This volume presents a variety of both normative and descriptive perspectives on the use of precedent by the United States Supreme Court. It brings together a diverse group of American legal scholars, some of whom have been influenced by the Segal/Spaeth "attitudinal" model and some of whom have not. The group of contributors includes legal theorists and empiricists, constitutional lawyers and legal generalists, leading authorities and up-and-coming scholars. The book addresses questions such as how the Court establishes durable precedent, how the Court decides to overrule precedent, the effects of precedent on case selection, the scope of constitutional precedent, the influence of concurrences and dissents, and the normative foundations of constitutional precedent. Most of these questions have been addressed by the Court itself only obliquely, if at all. The volume will be valuable to readers both in the United States and abroad, particularly in light of ongoing debates over the role of precedent in civil-law nations and emerging legal systems.

Precedent is an important tool of judicial decision making and reasoning in common law systems such as the United States. Instead of having each court decide cases anew, the rule of precedent or stares decisis dictates that similar cases should be decided similarly. Adherence to precedent promotes several values, including stability, reliability, and uniformity, and it also serves to constrain judicial discretion. While adherence to precedent is important, there are some cases where the United States Supreme Court does not follow it when it comes to constitutional reasoning. Over time the US Supreme Court under its different Chief Justices has approached rejection of its own precedent in different ways and at varying rates of reversal. This book examines the role of constitutional precedent in US Supreme Court reasoning.

Examines the influence of precedent on the behavior of the US Supreme Court justices.

The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court offers an insightful and provocative analysis of the Supreme Court's most important task--shaping the law. Thomas Hansford and James Spriggs analyze a key aspect of legal change: the Court's interpretation or treatment of the precedents it has set in the past. Court decisions do not just resolve immediate disputes; they also set broader precedent. The meaning and scope of a precedent, however, can change significantly as the Court revisits it in future cases. The authors contend that these interpretations are driven by an interaction between policy goals and variations in the legal authoritativeness of precedent. From this premise, they build an explanation of the legal interpretation of precedent that yields novel predictions about the nature and timing of legal change. Hansford and Spriggs test their hypotheses by examining how the Court has interpreted the precedents it set between 1946 and 1999. This analysis provides compelling support for their argument, and demonstrates that the justices' ideological goals and the role of precedent are inextricably linked. The two prevailing, yet contradictory, views of precedent--that it acts either solely as a constraint, or as a "cloak" that never actually influences the Court--are incorrect. This book shows that while precedent can operate as a constraint on the justices' decisions, it also represents an opportunity to foster preferred societal outcomes.

Precedent is an important tool of judicial decision making and reasoning in common law systems such as the United States. Instead of having each court decide cases anew, the rule of precedent or stares decisis dictates that similar cases should be decided similarly. Adherence to precedent promotes several values, including stability, reliability, and uniformity, and it also serves to constrain judicial discretion. Yet while adherence to precedent is important, there are some cases where the United States Supreme Court does not follow it when it comes to constitutional reasoning. Over time the US Supreme Court under its different Chief Justices has approached rejection of its own precedent in different ways and at varying rates of reversal. This book examines the role of constitutional precedent in US Supreme Court reasoning. The author surveys the entire history of the US Supreme Court up until 2020, keying in on decisions regarding when it chose to overturn its own constitutional precedent and why. He explores how the US Supreme Court under its different Chief Justices has approached constitutional precedents and justified its reversal and quantifies which Courts have reversed the most constitutional precedents and why. Constitutional Precedent in US Supreme Court Reasoning is essential reading for law professors and students interested in precedent and its role in legal reasoning. Law libraries which will find this book of importance to their collections on legal reasoning and analysis.

Presenting a new theoretical perspective, Fix and Kassow show how law and politics shape state high court use of Supreme Court precedent. This book approaches this complex topic in an accessible way that will appeal to anyone interested in law and politics or traditional approaches to legal decision-making.

This book analyzes the theoretical nuances and practical implications of how judges use precedent.

The United States Supreme Court exists to resolve constitutional disputes among lower courts and the other branches of government, allowing elected officials, citizens, and businesses to act without legal uncertainty. American law and society function more effectively when the Court resolves these ambiguous questions of Constitutional law. Since lower courts must defer to its reasoning, the Court should also promulgate clear and consistent legal doctrine, giving a reason for its judgment that a majority of justices support. Yet a Court that prioritizes resolving many disputes will at times produce contradictory sets of opinions or fail to provide a rationale and legal precedent for its decision at all. In either case, it produces an unreasoned judgment. Conversely, a Court that prioritizes logically consistent doctrine will fail to resolve many underlying disputes in law and society. Inconsistency and Indecision in the United States Supreme Court demonstrates that over time, institutional changes, lobbied for by the justices, substantially reduced unreasoned judgments in the Court’s output, coinciding with a reduction in the Court’s caseload. Hence, the Supreme Court historically emphasized the first goal of dispute resolution, but evolved into a Court that prioritizes the second goal of logically consistent doctrine. As a result, the Court today fails to resolve more underlying questions in law and society in order to minimize criticism of its output from other elites. In so doing, the modern Court often fails to live up to its Constitutional obligation.

2004 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's unanimous decision to end segregation in public schools. Many people were elated when Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka in May 1954, the ruling that struck down state-sponsored racial segregation in America's public schools. Thurgood Marshall, chief attorney for the black families that launched the litigation, exclaimed later, "I was so happy, I was numb." The novelist Ralph Ellison wrote, "another battle of the Civil War has been won. The rest is up to us and I'm very glad. What a wonderful world of possibilities are unfolded for the children!" Here, in a concise, moving narrative, Bancroft Prize-winning historian James T. Patterson takes readers through the dramatic case and its fifty-year aftermath. A wide range of characters animates the story, from the little-known African Americans who dared to challenge Jim Crow with lawsuits (at great personal cost); to Thurgood Marshall, who later became a Justice himself; to Earl Warren, who shepherded a fractured Court to a unanimous decision. Others include segregationist politicians like Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas; Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon; and controversial Supreme Court justices such as William Rehnquist and Clarence Thomas. Most Americans still see Brown as a triumph--but was it? Patterson shrewdly explores the provocative questions that still swirl around the case. Could the Court--or President Eisenhower--have done more to ensure compliance with Brown? Did the decision touch off the modern civil rights movement? How useful are court-ordered busing and affirmative action against racial segregation? To what extent has racial mixing affected the academic achievement of black children? Where indeed do we go from here to realize the expectations of Marshall, Ellison, and others in 1954?