During the 13-year insurgency (1961-74) in Portuguese Africa, more than 800,000 men and women served in the Portuguese armed forces. Of this number, about 9,000 served as commandos (or about 1 percent). Yet their combat losses ― 357 dead, 28 missing in action and 771 wounded ― represented 11.5 percent of the total casualties (a percentage 10 times that of normal troops). It is well established that these warriors were responsible for the elimination of more insurgents and capturing more of their weapons than any other force during the war. Great pains were taken to stay abreast of the latest enemy operational methods and maintain the 'warrior edge' in the force. This edge, in essence, was an approach to fighting that pushed the commandos always to think of themselves as the hunter rather than the hunted. Officers returning from contact with the enemy were rigorously debriefed, and commando instructors regularly participated in operations to learn of the latest enemy developments. This information was integrated with intelligence from other sources gathered by the military and national intelligence services, and from this current knowledge, training was constantly revised to remain attuned to the enemy and his behavior. The commandos became a breed apart - and their reputation was such that when insurgents discovered a unit deployed into their area, they would generally withdraw until the killers left. This commando training - and its sympathy with the fighting environment - made the commandos the most effective ground force in the Portuguese Army. The commandos were expert practitioners in the art of counterinsurgency, and their practice of destroying the enemy in great numbers quickly and quietly served as inspiration not only to South Africa and Rhodesia, but to the enemy himself. This is the story of the Portuguese commandos: their beginnings, their unique operations and their legacy and influence in subsequent sister units such as the Buffalo Battalion of South Africa.

In 1961, Portugal found itself fighting a war to retain its colonial possessions and preserve the remnants of its Empire. It was almost completely unprepared to do so, and this was particularly evident in its ability to project power and to control the vast colonial spaces of Africa. Following the uprisings of March 1961 in the north of Angola, Portugal poured troops into the colony as fast as its creaking logistic system would allow; however, these new arrivals were not competent and did not possess the skills needed to fight a counterinsurgency. While counterinsurgency by its nature requires substantial numbers of light infantry, the force must be trained in the craft of fighting a ‘small war’ to be effective. The majority of the arriving troops had no such indoctrination and had been readied at an accelerated pace. Even their uniforms were hastily crafted and not ideally suited to fighting in the bush. In reoccupying the north and addressing the enemy threat, Portugal quickly realized that its most effective forces were those with special qualifications and advanced training. Unfortunately there were only very small numbers of such elite forces. The maturing experiences of the Portuguese and their consequent adjustments to fight a counterinsurgency led to the development of specialized, tailored units to close the gaps in skills and knowledge between the insurgents and their forces. This book is about the Fuzileiros or Portuguese marines, a naval force that operated in the riverine littorals of Africa and that was both feared by the enemy and loved by those loyal to Portugal. The Fuzileiros underwent one of the longest and most physically demanding specialist infantry training regimes in the world, lasting some forty-two weeks. Perhaps only 15 to 35 percent of the inductees eventually passed the course and were awarded the traditional and highly coveted navy blue beret. When deployed to Africa, they underwent further acclimation for weeks until they were able to move through the slime and mud of a riverbank with ease, as their lives depended on it. They became experts at riverine warfare and regularly ranged inland on extended patrols, many of which are recounted here. They were comfort able with the uncomfortable fighting environment, and this ability translated into an unpredictability that the enemy feared. This book is the story of how they came to be formed and organized, the initial teething difficulties, and their unqualified successes.

Nominated for the NYMAS Arthur Goodzeit Book Award 2013 Portugal's three wars in Africa in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea (Guiné-Bissau today) lasted almost 13 years - longer than the United States Army fought in Vietnam. Yet they are among the most underreported conflicts of the modern era. Commonly referred to as Lisbon's Overseas War (Guerra do Ultramar) or in the former colonies, the War of Liberation (Guerra de Libertação), these struggles played a seminal role in ending white rule in Southern Africa. Though hardly on the scale of hostilities being fought in South East Asia, the casualty count by the time a military coup d'état took place in Lisbon in April 1974 was significant. It was certainly enough to cause Portugal to call a halt to violence and pull all its troops back to the Metropolis. Ultimately, Lisbon was to move out of Africa altogether, when hundreds of thousands of Portuguese nationals returned to Europe, the majority having left everything they owned behind. Independence for all th Indeed, on a recent visit to Central Mozambique in 2013, a youthful member of the American Peace Corps told this author that despite have former colonies, including the Atlantic islands, followed soon afterwards. Lisbon ruled its African territories for more than five centuries, not always undisputed by its black and mestizo subjects, but effectively enough to create a lasting Lusitanian tradition. That imprint is indelible and remains engraved in language, social mores and cultural traditions that sometimes have more in common with Europe than with Africa. Today, most of the newspapers in Luanda, Maputo - formerly Lourenco Marques - and Bissau are in Portuguese, as is the language taught in their schools and used by their respective representatives in international bodies to which they all subscribe. ing been embroiled in conflict with the Portuguese for many years in the 1960s and 1970s, he found the local people with whom he came into contact inordinately fond of their erstwhile 'colonial overlords'. As a foreign correspondent, Al Venter covered all three wars over more than a decade, spending lengthy periods in the territories while going on operations with the Portuguese army, marines and air force. In the process, he wrote several books on these conflicts, including a report on the conflict in Portuguese Guinea for the Munger Africana Library of the California Institute of Technology. Portugal's Guerrilla Wars in Africa represents an amalgam of these efforts. At the same time, this book is not an official history, but rather a journalist's perspective of military events as viewed by somebody who has made a career of reporting on overseas wars, Africa's especially. Venter's camera was always at hand; most of the images used between these covers are his. His approach is both intrusive and personal and he would like to believe that he has managed to record for posterity a tiny but vital segment of African history.

