Looks at the relationship Franklin D. Roosevelt had with a variety of influential Jews and examines their actions and inactions regarding the Jewish Holocaust in Euorpe during World War II.

Bestselling author, syndicated political columnist, and PBS commentator Oliphant explains how some of the smartest, most experienced, and politically savvy people in Washington ran the Bush administration into the ground.

Tells what it was like for TV and radio journalists to report the terrifying story of their lives.

Invading Paradise: Esopus Settlers at War with Natives, 1659, 1663 reopens and redirects debate about causes of the two Esopus Wars in what are now Kingston and Hurley, New York. Historical studies are found inadequate to explain the conflict and its genocidal outcome. If causality is ever to be reliably decided, the principal actors in this colonial drama need study. Records of aboriginals are understandably scant, while those of settlers are full enough to give impressions of their motivations and attitudes to the frontier. This study is the first to introduce as individuals the main European immigrants involved in the wars. Were they prepared for what confronted them upon acquiring native agricultural lands? Readers are invited to consider exactly what happened to bring on violence.

Based on the research that has been conducted at Wharton Risk Management Center over the past five years on catastrophic risk. Covers a hot topic in the light of recent terroristic activities and nature catastrophes. Develops risk management strategies for reducing and spreading the losses from future disasters. Provides glossary of definitions and terms used throughout the book.

No modern president has had as much influence on American national politics as Franklin D. Roosevelt. During FDR’s administration, power shifted from states and localities to the federal government; within the federal government it shifted from Congress to the president; and internationally, it moved from Europe to the United States. All of these changes required significant effort on the part of the president, who triumphed over fierce opposition and succeeded in remaking the American political system in ways that continue to shape our politics today. Using the metaphor of the good neighbor, Mary E. Stuckey examines the persuasive work that took place to authorize these changes. Through the metaphor, FDR’s administration can be better understood: his emphasis on communal values; the importance of national mobilization in domestic as well as foreign affairs in defense of those values; his use of what he considered a particularly democratic approach to public communication; his treatment of friends and his delineation of enemies; and finally, the ways in which he used this rhetoric to broaden his neighborhood from the limits of the United States to encompass the entire world, laying the groundwork for American ideological dominance in the post–World War II era.

'Lloyd George at War, 1916-1918' refutes the traditional view that Lloyd George was the person most responsible for winning the Great War. Cassar's careful analysis shows that while his work on the home front was on the whole good, he was an abysmal failure as a strategist and nearly cost Britain the war.

This book uses Russian archival and previously classified secondary sources to document the experience of the Red Army in the conflict with Finland, and examines the diplomatic, organisational and social aspects of Soviet's 'strategic culture'

"All disasters are in some sense man-made." Setting the annus horribilis of 2020 in historical perspective, Niall Ferguson explains why we are getting worse, not better, at handling disasters. Disasters are inherently hard to predict. Pandemics, like earthquakes, wildfires, financial crises. and wars, are not normally distributed; there is no cycle of history to help us anticipate the next catastrophe. But when disaster strikes, we ought to be better prepared than the Romans were when Vesuvius erupted, or medieval Italians when the Black Death struck. We have science on our side, after all. Yet in 2020 the responses of many developed countries, including the United States, to a new virus from China were badly bungled. Why? Why did only a few Asian countries learn the right lessons from SARS and MERS? While populist leaders certainly performed poorly in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, Niall Ferguson argues that more profound pathologies were at work--pathologies already visible in our responses to earlier disasters. In books going back nearly twenty years, including Colossus, The Great Degeneration, and The Square and the Tower, Ferguson has studied the foibles of modern America, from imperial hubris to bureaucratic sclerosis and online fragmentation. Drawing from multiple disciplines, including economics, cliodynamics, and network science, Doom offers not just a history but a general theory of disasters, showing why our ever more bureaucratic and complex systems are getting worse at handling them. Doom is the lesson of history that this country--indeed the West as a whole--urgently needs to learn, if we want to handle the next crisis better, and to avoid the ultimate doom of irreversible decline.