for Army training and training management. It addresses the fundamental principles and tenets of training. FM 7-0 addresses the fundamentals of training modular, expeditionary Army forces to conduct full spectrum operations-simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations-in an era of persistent conflict. Conducting effective training for full spectrum operations must be a top priority of senior leaders during both force generation and operational deployments. FM 7-0 incorporates new tenets for training modular organizations to conduct full spectrum operations. However, the manual has further developed the concepts in the 2002 version as well. The Army must not lose the many sound training practices used before 11 September 2001. In addition, the manual emphasizes that commanders should leverage the combat experience of seasoned individuals and their leaders in developing training plans. FM 7-0 cannot answer every training challenge of today's complex operational environments. It should, however, generate reflection and introspection on how Soldiers and units train for full spectrum operations as an expeditionary Army. FM 7-0 is organized as follows: * Chapter 1 discusses the environment in which training and operations occur. It stresses the need for the Army to prepare for full spectrum operations. The chapter concludes by discussing the aim point concept used to focus training on the most likely operational environments. * Chapter 2 focuses on the Army's seven principles of training and the supporting tenets that apply at all organizational levels and across all components. * Chapter 3 describes the Army Training System, defines training and education, describes the three training domains, and provides a brief discussion of leader development. * Chapter 4 describes Army training management. It begins by describing the effects of Army force generation and modular organizations on training management. Then it addresses how to develop the mission-essential task list. The bulk of the chapter discusses how to use the Army's training management model to plan, prepare, execute, and assess training.

The Army¿s and Marine Corps¿ major training facilities have focused on training units for counter-insurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As troop levels decrease in Iraq and increase in Afghanistan, larger numbers of forces will be training for Afghanistan. To meet future requirements, the services plan to adjust training to train forces on a fuller range of missions. This report assessed the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have: (1) made adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger deployments to Afghanistan; and (2) developed plans to adjust training capacity to meet future requirements. The report analyzed service training guidance and requirements, and interviewed officials from the services¿ training facilities. Illus.

Will help develop an Army experienced enough to be comfortable with operating anywhere, in any type of operation, under any conditions. Its principles and concepts are intended to produce agile leaders, who can rapidly and easily adapt to changing, ambiguous situations. The manual's 4 chapters address the breadth and depth of Army training concepts. FM 7-0 sets out to change the Army mindset. The Army cannot return to its pre-9-11 focus of training for offensive and defensive operations in major combat operations. Army leaders must think differently about training and leader development in an Army that must be capable of conducting simultaneous offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations in any of the 5 operational themes. Illus.

The U. S. Army exists for one reason—to serve the Nation. From the earliest days of its creation, the Army has embodied and defended the American way of life and its constitutional system of government. It will continue to answer the call to fight and win our Nation's wars, whenever and wherever they may occur. That is the Army's non-negotiable contract with the American people. The Army will do whatever the Nation asks it to do, from decisively winning wars to promoting and keeping the peace. To this end, the Army must be strategically responsive and ready to be dominant at every point across the full spectrum of military operations. Today, the Army must meet the challenge of a wider range of threats and a more complex set of operating environments while incorporating new and diverse technology. The Army meets these challenges through its core competencies: Shape the Security Environment, Prompt Response, Mobilize the Army, Forcible Entry Operations, Sustained Land Dominance and Support Civil Authorities. We must maintain combat readiness as our primary focus while transitioning to a more agile, versatile, lethal, and survivable Army. Doctrine represents a professional army's collective thinking about how it intends to fight, train, equip, and modernize. When the first edition of FM 25-100, Training the Force, was published in 1988, it represented a revolution in the way the Army trains. The doctrine articulated by FMs 25-100, Training the Force, and 25-101, Battle Focused Training, has served the Army well. These enduring principles of training remain sound; much of the content of these manuals remains valid for both today and well into the future. FM 7-0 updates FM 25-100 to our current operational environment and will soon be followed by FM 7-1, which will update FM 25-101. FM 7-0 is the Army's capstone training doctrine and is applicable to all units, at all levels, and in all components. While the examples in this manual are principally focused at division and below, FM 7-0 provides the essential fundamentals for all individual, leader, and unit training. Training for warfighting is our number one priority in peace and in war. Warfighting readiness is derived from tactical and technical competence and confidence. Competence relates to the ability to fight our doctrine through tactical and technical execution. Confidence is the individual and collective belief that we can do all things better than the adversary and the unit possesses the trust and will to accomplish the mission. FM 7-0 provides the training and leader development methodology that forms the foundation for developing competent and confident soldiers and units that will win decisively in any environment. Training is the means to achieve tactical and technical competence for specific tasks, conditions, and standards. Leader Development is the deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process, based on Army values, that develops soldiers and civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action. Closing the gap between training, leader development, and battlefield performance has always been the critical challenge for any army. Overcoming this challenge requires achieving the correct balance between training management and training execution. Training management focuses leaders on the science of training in terms of resource efficiencies (such as people, time, and ammunition) measured against tasks and standards. Training execution focuses leaders on the art of leadership to develop trust, will, and teamwork under varying conditions—intangibles that must be developed to win decisively in combat.