Between 1961 and 1974 Portugal fought a war to retain its African colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Collectively known as the Campaigns for Africa, the origin of the conflict stems from the post-World War II atmosphere of nationalism and anti-colonial fervor. The Angolan insurgency began in 1961, followed by unrest in Guinea-Bissau in 1963 and Mozambique in 1964. Portugal’s initial actions in Angola were based on foot-slogging by infantry, considered the best method of addressing an insurgency, not only to hunt the enemy but also to keep contact with the population. But in the vast areas of Angola – the majority of which was unsuited to wheeled vehicles – this tactical approach was too painful, and for Portugal the number of troops available was limited. The helicopter was a possible solution, but it was beyond Portugal’s finance resources and it had a tendency to fly over those areas where it was vital to communicate with the population and secure its loyalty. When in 1966 the enemy guerrillas sought a new front in eastern Angola, Portugal needed a force that could combine mobility over rough terrain with the ability to engage insurgents, while maintaining strong links with the population. One of the adaptive solutions to this challenge was found in the past: create horse cavalry units in the form of dragoons that were equally trained for cavalry or infantry service, just as their historical predecessors fought. In this particular case, adaptive tactics involved adjusting existing military methods and means from the traditional and available inventory to craft a solution that would deny eastern Angola to insurgents and support the population there. This story is about imaginative thinking that, instead of a ‘forced abandonment of the old’, led to a ‘resurrection of the old.'

Hearings held before and after the Apr. 25, 1974 coup, known as the Carnation Revolution, to consider the Azores agreement; U.S. military assistance to Portugal and its implications for U.S. relations with African; and developments in Mozambique, Angola, and the new Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Also considers present view in Portugal on the so-called territories in Africa, particularly those of General Antonio de Spinola, former commanding officer of Guinea-Bissau, and the question of Brazil's relationship with Portugal in Africa.

This book gathers the proceedings of the Multidisciplinary International Conference of Research Applied to Defense and Security (MICRADS), held at the Military Engineering Institute, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 8 to 10th May 2019. It covers a variety of topics in systems, communication and defense; strategy and political-administrative vision in defense; and engineering and technologies applied to defense. Given its scope, it offers a valuable resource for practitioners, researchers, and students alike.

A gripping firsthand account of life and combat operations in the elite South African Special Forces, known as Recces, by a veteran Recce officer. The South African Special Forces are one of the most effective—and mysterious—military units in the world. Working in secret on covert operations, the legendary Recces have long fascinated, but little is known about how they operate. Now Koos Stadler, a career officer in the South African Special Forces, shares a revealing chronicle of his life and his experiences in the Border War. Shortly after passing the grueling Special Forces selection course in the early 1980s, Koos Stadler joined the so-called Small Teams group at 5 Reconnaissance Regiment. This sub-unit was made up of two-man teams and was responsible for many secret missions behind enemy lines. Sent to blow up railway lines and enemy fighter jets in south Angola, Stadler and his partner stared death in the face many times.

This in-depth study of U.S. involvement in the modern Middle East carefully weighs the interplay of domestic, cultural, religious, diplomatic, international, and military events in one of the world's most troubled regions. The monumental, five-volume The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts is a must-have resource for anyone seeking to comprehend U.S. actions in this volatile region. Under the expert editorship of Spencer C. Tucker, the encyclopedia traces 20th- and 21st-century U.S. involvement in the Middle East and south-central Asia, concentrating on the last three decades. Beginning with the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War, it covers the 1979–1989 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, allied punitive actions against Iraq during the 1990s, the Afghanistan War, the Iraq War, and the Global War on Terror. Many smaller military actions against Iran, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and other regimes that have been involved in international terrorism are also included. Diplomacy, religion as it pertains to Middle East conflict, and social/cultural developments are other key subjects of analysis, as is the interplay of politics with military policy in the United States and other nations involved in the region.

During the Cold War, the G3 was one of the world's pre-eminent battle rifles. Developed in France and Spain after 1945, the rifle was produced by the German arms manufacturer Heckler & Koch. Adopted by more than 40 countries and produced on licence by many more, it was widely employed during colonial wars in Africa, insurgencies in Latin America and conflicts in the Middle East, but perhaps its widest use was in the Iran–Iraq War. Variants of the G3 have also seen substantial usage among Special Forces including Britain's Special Boat Service and the US Navy SEALs. Semi-automatic versions, especially the HK91 and HK93, remain popular in the United States, and the G3-derived HK11 and HK21 family of light machine guns have also been widely adopted by military and law-enforcement units across the world. Fully illustrated with specially commissioned artwork, this study examines one of the iconic weapons of the Cold War era.

WINNER OF THE 2017 MARTIN A. KLEIN PRIZE In his in-depth and compelling study of perhaps the most famous of Portuguese colonial massacres, Mustafah Dhada explores why the massacre took place, what Wiriyamu was like prior to the massacre, how events unfolded, how we came to know about it and what the impact of the massacre was, particularly for the Portuguese empire. Spanning the period from 1964 to 2013 and complete with a foreword from Peter Pringle, this chronologically arranged book covers the liberation war in Mozambique and uses fieldwork, interviews and archival sources to place the massacre firmly in its historical context. The Portuguese Massacre of Wiriyamu in Colonial Mozambique, 1964-2013 is an important text for anyone interested in the 20th-century history of Africa, European colonialism and the modern history of war.