The shocks of the unexpected outbreak of violent internal armed conflicts in post Cold War West Africa continue to linger in policy and academic circles. While considerable attention is devoted to explaining the civil wars, there is little understanding of the delicate and unpredictable processes of reconstruction. Post-war reconstruction programmes in Africa have become, by and large, externally driven processes; and while externalisation may not be negative per se, it is important to interrogate how such intervention recognises and interacts with local dynamics, and how it manipulates and conditions the outcomes of post-conflict reconstruction agenda. Investigating the interface between power elite, the nature of post-war regimes and the pattern which post-war reconstruction takes is important both for theory and practice. This original study, by some of West Africa's leading scholars, interrogates post-war reconstruction processes in the twin West African countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone, focusing on the effects of regime types on the nature, scope, success or failure of their post-war reconstruction efforts. Political scientists, diplomats, the international community, donor and humanitarian agencies, advocacy groups, the United Nations and its agencies, would find it an important resource in dealing with countries emerging from protracted violence and civil war.

This original study, by some of West Africa's leading scholars, interrogates post-war reconstruction processes in the twin West African countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone, focusing on the effects of regime types on the nature, scope, success or failure of their post-war reconstruction efforts. --

Bosnia, Angola, Cambodia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and other conflicts have posed challenges to peacemaking and policymaking agents alike, seeking to end such violent conflicts: How can the opposing warring factions be brought to a settlement? How has a peace agreement to be formulated to enhance a successful implementation thereof? How can the prospects of a stable peace be enhanced? One of the most challenging problems is the reassurance of the warring factions that the opposing party or parties will not renege the agreement. The security situation is most precarious immediately after the signing of a peace agreement, and there is a high risk of renewed hostilities. The successful implementation of a peace agreement lays the groundwork for a long-term peace-consolidating process to set in. A comprehensive peace agreement is a first step towards peace consolidation but it does not guarantee lasting stability as long as no mid- and long-term peace-consolidating measures have been put in place, which take into account and/or remove the underlying causes of the armed conflict.The purpose of this study is to understand the causes of the Sierra Leonean conflict and to analyse the reconstruction programmes that followed it. Post-war reconstruction programmes must not be limited to the re-joining of families or reintegration of communities. It must also go a long way in providing an improved situation for all those affected by the war. Notably, where post-war reconstruction programmes fail to focus on the original causes of the conflict, it may result in reinforcement of the original social structures and prejudices and in continued marginalisation of certain groups. Using post-conflict Sierra Leone as a case study, the study attempts to examine the notion that “post-war reconstruction programmes tend to reinforce earlier social structures and prejudices rather than create opportunities for the previously marginalised”. The work focuses on the role of the Department for International Development (DfID)-funded Community Reintegration Programme (CRP). Considering the Sierra Leone post-war scenarios, the causes and political resolution of the conflict and the situation in 2001 when the conflict officially came to an end, the study reviews the philosophy, planning, policies, practices and activities of donor agencies in general and CRP in particular before assessing impact on the process of rebuilding communities in Sierra Leone.

Current approaches to post-war state reconstruction are primarily dominated by the liberal peace thesis. These approaches tend to ignore the indigenous institutions, societal resources and cultural agencies of post-conflict societies, although such entities are rooted in the sociological, historical, political and environmental realities of these societies. Such universalised and 'best practice' approaches, more often than not, tend to reproduce artificial states. The Poro and Sande are the largest indigenous sodality institutions in the 'hinterlands' - a pejorative term attributed to rural Liberia and Sierra Leone. Both the Poro and Sande exercise spiritual, political, economic and social authority. In this thesis, I use critical realism and the case study approach to investigate: a) the extent to which the liberal peace practitioners who are leading state reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone recognised the role and potential utility of the Poro and Sande institutions; b) the extent to which the Poro and Sande were engaged; and c) the implications for the quality and viability of the reconstructed states. This evidence-based research suggests that the liberal peace project sidelined indigenous institutions, including the Poro and Sande, in the post-war recovery and rebuilding exercises. The disregard for indigenous and emerging resources in the context of state reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone has contributed to the resurgence of 19th century counter-hegemonic resistance from the sodality-governed interior of both countries. At the same time, the reconstructed states are drifting back towards their pre-war status quo. Authority structures remain fragmented, kleptocracy is being restored, webs of militarised patronage networks are being emboldened, and spaces for constructive dialogues are shrinking. This thesis underscores the need for indigenisation as a complementary strategy to help reverse the deterioration, and to maximise gains from massive investments in peacebuilding.

In the aftermath of explosive civil wars in Africa during the 1990s and 2000s, the establishment of multi-party elections has often been heralded by the West as signaling the culmination of the conflict and the beginning of a period of democratic rule. However, the outcomes of these elections are very rarely uniform, with just as many countries returning to conflict as not. Here, David Harris uses the examples of Sierra Leone and Liberia to examine the nexus of international and domestic politics in these post-conflict elections. In doing so, he comes to the conclusion that it is political, rather than legal, solutions that are more likely to enhance any positive political change that has emerged from the violence. This book is thus of significance to Western and African policy makers, and also to students and scholars who wish to engage with the critical issues of conflict resolution and reconciliation both in Sierra Leone and Liberia in particular and in the wider region in general.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, manipulation of the democratic process coupled with preexisting political and economic grievances led to years-long civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire. During and after these conflicts, international peacekeeping efforts and humanitarian intervention became the dominant paths for restoring stability by rebuilding the state. Using these three countries as case studies, this manuscript sheds light on internationally driven state building in war-torn West African nations, the problematic nature of the postcolonial state, and the difficulties of securing its people's wellbeing. Connecting peace and conflict, democracy, and international development studies, Bah and Emmanuel argue that there is a clear nexus between the concepts and practices of peace building and statebuilding; that peace building and statebuilding are not domestic matters alone but also matters of global intervention; and that civil wars can be viewed as opportunities for state building through creative postwar partnerships and organization. This study goes beyond the familiar concepts of failed states, R2P, peacekeeping, and peace mediation and introduces and enhances the concepts of state decay, new humanitarianism, people-centered liberalism, and institutional design. In doing so, it provides critical lessons that local and international actors can draw on as they try to figure out practical solutions to the political, economic, and social problems that impede the development of peaceful and democratic multiethnic postcolonial states in Africa and beyond. Applying comparative-historical methods and theory to archival materials and expert interviews, International Statebuilding in West Africa seeks to shift the discourse on civil wars from their causes and implications to the opportunities they provide to rework failed states—and to shift the discourse on African states from their colonial and neocolonial legacies to their shared moral and security interests with the rest of the world.

