While constitutions are supposed to be stable documents entrenching a set of rules of the political game, Latin American and Caribbean constitutional development has been characterized by frequent change and instability. We hypothesize that the Latin American tradition for populist governments and heads of state explains this tradition. Contrary to established parties and interests, populist tend to aim at securing the median vote and be supported by non-encompassing interests. They also depict themselves as outside the regular elite and oppose the regularly conduct of politics. It may therefore be in the particular interest of populists to change the constitution to suit their specific needs. Exploring the frequency and direction of constitutional reforms in 42 Latin America and Caribbean countries, we find evidence indicating that populists are more likely to amend the constitution to concentrate power.

Latin America has a long tradition of constitutional reform. Since the democratic transitions of the 1980s, most countries have amended their constitutions at least once, and some have even undergone constitutional reform several times. The global phenomenon of a new constitutionalism, with enhanced rights provisions, finds expression in the region, but the new constitutions, such as those of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, also have some peculiar characteristics which are discussed in this important book. Authors from a number of different disciplines offer a general overview of constitutional reforms in Latin America since 1990. They explore the historical, philosophical and doctrinal differences between traditional and new constitutionalism in Latin America and examine sources of inspiration. The book also covers sociopolitical settings, which factors and actors are relevant for the reform process, and analyzes the constitutional practices after reform, including the question of whether the recent constitutional reforms created new post-liberal democracies with an enhanced human and social rights record, or whether they primarily serve the ambitions of new political leaders.

"Well-written paper discusses institutional reforms needed for dismantling the populist State. Contends that such reforms, no matter how painful, must be made immediately to consolidate gains from earlier reforms"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 57.

Latin American states took dramatic steps toward greater inclusion during the late twentieth and early twenty-first Centuries. Bringing together an accomplished group of scholars, this volume examines this shift by introducing three dimensions of inclusion: official recognition of historically excluded groups, access to policymaking, and resource redistribution. Tracing the movement along these dimensions since the 1990s, the editors argue that the endurance of democratic politics, combined with longstanding social inequalities, create the impetus for inclusionary reforms. Diverse chapters explore how factors such as the role of partisanship and electoral clientelism, constitutional design, state capacity, social protest, populism, commodity rents, international diffusion, and historical legacies encouraged or inhibited inclusionary reform during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Featuring original empirical evidence and a strong theoretical framework, the book considers cross-national variation, delves into the surprising paradoxes of inclusion, and identifies the obstacles hindering further fundamental change.

"Over the past 30 years, Latin America has lived through an intense period of constitutional change. Some reforms have been limited in their design and impact, while others have been far-reaching transformations to basic structural features and fundamental rights. Scholars interested in the law and politics of constitutional change in Latin America are turning increasingly to comparative methodologies to expose the nature and scope of these changes, to uncover the motivations of political actors, to theorise how better to execute the procedures of constitutional reform, and to assess whether there should be any limitations on the power of constitutional amendment. In this collection, leading and emerging voices in Latin American constitutionalism explore the complexity of the vast topography of constitutional developments, experiments and perspectives in the region. This volume offers a deep understanding of modern constitutional change in Latin America and evaluates its implications for constitutionalism, democracy, human rights and the rule of law."--Bloomsbury Publishing.

The study of institutions, a core concept in comparative politics, has produced many rich and influential theories on the economic and political effects of institutions, yet it has been less successful at theorizing their origins. In Fixing Democracy, Javier Corrales develops a theory of institutional origins that concentrates on constitutions and levels of power within them. He reviews numerous Latin American constituent assemblies and constitutional amendments to explore why some democracies expand rather than restrict presidential powers and why this heightened presidentialism discourages democracy. His signal theoretical contribution is his elaboration on power asymmetries. Corrales determines that conditions of reduced power asymmetry make constituent assemblies more likely to curtail presidential powers, while weaker opposition and heightened power asymmetry is an indicator that presidential powers will expand. The bargain-based theory that he uses focuses on power distribution and provides a more accurate variable in predicting actual constitutional outcomes than other approaches based on functionalism or ideology. While the empirical focus is Latin America, Fixing Democracy contributes a broadly applicable theory to the scholarship both institutions and democracy.

"The transformation of politics in Latin America, the consolidation of a democratic consensus in the Anglophone Caribbean, and the able performance of many democratic governments in fashioning economic policies made this book intellectually possible. Most of Latin America's democratic governments have carried economic reforms more effectively than their authoritarian predecessors and have remained stunningly resilient despite many problems. The naysayers have not been proven right. Indeed, even if democratic governments were to be overthrown tomorrow, the history of democratic politics in the 1980s and 1990s is already noteworthy." -- from the Introduction In Democratic Politics in Latin America and the Caribbean, Jorge Domnguez focuses on the successful accomplishments of democratic politics in the region -- a process that nations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa seek to emulate. Domnguez considers the role of British colonial rule and United States policies. But he also examines the development of parties, other civil institutions, and competitive markets, which lend permanence to democracy. He also discusses the prospects for democracy in Cuba and Mexico. Despite recurrent problems, Domnguez concludes, the outlook is good for stable democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean.

By the end of the 1960s, most of Latin America was under repressive military rule. Conversely, the 1980s have seen the emergence of formal, constitutional democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean. Authoritarians and Democrats describes these changes and the future prospects for constitutional government in Latin America.