On December 24, 1989, a group of Libyan-trained armed dissidents, which styled itself the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), attacked Liberian territory from neighboring Ivory Coast. The band of outlaws was led by Charles Taylor, an ex-Liberia government official who escaped from prison in the United States while facing extradition to Liberia for allegedly embezzling nearly one million dollars of public funds. After he fled the U.S. Taylor returned to West Africa, from where he connected with Libya. Sustained by Libyan support, Taylor went to Liberia to spearhead his murderous brand of civil war. Liberia's dictatorial leader Samuel Doe responded to the NPFL invasion by deploying troops in the conflict area, whose senior ranks were dominated by the military strongman's own ethnic group. The government forces carried out collective punishment against local villagers, killing, looting, and raping, while singling out people from certain ethnic groups whom they regarded as supporters of the invasion by reason of their ethnic identity. The NPFL also targeted members of Doe's ethnic group and other ethnic groups that were seen to be supportive of the government, as well as its officials and sympathizers. As the war spread from the interior toward the Liberian capital of Monrovia amid widespread death and destruction, the United States responded to the deteriorating situation by dispatching four warships with 2,300 marines to evacuate Americans and other foreigners who were in the country. The U.S. decided not to intervene to contain the unfolding catastrophe. Officials of the George Bush administration maintained that Liberia, which was then America's closest traditional ally in Africa, was no longer of strategic importance to the U.S. Coincidentally, the Liberian civil war started at the time the Cold War was ending. Located on the West Coast of Africa, Liberia was founded in 1822 by freed black American slaves who were returned to the continent. Their passage was paid by the American Colonization Society, a philanthropic organization, whose members included Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe. The Liberian capital Monrovia is named after Monroe, who was president of the United States at the time Liberia was founded. The country's national flag of red, white and blue stripes with a star, bears close resemblance to the American flag. The systems of government and education, architecture and other aspects of Liberian life reflect American taste. Names of places in the country include Virginia, Maryland, Georgia, Louisiana and Buchanan. More than anywhere in Africa, spoken English in Liberia echoes the rhythms of Black American speech. Liberia served as the regional headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and hosted a Voice of America relay station that beamed American propaganda, as well as other major U.S. security installations during the Cold War. The Americans also operated the Omega Navigation Tower, which was intended to track the movement of ships and planes in the region and beyond. Once one of Africa's most stable and prosperous countries, Liberia was regarded as a haven for international trade and commerce because of the use of the American dollar as a legal tender. Major U.S. investments in the country included the Firestone Rubber Plantation, the world's largest plantation, which produce rubber for Firestone tires, Chase Manhattan Bank, and Citibank. Pan American Airlines (PAN AM) once operated Liberia's Roberts International Airport, where U.S. fighter jets have landing rights. During part of the 1970s, Liberia's per capita income was equivalent to that of Japan. Independent since 1847 as Africa's first republic, Liberia's plunge into anarchy began after a bloody military coup that ended the rule of descendants of the freed slaves, who monopolized political and economic power for over a century. During the 1980 coup, President William Tolbert, who tried to institute some meaningful po

Nach dem langen Bürgerkrieg der 1990er Jahre galt Liberia unter der Präsidentschaft des Warlords Charles Taylor vielen Beobachtern als gescheiterter Staat. Seit der Machtübernahme durch Ellen Johnson Sirleaf im Jahr 2006 wird die Landesentwicklung weithin als Erfolgsgeschichte bewertet. Felix Gerdes zeigt, welche strukturellen Änderungen zu diesem Wandel und damit zur relativen Stabilisierung führten. Seine Analysen machen deutlich, dass die liberianischen Kriege gerade nicht die Zerstörung des Staates bedeuteten, sondern als Teil des Prozesses der Staatsbildung zu verstehen sind. Die Betrachtungen der Kontinuitäten und Brüche der politischen Verfasstheit Liberias ermöglichen eine fundierte Bewertung der anhaltenden strukturellen Probleme der Nachkriegsordnung.

Almost ten years on from the official end of wars in Sierra Leone (2002) and Liberia (2003), attention is shifting from post-war peacebuilding to longer-term development. What headway has been made? What challenges lie ahead? And what lessons that can be learnt? This issue of Accord draws on experiences and perspectives from across societies in both countries to explore comparative lessons and examine progress, and argues that peacebuilding policy and practice needs to concentrate more on people: on repairing and building relationships among communities, and between communities and the state; and on developing more participatory politics and society that includes marginalised groups. It suggests that customary practices and mechanisms can help deliver essential services across a range sectors, and that local civil society can facilitate national and international policy engagement with them.